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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The theological project of Hans Urs von Balthasar contains elements of 
speculation that give the contemporary theologian pause. This is no great secret. 
Mention of his name in a group of theologians will produce as many raised eyebrows as 
enthusiastic nods. Even in the very act of defending his orthodoxy, some of his most 
ardent expositors acknowledge that, much like one of his professed Patristic masters, 
Origen, Balthasar was raising issues within Catholic theology that had either gone 
unexplored or lain dormant for centuries, and in doing so, he was not concerned with 
proposing (imposing) any necessary systematic presentation of them.1 In fact, as will be 
outlined in the first chapter, his antipathy toward most attempts at “systematizing” the 
mysteries of the Faith is a well-documented aspect of his work, theological-style, and 
career. Instead of a system, the bulk of Balthasar’s work seeks to delineate and explore 
various theological themes mined and catalogued in an act of Ressourcement:  
There are any number of theses deserving of development 
which the Fathers initiated, and which, subsequently, as 
theology became systematized, were held unsuitable, 
unimportant, and so left in abeyance; a process of 
exclusion carried further, and with rapidity, in 
Scholasticism from the late Middle Ages to the present.2 
 
                                                          
 1 “Were I to be asked which of my own books gives me the greatest joy […] the answer would be, 
without doubt, my Origen anthology. For in Origen I discovered that brilliant sense of what is Catholic 
which I myself would like to attain.” My Work in Retrospect. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 108-
109. The anthology to which he refers, Spirit and Fire – Origen: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings, 
begins with a fitting epigraph by the subject that could be applied just as well to some of Balthasar’s own 
work in speculative theology: “I want to be a man of the Church. I do not want to be called by the name of 
some founder of a heresy […] if I become a scandal to you, the Church, then may the whole Church, in 
unanimous resolve, cut me off and throw me away.” Origen: Spirit & Fire – A Thematic Anthology of His 
Writings. Translated by Brian Daly. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd., 1984). 
 
 2 My Work in Retrospect. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). 
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What is especially interesting to the scholar of these more speculative elements of his 
oeuvre is discovering one common thesis, picking up the thread, and following it on its 
course of winding development, through the varied lenses of his many volumes. I here 
submit that the subject of sin’s ontological weight, its substance, the very quiddity of the 
morally evil, is one such repeated motif in a theologian whose work is often dubbed 
“symphonic.”  
 Whether in the abstract or the mundane, the issue of sin’s substantiality appears 
as clearly central to many of the speculative ideas Balthasar explored. These encompass 
themes as far reaching (but as deeply intertwined), as his theology of the Trinity, with 
his focus on the eternal “risk” involved in the Father’s act of allowing the existence of 
the “Other” (the Son), through to a soteriology, wherein the Incarnate Son assumes a 
substantially real burden of sin (abstracted from the sinner), and finally on, into his 
deeply divisive interpretation of the destruction of said sin by way of Christ’s removal 
of its whole during his descent into Hell. In all these areas of theology, Trinitarian, 
Christological, and Soteriological, we find Balthasar, proposing bold notions on the 
nature of moral evil. This is all the more striking given the way in which he speaks of 
sin. Balthasar does not employ the normative, Augustinian grammar of privation.  To be 
clear, this is not to say that Balthasar offers any alternative theodicy to the Augustinian, 
or any other, theodicy in the traditional understanding of that word (as literal “God-
Defense”). While the issue of the origin/cause of evil is certainly touched on in the 
course of his wide reaching speculation, Balthasar’s exploration of these issues is more 
interested in a tentative construction of an ontology of evil, one in which the nature and 
essence of this tragic substance is better understood (though never comprehensively) 
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because it is better defined.  If granted the metaphysical or theological “permission” to 
possess a substantial nature, one that gives full weight to the events of the Paschal 
Mystery, sung of in the ancient liturgical acclamation: Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata 
mundi, Balthasar believed that we could better understand what our atonement 
entailed. 
 In normative Christian theology, sin (often expressed liturgically as “the sin of 
the world”) exists, at least in the language used to speak of one crucial instance, in the 
state of its salvific transference, from one subject to another: the Paschal Mystery. In as 
much as this act alone supports some measure of exploration into sin’s ubiety, it also, to 
that extent, justifies an exploration into sin’s substantiality. Ubiety, after all, is a 
particular property of a substance – the act of possessing a location. This medieval term, 
originally used by Scholastic philosophers to help understand how angels, spiritual 
substances, interacted with a world of physical substance, is also at work in this type of 
soteriological language. Substances, in Thomistic thought, are able to exist without 
depending on a relationship with, or in, another substance, which is to say that they are 
not merely accidents of another substance but possess some measure of subsistence.3  
As will become clear, one of the major arguments of this study, outlined in both Chapter 
2 and the Epilogue, focuses on the lack of a working metaphysical taxonomy with which 
to speak meaningfully of sin. If it does not possess substance, or is merely accidental via 
                                                          
 3 “An Individual thing is a substance because it underlies (substands) accidents […]. Subsistence 
is not identical with substance, [but] a thing has subsistence if, unlike an accident, it does not need a 
subject in which to exist.” Armand A. Maurer. Medieval Philosophy. (Toronto, ON: Pontifical Institute of 
Medieval Studies, 1982), pg. 31.  
 I have chosen, for this study, to use the term “substance”, as opposed to “subsistence”, as the 
former implies more of a reification of the subject at hand than the latter, and to that extent, better 
accords with the language of Balthasar, as will become clear in the passages of his that follow. 
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privation in another subject, how do we account for our Scriptural and Liturgical 
language surrounding the sacrum commercium?4 
 Mention of the disparity between Balthasar and the “traditional” Augustinian 
denial of sin’s “substantiality” made a peripheral appearance in 2006-7, when a 
particularly heated exchange began in the pages of First Things over the larger issue of 
the orthodoxy of the soteriology of Balthasar.5 The first salvo sounded from an 
unexpected source: a recent recipient of a doctoral degree from the Vatican’s 
Angelicum, Alyssa Pitstick. Her scholarship, which was to be published in 2007 as Light 
in Darkness: Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of Christ's Descent into 
Hell, was extremely critical of Balthasar’s theologoumenon on the salvific value of 
Christ’s Descent into Hell, as well as openly suspicious of what these perceived 
soteriological innovations also said about his Christology, Trinitarian orthodoxy, and 
ultimately therefore, his trustworthiness as an ecclesial theologian.6 If the source was 
unexpected (a new voice representing a conservative, Neo-Scholastic-driven distrust of 
Balthasar, in spite of his established reputation as a papal favorite), the place of attack 
was equally surprising. First Things had been a regular outlet for one the foremost 
English-language Balthasarian scholars, the late Edward T. Oakes, SJ. While disagreeing 
                                                          
4 The sacrum (or admirable) commercium is probably best defined by one of its earliest expressions, 
Athanasius of Alexandria’s statement that “the Son of God became man so that we might become God”, De 
Incarnatione: 54.3. 
 
 5  The term “traditional”, both here and throughout the course of the present study, should not be 
confused with “Tradition” in the Catholic sense of dogmatic definition by way of implicit or explicit Magisterial  
teaching; instead, it should only designate the majority, or normative, approach – if one exists in an particular  
instance  (i.e. privation models of sin) – among Catholic theologians, past and present.  
 
 6 Alyssa Pitstick, Light in Darkness: Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of Christ's 
Descent into Hell Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2007). 
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with many of Pitstick’s conclusions, it is not my intention here (within this Introduction, 
or within the body of the present study) to address her particular criticisms of 
Balthasar. Instead, mention of her exchange with Oakes is made in order to highlight 
one thing that both scholars seem to agree on: Balthasar was certainly proposing 
something unusual in the way he wrote about sin.  
 
 During her original entry, Pitstick mentions the concept of our direct concern, 
Balthasar’s granting of a realism to sin, at least in the moments comprising the Passion, 
that borders on ubiety: 
The received Catholic theological tradition holds that 
Christ’s death on the cross was satisfactory in virtue of the 
preeminent qualities of his person, that is, his divine 
excellence and his perfect charity. In contrast, Balthasar’s 
soteriology of Christ’s descent depends on quantitative 
penal substitution: In the place of all sinners, Christ suffers 
the punishment for all sins. Humanity is redeemed by Christ’s 
cross insofar as the guilt of all sins is actually transferred to 
him there, but these sins remain to be expiated in Sheol 
through his suffering their punishment in place of the 
sinners who deserved it.7  
 
While disagreeing with the first half of this statement as to what actually consists of the 
“theological tradition” regarding atonement, there is no arguing with the second half, 
with her assessment of Balthasar’s most central conception of the workings of that 
atonement, vis a vi sin.  
                                                          
 7 The whole of the debate between Pitstick and Oakes has been archived in three sections by First 
Things:http://www.firstthings.com/article/2006/12/balthasar-hell-and-heresy-an-exchange  (emphasis, 
mine);followed by http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/003-more-on-balthasar-hell-and-
heresyand closing with: http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/03/responses-to-balthasar-hell-and-
heresy (all accessed 6/2013] 
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 And in the course of Oakes’ first response to Pitstick, while heartily defending 
the orthodoxy of Balthasar on the larger issue of the salvific value of the Descent, this 
same Balthasarian conception of sin is presented with all its idiosyncrasies 
acknowledged: 
Hans Urs von Balthasar is a disturbing theologian. Even 
among some of his most vocal enthusiasts, he seems ‘not 
quite right.’ […] And surely the central reason for that 
uneasiness is Balthasar’s claim that Christ descended into 
the depths of hell in order to rescue, at least potentially, all 
[…] Since Christ is “literally ‘made sin’” in Sheol, Balthasar 
thinks that sin is something like a substantial reality due to 
the energy invested in it by the sinner. 8 
 
Returning to this issue, in the most definitive presentation of it in her aforementioned 
monograph, Pitstick summarizes the situation as follows: 
Balthasar characterizes Christ's experience in Sheol in two 
ways: in one, he stresses hell as the absence of the presence 
of God; in the other, he emphasizes the visio mortis of Sheol 
[…]. Setting aside any questions about the nature of being, 
not being, and the contrary of being, the unity of the two 
approaches might be expressed thus: where God is not, 
there is what-is-not God, in the sense of what-is-contrary-to 
God.9   
 
In short, it is exactly the metaphysical concerns that Pitstick set aside that I would like 
to take up and explore in no little detail. This is especially necessary in light of the 
traditional Catholic (Augustinian and Thomistic) understanding of sin as a privation or 
defect, possessing no ontological value of its own.  How does Balthasar’s soteriology 
work within this non-traditional paradigm? Even if he resisted the idea of a systematic 
                                                          
 8 Ibid. Emphasis, mine. 
 
 9 Alyssa Pitstick, Light in Darkness, 100. Emphasis, mine. 
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theology, does he present a coherent position on the subject of sin’s potential substance 
in the major works that comprise his soteriology? If so, what does he say of its quiddity? 
What of its pathology? It is to these questions that this work devotes itself.  
 However, as the foregoing Pitstick-Oakes debate demonstrates, the issue of sin’s 
substantiality is deeply embedded in several other theological and philosophical 
concerns. With this in mind, it is worth stressing that, however much they may employ 
many of the same subjects in pursuits of different objectives, this study should not be 
read as concerning itself with questions of Theodicy (i.e. with the human 
condition/problem of evil). Nor should the following be read as Harmitology, those 
Biblically-based attempts to define the workings of sin within the individual human 
soul, perhaps best exemplified by the first chapter of Romans, where Paul  presents an 
examination of the cause and effect of idolatry, or the third chapter of James, wherein 
one finds a similar treatment of slander and gossip.  Finally, it most certainly should not 
be read as an attempt to present a Moral Theology of Balthasar, outlining his 
understanding of Christian virtues in need of cultivation and vices in need of avoidance. 
Instead, I present this work as an attempt to construct a metaphysic of evil in 
Balthasar’s work, with a particular eye to questions of ontology.  Further, I propose to 
undertake this effort in two principle ways: first, via exegesis of the central Balthasarian 
texts that bear upon the substantiality of sin (and in the process, demonstrating their 
coherence as a whole) and secondly, to propose central theological, philosophical, and 
personal influences on Balthasar that will help contextualize such passages (and the 
larger whole to which they contribute).   
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Therefore, having proposed that in contradiction to the normative Catholic theological 
tradition on the privative nature of sin, key Balthasarian texts speak of sin that 
possesses substance, it will be my intention to explore the issue in the following way: 
 In Chapter One, I provide the context necessary to demonstrate what this 
present study brings to the ever-growing field of Balthasarian studies. This will be done 
primarily in two ways: first, by briefly outlining the ecclesial reception of Balthasar and 
his theology, and secondly, by exploring some of the posthumous English-language 
efforts to present his work as a whole, as a unified theological-project. From this 
baseline, I’ll look briefly at those few works that have attempted to evaluate, in 
particular, his conception of evil. 
  Having determined that those few works that do look at this aspect of 
Balthasar’s work all tend to avoid ontological engagement, Chapter Two will consider 
one of the reasons for this: the perceived binding nature of the Augustinian theological 
norm of privation. In light of this perception, it will become necessary to explore the 
origins of Augustine’s anti-substantiality stance and to look at those passages from 
Balthasar’s corpus that deal directly with Augustine and this issue. 
 Chapter Three will explore what conception of sin Balthasar proposes in the 
wake of his rejection of the Augustinian tradition, with a close reading of his major 
forays into an ontology of sin, as they appear in his life-long engagement with 
explicating the event and effects of the Passion.  Doing so will reveal Balthasar’s 
indebtedness to a very particular language of “mystical realism,” mined from his 
scholarship in Pauline exegesis and Patristic thought. 
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 Having established the substantiality of sin witnessed to in the Paschal mystery, 
Chapter Four will explore the major philosophical and theological a priori concepts 
that allowed for Balthasar’s development of a notion of substantial sin, primarily ideas 
of primordial chaos and Barthian nothingness.10  Chapter Five will then proceed to 
examine the a posteriori mechanisms of this substantial sin’s instantiation in humanity, 
revealing Balthasar’s deep debt to both F.W.J Schelling’s work in the area of human 
freedom and Maurice’s Blondel’s philosophy of action.  
 Finally, in a short Epilogue undertaken in the manner of Balthasar’s own theo-
poetic tendencies, I hope to bring all of these considerations together into a “pathology” 
of ontological sin, using an oncological metaphor that lends it the metaphysical 
language its tragic existence demands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Throughout the course of this work, the term “a priori” will be used in its normative fashion 
within philosophical discourse as referring to those arguments based on deduction from a set of 
previously established (literally, “before the fact”) philosophical and theological conditions. Likewise, “a 
posteriori”, will be used throughout to refer to those arguments drawn from mundane experience 
(literally, “after the fact”). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Context of Balthasar’s Life, Work & Reception   
  
 
In undertaking an introduction to the life and work of Hans Urs von Balthasar 
(1929-1989), the historian of theology is immediately met with three major challenges. 
In the first instance, she must come to terms with the sheer size and scope of this one 
man’s writing, witnessed to by a bibliography running to 174 pages, with more than 80 
monographs, and well over 100 journal articles. Room must also, of course, be made for 
the primary work of a priest who never rose in ecclesial ordination or rank beyond 
parish pastor: that is, hundreds of homilies and sermons, both those collected for 
publication and the bulk that remain unreleased. Representative of and in many ways 
crowning this prodigious and oft-times overwhelming catalogue looms what has come 
to be known as his Trilogy (or Triptych). This 15-part work represents Balthasar’s life-
long exploration of the central mysteries of Christianity through the prism of the 
transcendental (ontologically coextensive) properties of Being, including the Beautiful, 
represented by the 7 volumes of his Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, the Good 
represented by the 5 volumes of his Theo-Dramatics, and the True, represented by the 
three volumes of his Theo-Logic.  
 Secondly, despite Balthasar’s massive written output, and the corresponding 
effect it has had on Catholic theology over the past 60-plus years, the contemporary 
scholar will find little by way of biographical information with which to better 
contextualize such work; in fact, as of this writing, there remains no full-length, 
scholarly biography of the man behind such major contributions to the Catholica 
(despite, as will be shown, the many extraordinary circumstances just such a resource 
11 
 
would clarify).  However, like almost all other English-language Balthasarian studies, 
given the limited needs on this subject for the purpose here, this lacuna will be filled as 
best as possible with recourse to a few remarks of his own as well as some preliminary 
sketches of his life, education, and ministry, as provided by his cousin, retired Auxiliary 
Bishop of Chur, Switzerland, and Professor Emeritus of apologetics at the Gregorian, 
Peter Henrici, SJ.11 
 Finally, a third challenge arises when, turning from Balthasar and his work, to 
the ever-growing field of critical scholarship on both, one is faced with more than a 
little polemic. At first glance, there appear to be no moderate opinions or options 
regarding Balthasar and his theological heritage. Mention of his name invites the 
extremes of reception. The late Edward T. Oakes, encountered in the First Things debate 
related in the Introduction, summarized this last challenge well when he wrote: 
Many liberal theologians see him as too conservative 
precisely for rooting his thought in the sources of the 
tradition, while on the other hand he is regarded with deep 
suspicion by many Catholics on the traditionalist right for 
his alleged innovations [...] Prescinding from these 
particular issues at least this much can be said about his 
relation to the past: unlike so many self-styled 
traditionalists, he actually knows the tradition.12 
 
However, what Oakes had to say here is by no means restricted to posthumous 
application. As the following brief overview of the contemporary reception of 
                                                          
 11 The most comprehensive of these, though still frustratingly vague in details of childhood, 
family life, personality, etc., would be the following: Peter Henrici, SJ, “Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Sketch of 
His Life” in Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work. Edited by David L. Schindler (San Francisco, CA: 
Ignatius Press, 1991), 7-44. 
 
 12 Edward T. Oakes, S.J., “Balthasar and Ressourcement: An Ambiguous Relationship?” In 
Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology, edited by Gabriel Flynn 
and Paul Murray (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 283.  
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Balthasar’s ministry and work will demonstrate, he was already quite sui generis in the 
conciliar generation of ecclesial polarization, spending time as both perceived 
theological revolutionary and perceived theological reactionary. 
 
A: Balthasar’s Ecclesial Reception 
 
1- Balthasar as Progressive (1930’s – 1969) 
 
 The man who would come to be considered by many the “court theologian” of 
three major post-conciliar pontificates (Paul VI, St. John Paul II, and Pope Emeritus 
Benedict XVI), actually spent the first 30 years of his ministry under a steadily growing 
cloud of ecclesial suspicion. Even his education and spiritual formation would have 
been seen as unusual for the time. After entering the Jesuit novitiate in 1929, having 
first obtained a doctorate in German literature, he became closely associated with two 
scholars who would remain his primary theological mentors for the rest of his life. 
These two fellow Jesuits were themselves regarded with a critical canonical eye for 
their own work, both driven in their respective fields, by a practice of actively engaging 
in a Ressourcement of Catholic thought before its entrenchment into an axiomatic, 
manual-bound, Neo-Scholasticism.  
 The first of these seminal influences was Erich Przywara (1889-1972), whose 
work in Thomism is only beginning to find an American audience after the first English-
language translation of his magnum opus, Analogia Enits, in 2014.13 The title is telling of 
Przywara’s particular preoccupation within Thomistic metaphysics, a preoccupation 
                                                          
 13 Erich Przywara. Analogia Entis – Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm. 
Translated by John Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014). 
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passed on to Balthasar and, subsequently into many of the latter’s works that will be 
used within this study: the analogy of being. This rejection of univocal and equivocal 
language concerning the relationship between Creator and creature, officially 
“canonized” at the 12th Ecumenical Council, Lateran IV, became a matter of no little 
contention among German-language theologians during the interwar years, with 
Przywara defending this Catholic principle during public debates with the great 
theologian of Neo-Orthodoxy in Protestantism, Karl Barth (1886-1968). After the close 
of World War II, when the conversation was able to resume, it was Balthasar who 
stepped into his master’s place in the debates, developing a life-long friendship with 
Barth.14 As will be explored in Chapter 4, besides leading to one of his earliest, popular 
publications, The Theology of Karl Barth, Balthasar discovered in Barth’s theology some 
of the conceptions that would lead to his formulation of sin possessing ontological 
substance.15  
 The second of the major theological influences on Balthasar’s development was 
another Jesuit who was causing quite a stir with his own Ressourcement of a central 
Thomistic conception. Henri de Lubac (1896-1991), who would outlive Balthasar by 3 
years (famously remarking at the latter’s funeral that he was “undoubtedly the most 
cultured man in Europe”), had been under Ecclesial suspicion since his work in the 
great debate over the interaction of the supernatural and natural orders. This suspicion 
                                                          
 14 This fascinating theological friendship has recently been documented in Stephen Long’s 
excellent Saving Karl Barth: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Preoccupation (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
2014). 
 
 15 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth. Translated by Edward T. Oakes (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992). 
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would continue to grow, until the promulgation of Humani generis, in 1950, which 
would result in the silencing of Lubac (as author and teacher) until he would see his 
theology become deeply embedded in the documents of The Second Vatican Council. It 
was not, however, this particular aspect of his work that would draw Balthasar into his 
circle when he arrived in Fourvière for further theological training; rather, it was 
Lubac’s commitment to a Ressourcement of patristic thought. Balthasar himself would 
attempt to define his own work in terms essentially drawn from this goal of the 
movement during this period: 
We proceed in the conviction that […] we are 
recovering a certain stream of the tradition that, in 
modern times, especially in Christian thought, has 
become slack and formed peculiarly stagnant pools. 
Just compare the understanding of the Fathers […] 
or the breadth and sovereign command with which 
an Aquinas could describe it, with the meager 
propositions that are the sum and substance of what 
contemporary manuals of Christian philosophy are 
able to serve up!16  
 
This movement, to make the primary texts of Thomas and pre-Thomistic theologians 
available to a general readership for the first time since Trent, resulted in three major 
patristic monographs by Balthasar (dealing, respectively, with Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, 
and Maximus the Confessor).17 While these works are absolutely central to a proper 
understanding of Balthasar’s own theology, it can be argued, however, that his 
introduction to other members of the Ressourcement circle and their respective areas of 
                                                          
 16 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic, Volume I: Truth of the World (San Francisco: Ignatius Press 
1985), 28. 
 
 17 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Origen: Spirit & Fire –1938; Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to 
Maximus the Confessor. Translated by Brian Daley (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988); Presence & 
Thought: Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995). 
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scholarship were equally formative to his thought. It was during this time with Lubac 
that he was introduced to Jean Daniélou (1905-1974), and his groundbreaking work on 
archaic formulations of Jewish Christian theology, and Henri Bouillard (1908-1981), 
and his deep engagement with the philosophy of Maurice Blondel.18 As will be seen, in 
Chapters 4 and 5, both of these subjects became key to Balthasar’s conception of sin 
with ontological value.    
Besides these personal oases of theological stimulation, Balthasar spoke of the 
15 years of his Jesuit formation in stark terms. He once went so far as to describe the 
experience as follows: 
My entire period of study in the Society was a grim struggle 
with the dreariness of theology, with what men had made 
out of the glory of revelation. I could not endure this 
presentation of the Word of God. I could have lashed out 
with the fury of a Samson […]. It really took Basel, 
especially the soothing goodness of the commentary on St. 
John to lead my aggressive will into true indifference.19  
 
The commentary referred to is an allusion to the longest work dictated to him by a 
woman he believed to be a contemplative and a mystic whom he had met in 1940 and 
who would change the course of his life, Ecclesial career, and theological reception.20 He 
                                                          
 18 Henri Bouillard, Blondel and Christianity (Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1970), & Jean 
Daniélou, The Theology of Jewish Christianity: The Development of Christian Doctrine before the Council of 
Nicaea, Volume One (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964). 
 
 19 Henrici, “A Sketch of His Life and Work”, 13. 
 
 20 This study will not concern itself with the status of Adrienne von Speyr’s life, work, or private 
revelations. While there is good evidence that (St.) Pope John Paul II believed it to be both valid and 
worthy of study, even convening a Vatican sponsored symposium on the issue in 1985, little information 
exists as to the current ecclesial standing of von Speyr’s work. On this particular, if not peculiar, aspect of 
Balthasar’s theological development, the reader is directed first, to his own writings on the topic, 
primarily: First Glance at Adrienne von Speyr (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981) and Our Task: A Report 
and Plan (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994). 
 In addition, two scholarly articles have become central to the question of how to interpret 
Balthasar in light of the influence of von Speyr: Fergus Kerr’s "Adrienne von Speyr and Hans Urs von 
16 
 
encountered Adrienne von Speyr (1902-1967) during his first assignment, having been 
sent to act as student chaplain to the University of Basel, when she was seeking a priest 
to begin her reception into the Catholic Church in 1940.  She soon confided in Fr. 
Balthasar that she had been the recipient of visions and mystic states since the early 
days of her Presbyterian upbringing. Within four years, Balthasar was taking daily 
dictation from her visions and experiences during these reported phenomena. At the 
heart of them, she believed she was being called (and Balthasar, through her) to begin 
the foundations for a lay order that would live in community, under the traditional 
evangelical counsels, to be called the Community of St. John (Johannesgemeinshaft).  
 As the visions and experiences (including reported stigmatization) continued in 
intensity, Balthasar officially asked his superiors in the order to assume the role of 
“ecclesial patron” of this community. After reviewing the request, The Jesuits refused in 
1946. Balthasar, frustrated by this set back, proceeded to ask the order to officially 
review von Speyr’s private revelations and mystical experiences. Disappointment only 
increased when, in 1947, his superior announced that they would not, in fact, rule on 
the genuineness of her case, but instead encouraged Balthasar to leave his work with 
her and prepare for taking final vows. In order to deal with this profound decision, 
Balthasar made a long retreat during 1949, eventually coming to his decision to leave 
the Society of Jesus in 1950, in order to continue what he believed to be a genuine 
movement of the Spirit. He would comment on this troubling time, in his confession 
                                                          
Balthasar" New Blackfriars Volume 79, Issue 923, (January 1998): 26–32 and Matthew Sutton’s "Hans Urs 
von Balthasar and Adrienne von Speyr's Ecclesial Relationship" New Blackfriars Volume 94, Issue 1049, 
(January 2013) 50–63. 
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that, “For me, the Society was of course a beloved homeland: the thought that one might 
have to ‘leave all’ more than once in a lifetime in order to follow the Lord, even an order, 
had never occurred to me, and struck me like a blow.”21  
 With this decision to pursue the foundation of the Johannesgemeinshaft, and 
continue his daily work as theological secretary and spiritual guide to von Speyr, 
Balthasar officially entered into a period of canonical exile. While still a priest, he was 
now without a diocese, an order, or even a university post. Perhaps most importantly 
for the purpose of the arguments herein, this crucial moment in his life left his own 
theological writings, which continued to flow at a surprising rate, largely overlooked or 
outright ignored by his peers.  In fact, one could say that Balthasar became largely 
overlooked and ignored by the institutional Church, even while gaining readers among 
its German-speaking ranks as he began a strenuous life of public lecturing.22 Of course, 
this theological rejection was most glaringly obvious in the fact that Balthasar, one of 
the foremost names in contemporary discussions of conciliar theology, was tellingly not 
invited to participate in any preparatory or session work of the most important 
theological event of his lifetime: the Second Vatican Council. His absence is all the more 
                                                          
 21 Henrici, “A Sketch of His Life and Work”, 22. 
 
 22 Some of the thought expressed during these years as itinerant lecturer and retreat master 
would be gathered for publication in such early work as: 1943’s The Grain of Wheat (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1995), a collection of short reflections and aphorisms for further contemplation or future 
exposition, 1945’s Heart of the World (San Francisco: Ignatius Press: 1987), a sui generis collection of 
startlingly intimate prose-poems, centering around Christological topics, expressed in a dense network of 
Patristic symbolism and typological exegesis), 1955’s Prayer (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), an 
examination of the particularly Christian contributions to the religious experience of prayer, 
contemplation, and meditation); along with 1947’s The Truth of the World  – later to be re-fashioned and 
updated into the first volume of the last section of his Triptych, The Theo-Logic (Theo-Logic, Volume I: 
Truth of the World. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985), and 1950’s A Theology of History (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1994) – both early attempts to synthesize his Przywara-influenced Thomism with what 
Balthasar believed to be central themes of Patristics in need of Ressourcement.  
18 
 
conspicuous in light of how many of his theological friends and peers played such 
central roles there: Lubac, Daniélou, Rahner, Ratzinger, etc. Even the Protestant Barth 
had been invited to observe. This 15-20 year period of theological exile should not be 
forgotten by those who, today, automatically and anachronistically, assume that this 
seeming conservative, an eventual aid to the papacies of both (St.) John Paul II and, 
posthumously, Pope-Emeritus Benedict XVI, had never experienced the role of 
perceived liberal, anti-Roman theologian.  
 
 
2 - Balthasar as Court Theologian (1969-1988) 
 
 
 It is interesting to note that when the tide of opinion regarding Fr. Balthasar’s 
theology did begin to turn, it did so among non-Catholic sources. 1965 saw him win the 
Orthodox-based Golden Cross of Mount Athos Prize in theology, primarily for his work 
in Patristics. An honorary doctorate in Theology followed the same year from the 
Protestant University of Edinburgh. Finally, on the strength of his highly reviewed, 
newly collected essays (dedicated to a young Fr. Ratzinger), and on the publication of 
the first 3 volumes of the Theological-Aesthetics, two bulwarks of the German Catholic 
university system followed suit, with both Universities of Munster and Freiburg 
conferring similar honors. Finally, Roman attention to Fr. Balthasar, was caught, and in 
1969, by appointment of Pope Paul VI, he joined the newly formed International 
Theological Commission, alongside the likes of Ratzinger and Rahner. Balthasar would 
hold this post, on the Commission convened to oversee questions raised in the wake of 
the perceived doctrinal changes of the Council and to advise – when called upon – the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, until his death, in 1988. 
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 In the twenty years between his appointment to the Commission and his death, 
Balthasar’s theological reputation continued to grow at a rapid pace. Passing quickly by 
his 1984 reception of the inaugural Paul VI Prize in Theology, awarded by (St.) Pope 
John Paul II, one of the most telling signs of his theological reputation and influence, 
especially among the Curia and within the Apostolic Palace, remains the strange honor 
of being the only theologian quoted in an Apostolic Letter while still alive and actively 
writing.23 1987’s Muleris dignitatem (On the Dignity and Vocation of Women), the 
document largely seen as having introduced an official ban on women’s ordination into 
Magisterial-level teaching, quotes an essay of Balthasar’s in note 55, to Section 6, 
reading, “A contemporary theologian has rightly stated that Mary is 'Queen of the 
Apostles without any pretensions to apostolic powers: she has other and greater 
powers' (H. U. von Balthasar)."24 Finally, a year later, after two previous attempts had 
been declined, (St.) Pope John Paul II demanded that Balthasar accept his invitation to 
be named Cardinal. Balthasar, however, again escaped the appointment by cause of his 
sudden death in the June of 1988, two days before his elevation.  
 However, even – and perhaps especially – his death, and the obsequies of his 
funeral, display the esteem with which the ecclesial community had come to accept this 
once rouge theologian. They also offer historians of theology a unique chance to hear 
the Church, in an official stance, endorse a scholar’s work in a manner not seen since 
Her (eventual) embrace of Aquinas. 
                                                          
 23 “An unusual departure from the tradition of not quoting living theologians” in The Legacy of 
John Paul II (New York, NY: Continuum Books, 2008), 32. 
 
 24 http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1988/documents/hf_jp-
ii_apl_19880815_mulieris-dignitatem.html (Accessed 6/15/2015). 
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 While the Pope could not attend the funeral in person, he sent the following 
telegram to be read by “Then” Cardinal Ratzinger, Prefect of the Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith:  
It is my particular desire […] to show the deceased, on the 
occasion of his burial services, a final honor through a 
personal word of commemoration. All who knew the 
priest, von Balthasar, are shocked, and grieve over the loss 
of a great son of the Church, an outstanding man of 
theology and of the arts, who deserves a special place of 
honor in contemporary ecclesiastical and cultural life […]. 
Your participation at the solemn funeral services, very 
reverend Cardinal [“Then” Ratzinger], will be an 
expression of the high esteem in which the person and the 
life work of this great priest and theologian are held by the 
Holy See.25 
 
Having conveyed these papal sentiments of praise, Ratzinger himself delivered the 
funeral homily. But it is to Ratzinger’s words after his elevation as Pope Benedict XVI 
that will next be quoted at some length, in order to establish the fact of the ecclesial 
respect, if not implied canonization, of Balthasar’s theology at this period.  
 During a Balthasarian convention celebrating the centenary of his birth in 2005, 
the now Pope Emeritus proclaimed: 
I am convinced that his theological reflections preserve 
their freshness and profound relevance […], and that they 
incite many others to penetrate ever further into the depths 
of the mystery of the faith, with such an authoritative guide 
leading them by the hand. The example that von Balthasar 
has given us is […] that of a true theologian who in 
contemplation had discovered a consistent course of action 
for giving Christian witness in the world. […] With these 
sentiments, I encourage all of you to continue, with interest 
and enthusiasm, your study of the writings of von Balthasar 
                                                          
 25 “Telegram from Pope John Paul II: June 30, 1988 in Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work. 
(San Francisco: Communio Books, 1991), 289. Emphasis, mine. 
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and to find ways of applying them practically and 
effectively.26 
 
While the encouragement to further Balthasarian scholarship should, of course, be 
taken in the context of the Pope’s intended audience, his continued esteem for 
Balthasar’s theology is clear. In point of fact, it is also evident in the latest, and 
purported last of Ratzinger/Pope Emeritus’ texts, the 2016 Last Testament, a book 
length interview containing the following exchange:   
Q: HANS URS von BALTHASAR […] WHEN DID YOU MEET? 
 
A: I’d already read him as student, of course. In 1949, I was at 
a lecture he gave at the University of Munich. In Freising, I 
was already utilizing some of his ideas in my lectures. I first 
met him personally in Bonn, in 1960 […]. We simply 
understood each other very well, from the first moment on … 
From then on, Balthasar became a household word for me. 
Here, the theology of the Fathers was present, a spiritual 
vision of theology, which genuinely developed out of faith and 
contemplation, which goes down to the depths and is new at 
the same time […], a synthesis of erudition, genuine 
professionalism, and spiritual depth.  That was what 
enraptured me. From then on, we were connected to each 
other. 
 
Q: REAL KINDRED SPIRITS? 
 
A: Certainly; even if I can’t keep up with his erudition. But the 
inward intention, the vision was always the same. 
 
Q: YOU COULDN’T KEEP UP? 
 
A: No, absolutely not. Really. It is unbelievable what this 
person has written and done.27 
                                                          
 26 “Message of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Participants in the International Convention on 
the Occasion of the Centenary of the Birth of Hans Urs von Balthasar”, 
http://www.ignatiusinsight.com/features2005/benxvi_praiseshub_oct05.asp (Accessed, 5/20/16). 
Emphasis, mine. 
 
 27 Joseph Ratzinger, Pope Emeritus Benedict XVIth: Last Testament— In His Own Words. 
Translated by Jacob Philip (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 145-149.  
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 These laudatory passages appear here at length to, once again, emphasize the 
drastic polarization of Balthasar, and his work, even during his lifetime. His early 
Ressourcement connections and publications, coupled of course with the institutional 
Church’s initial reaction to his work with von Speyr, and what he perceived to be the 
genuine commencement of a new charism, led him and his ideas to an early (in fact, 
original) perception of him as a progressive liberal. After all, one of his more famous 
publications from this time boldly proclaimed a theological agenda to “raze the 
bastions” of the hold that Neo-Scholasticism had upon the Church’s teaching 
Magisterium.28 However, Balthasar’s later reception, almost 30 years after his initial 
ordination, finds him deeply informing the theological language and paradigm of two 
Pontificates, which would include the publication of binding Church documents (not the 
least of which is, of course, the 1994 publication of the Catechism of the Roman Catholic 
Church).  And, while one would be hard-pressed to apply any Euro-centric Theological 
model to Pope Francis, it is also of some note that three of the touted “papabile” of the 
past two conclaves (2005 and 2015) are pronounced Balthasarians, each having 
worked with him at one point, and each having written at least one major volume on his 
theology. These include the now retired Cardinal-Archbishop of Milan, Angelo Scola (b. 
1941); the previous Primate of Canada and Archbishop of Quebec, Cardinal Marc 
Ouellet (b. 1944); and most notably, Archbishop of Vienna and Editor of the 
aforementioned Catechism, Cardinal Christoph Schönborn (b. 1945). If Balthasar’s 
theology is to continue to have a contemporary role in issues regarding the 
                                                          
 28 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Razing the Bastions: On the Church in This Age (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1993). 
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Magisterium, it will largely be due to the efforts of the last. Cardinal Schönborn 
continues his engagement with Balthasarian themes in his scholarship and writing, 
while also having become a trusted advisor to Pope Francis on theological matters, 
having been most recently tasked with explaining possible confusion over the 
promulgation of  Amoris laetitia, in 2016. 
 But the polarization of Balthasar’s theological project promises to continue, as 
noted in the introduction, with the recent work of Alyssa Pitstick. In fact, in response to 
the above and similar citations in praise of Balthasar that had been used to attack the 
conclusions of her first text on Balthasar, her second work, 2016’s Christ’s Descent into 
Hell: John Paul II, Joseph Ratzinger, and Hans Urs von Balthasar on the Theology of Holy 
Saturday, was written to address the relationship between these Churchmen and 
Balthasar’s thought concerning his most infamous theologoumenon.29 While one can 
find profound disagreement with her seeming unwillingness to dialogue with the 
theology of the Ressourcement, by default dismissing 75-100 years of crucial Catholic 
thought, including Magisterial teaching, Pitstick’s work is important in that it stands as 
a reminder that the theological reputation of Hans Urs von Balthasar is far from settled, 
even after two pontificates of avowed support. However, for the purposes of the 
present examination, it is important to analyze the context of the earliest English-
language studies of his work as a whole, as a systematic project, in order to then survey 
the subset that have dealt with Balthasar’s theology of sin and evil. 
 
 
                                                          
 29 Alyssa Pitstick. Christ’s Descent into Hell: John Paul II, Joseph Ratzinger, and Hans Urs von 
Balthasar on the Theology of Holy Saturday, (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2017). 
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B: Context of the Earliest English-Language Studies of Balthasar’s Theology 
 
 
 While little substantial scholarship on Balthasar’s work was undertaken in 
English during his life (besides early translations and a first wave of dissertations 
completed for British and American universities), critical scholarship began in earnest 
shortly after his death. In briefly surveying three of the most important “Balthasarian” 
scholars, David L. Schindler, Edward T. Oakes, SJ (+2013), and Aidan Nichols, OP, 
similarities quickly present themselves. All three were among the first translators of 
Balthasar’s work into English. All three would eventually write or edit major 
introductory works on his theology, and would continue their respective scholarship 
largely within the pages of three major theological journals. As Balthasar himself was 
responsible for the founding of one of these journals, Communio: An International 
Catholic Review, it is to David L. Schindler, named editor-in-chief of the North American 
branch in 1982, that the examination should turn first.  
 Communio was founded by Balthasar, alongside Lubac and Ratzinger, in order, 
essentially, to continue the Ressourcement school of theology in a post-Conciliar setting. 
In this respect, when viewed in light of the Aggiornamento-minded Concilium (founded 
by Congar, Küng, and Rahner), that had begun publication in 1965, it is often reduced to 
one side of a theological binary that does little justice to the complexity of thought 
offered by both “camps.” Regardless of its origins, or perceived “pole,” by the late 70’s 
Communio had begun to publish the first of its English-language issues. In 1978, the 
North American branch held its first symposium devoted to Balthasar’s theology 
(inaugurating a tradition to be repeated in 1990, 2005, and 2015), having by then 
published well over 50 articles and excerpts of his works. In 1991, under the guiding 
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hand of Schindler as editor and contributor, one of the central volumes in English-
language Balthasarian studies was published under the fitting title Hans Urs Von 
Balthasar: His Life and Work (1991).30 It featured such scholars as the above-mentioned 
Ouellet and Schönborn, in addition to (now Cardinal) Walter Kasper, and ranged in 
Balthasarian studies of exegesis to ecumenism. Schindler later repeated the task with a 
second collection of essays (largely adapted from papers presented at the 2005 
symposium), entitled, Love Alone is Credible: Hans Urs Von Balthasar as Interpreter of 
the Catholic Tradition (Eerdmans, 2008), widening both the scope of authorship and 
topics treated.31 
 Though Schindler may be seen as a primary point of transmission to a North 
American audience, his own scholarly interests have primarily centered on Balthasar’s 
contribution to a philosophy of Christian culture, and he has written much on this topic. 
However, the first comprehensive study and attempted systematic presentation of 
Balthasar’s theological system came from another source, the aforementioned Edward 
T. Oakes, SJ (1948-2013). His Pattern of Redemption: The Theology of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, first appearing in 1994, is the work of scholarship and translation that has 
long kept its place as the primary, though by no means simple, summa.32 This 
accomplishment in focusing on the structure and methodology behind Balthasar’s most 
                                                          
 30 David L. Schindler, (editor). Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work (San Francisco: 
Communio Books, 1991). 
 
 31 David L. Schindler (editor), Love Alone Is Credible: Hans Urs von Balthasar as Interpreter of the 
Catholic Tradition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 2008). 
 
 32 Edward T. Oakes, Pattern of Redemption: The Theology of Hans Urs Von Balthasar (New York, 
NY: Continuum Intl. Pub Group, 1994). 
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important work, the volumes comprising his Triptych, also foregrounded certain motifs 
that have since become synonymous with Balthasar’s theology, such as the theological 
application of metaphysical structures, including the analogy of being and the 
transcendentals, as well as the soteriological concerns surrounding the Christological 
acts of kenosis and Descent (into Hell), etc. Oakes’ work for the publication, First Things, 
would go on to provide him with an organ with which to further research these 
complex Balthasarian themes.33 His aforementioned (see Introduction) passionate 
defense of what he perceived to be, at times, ad hominem attacks by Pitstick against the 
orthodoxy of Balthasar would result in 2007’s systematic and convincing "Descensus 
and Development: A Response to Recent Rejoinders".34 And in 2013, the year of his 
death, he released an article that was both a distillation of his previous work and a 
summation of the problems he foresaw for future Balthasarian study, “Reason 
Enraptured: Commending the Theological Project of Hans Urs von Balthasar”.35 
 Finally, turning from the North American reception of Balthasar, and particularly 
from the scholarship of Oakes and his introduction of Balthasar’s theology of the 
Triptych, the British Aidan Nichols, STM – OP also deserves examination.36 Having first 
                                                          
 33 First Things, is published by the Institute on Religion and Public Life, having been founded in 
1990 by Richard John Neuhaus.   
 
 34 Edward T. Oakes, SJ. “Descencus and Development: A Response to Recent Rejoinders,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology Volume 13, Issue 1 (January 2011): 3–24. Besides Oakes’ 
work, on the subject another contributor to First Things, Paul J. Griffiths, offers perhaps the best defense 
against Pitstick’s arguments in his “Is There a Doctrine of the Descent into Hell?” PRO ECCLESIA: A Journal 
of Catholic and Evangelical Theology Vol. XVII No. 3 (Summer 2008): 257-268.  
 
 35 Edward T. Oakes. “Reason Enraptured: Commending the Theological Project of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar “First Things (April 2013): 45-50. 
 
 36 As opposed to the present understanding of a “Masters” degree, and in keeping with the 
medieval university system which produced the likes of Dominican Masters such as St. Albert Magus and, 
of course, Aquinas, this Sacrae Theologiae Magister is awarded by the Order of Preachers on those 
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published work on the theology of Ratzinger in the late 1980’s Nichols began to turn his 
academic attention to one of the sources Ratzinger’s thought. In 1998, the first of (what 
has thus far run to) five volumes of commentary on Balthasar’s work appeared, with 
1998’s The Word Has Been Abroad: A Guide through Balthasar’s Aesthetics.37  This was 
followed in 2000 by No Bloodless Myth: A Guide through Balthasar’s Dramatics, and in 
2001, with Say It Is Pentecost: A Guide through Balthasar’s Logic.38  
 Like Schindler, at Communio, and Oakes, via First Things, Nichols has also had the 
benefit of continued work in, and dialogue on, Balthasarian themes through his order’s 
journal of New Blackfriars. His authoritative voice on the subject has drawn many other 
Balthasarian contributions to the journal, from the likes of the historian of 20th-21st 
century Thomism, Fergus Kerr, to the retired Archbishop of Canterbury, and early 
ecumenical voice in Balthasar’s reception, Rowan Williams. 
  The foregoing survey of the three major early, English-language Balthasarian 
scholars should not, in any way, imply that there have been no Balthasarian critiques. 
Two points require some consideration in this regard. First, those scholars who 
expressed concerns or suggested correctives to Balthasar’s work in English during his 
                                                          
individuals who are recognized, through the value of their teaching and publications, as an ecclesial 
theologian of the highest order. Nichols was awarded the title, by the Master of the Order (who, as such, 
also holds the office of Grand Chancellor of the Angelicum), in 2003.  
 
 37 Aidan Nichols. The Word Has Been Abroad: A Guide through Balthasar’s Aesthetics (Washington, 
DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998). 
 
 38 Aidan Nichols, No Bloodless Myth: A Guide through Balthasar’s Dramatics (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2000), and Say It Is Pentecost: A Guide through Balthasar’s Logic 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2001); as well as two further volumes: Scattering 
the Seed. A Guide through Balthasar's Early Writings on Philosophy and the Arts (Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2006), and Divine Fruitfulness: A Guide Through Balthasar's Theology Beyond 
the Trilogy (2007). 
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lifetime, and the first 5-10 years after his death (when his Papal esteem was perhaps still 
in its ascendancy), were few. It was not until the three scholars mentioned above had 
already begun to lay the groundwork for a largely positive reception that more skeptical 
voices made themselves heard. Secondly, when these critical works did begin to appear, 
they tended to argue against specific issues within Balthasar’s theology as opposed to 
commenting upon his theological project in toto, unlike the more comprehensive 
contexts set by the studies of an Oakes and or Nichols. Representative of this work, 
mention should be made of Susan Ross’ 2005, “Moving Beyond Balthasar”, the first 
feminist critique of his (now) much-maligned use of patriarchal language and 
paradigms; and Roberto Guizueta’s, Christ Our Companion: Toward a Theological 
Aesthetics of Liberation, which features discussion of Balthasar’s euro-centric 
understanding of beauty, in light of a Latina/o theology of Liberation.39  One more 
recent, corrective study that does, in fact, finally approach a more comprehensive 
critique of his whole theological project appeared in Karen Kilby’s 2012 (appropriately 
titled), Balthasar: a (very) critical introduction.40 Her work highlights a new phase of 
contention in Balthasarian criticisms by focusing on the theologian’s style, specifically 
what she refers to as his tendency to write from a “God’s-eye-view”.41 While this is, 
                                                          
 39 Susan Ross, “Women, Beauty, and Justice: Moving Beyond Balthasar,” Journal of the Society of 
Christian Ethics 25, 1. (2005): 79-98 and Roberto Goizueta, Christ Our Companion: Toward a Theological 
Aesthetics of Liberation. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2009). 
 
 40 Karen Kilby, Balthasar: a (very) critical introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2012). Some of the better Balthasarian responses to Kilby’s work, and her answers 
to them, can be found in an issue of PRO ECCLESIA: http://www.e-ccet.org/pro-ecclesia/#fall2k15 
(accessed June 2015). 
 
 41 “Though he never draws attention to himself, or to his own role as a theologian, Balthasar's 
programmatic deployment of [aesthetic] images, in fact, silently positions him quite distinctly in relation 
to his readers and his materials. … And Balthasar's use of the image of the drama, fascinating though it is, 
seems implicitly to locate him well above all that he speaks of, so that ultimately he is in a position to 
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again, not a study intended to argue for or against such criticism, with the task of 
outlining Balthasar’s understanding of sin ever in view, it is however interesting to note 
this turn toward talk of style.  As another Balthasarian scholar has recently noted, this 
issue is deeply tied to our present task –  
Balthasar's metaphors are particularly at risk when 
transposed out of the context in which they are used and in 
which they take their meaning, and outside of the ontology 
that supports and controls them. However, while prone to 
ambiguity, Balthasar's use of metaphor is richly evocative 
and, indeed, most apt to the sheer beauty and glory of the 
mystery he wishes to convey.42  
 
It is exactly this attention to the “supporting ontology” that should be brought to his 
statements on evil as substantial, especially due to its centrality in his soteriology. With 
this in mind, we turn to those few scholars who have completed scholarship on the 
issue. 
 
C: A Short Survey of Work Addressing Balthasar’s Conception of Moral Evil 
 
 
 Having set the context for English-language studies of Balthasar’s work in 
general, we turn our attention now to three contributions toward a response to the 
question at hand: Balthasar and the nature of sin/moral evil. As will become clear in 
doing so, if these scholars do speak of moral evil, they do so in light of the classic 
theodicy approach – that is, looking for the cause of the first sin, be it human or angelic, 
and subsequently attempting to defend/attack either the concept of divine 
                                                          
survey not only all of world history, but all of history in relation to God, and God's own inner life, and 
describe the whole to us as a single play”. Kilby, 5. 
 
 42 Anne Hunt, 88 
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omnipotence, or divine benevolence, on the basis of that information. As already stated 
above, however, the present work is not concerned with the “legal proceedings” as it 
were of an attempted “God-Defense”, and certainly does not wish to concern itself with 
issues of morality or ethical systems, but rather with the metaphysics underlying some 
of Balthasar’s bolder/more controversial soteriological statements on the issue. These 
same statements that alarmed both Pitstick and Oakes as “unorthodox” or “troubling” 
(i.e. innovative and anti-traditional) strike me as a carefully mined Ressourcement of 
Archaic, Patristic, and Medieval perspectives on the Paschal Mystery. Therein, Balthasar 
wrote of the substantial nature of human sin, amassed and assumed by Christ on Good 
Friday, passively experienced as the viso mortis in His descent to Sheol on Holy 
Saturday, and finally overcome (from within) on Easter. To be even more precise, the 
area of metaphysics underlying this soteriology that needs further elucidation is 
ontological in nature. While the works mentioned do attend to metaphysical questions 
(these would be hard to avoid in writing of Balthasar), few of those questions are 
ontological in nature. None of them try to explain what, for Balthasar, sin is – 
qua sin. 
 The first of these three works to appear did so even before the more holistic 
studies of Balthasar’s project mentioned above (Oakes, et al). Gerard O’Hanlon’s 1990 
The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar not only introduced 
Balthasar’s idea’s on the divine nature and humanity’s conception of impassibility to 
American theologians, but it remains one of the foremost studies on the topic over 25 
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years after its initial publication.43  His contributions to this particular question in 
Balthasarian studies, which will be explored further in Chapter 5, centers around his 
foregrounding of Balthasar’s ideas on “unterfessing”, a German term he employs to 
stress the metaphysical grounding of all extra-Divine existences within the intra-Divine 
procession of Son from Father. However, as much as O’Hanlon’s work deals with 
Balthasar’s assertions that, because of this cosmic Christological structure, all of 
humanity’s collective “no’s” to the good are, while still free, subsumed in (because only 
possible through) the Divine “yes”, the nature of evil itself remains a secondary concern, 
never fully explored. 
  Nicholas Healy’s, The Eschatology of Hans Urs von Balthasar: Being as 
Communion has received the most attention among Balthasarian scholars of late. This is 
not unexpected; Balthasar’s eschatological ideas are still those that draw the most 
readers into his theology. His hope (never expressed as a certainty) for universal 
salvation and an Origen-like apocatastasis, most clearly presented in the late-in-life 
Dare We Hope ...?, is one of the major topics of dispute in his theological reception, 
deeply tied to his theology of Christ’s Descent.44 However, for Healy, in exploring these 
themes, “evil” while a consideration, remains so only in universal-eschatological 
terms.45 While he reaches similar conclusions as those of O’Hanlon on Balthasar’s 
                                                          
 43 Gerard O’Hanlon, The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
 44 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Dare We Hope “That All Men Be Saved”? – With a Short Discourse on 
Hell. Translated by David Kipp and Lothar Karuth. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989). 
 
 
 45 Nicholas Healy, The Eschatology of Hans Urs von Balthasar: Being as Communion (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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conception of the Christological girding of all reality, Healy’s proposal, that the goal of 
all reality is to function according to this ontic law (kenosis, or “being as communion”), 
is not applied to sin, is not examined as the “control group” against which sin could be 
examined. 
 One finds a similar situation at work in Jacob Friesenhahn’s The Trinity and 
Theodicy: The Trinitarian Theology of von Balthasar and the Problem of Evil.46   Once 
again, while some metaphysical consideration is afforded to the possibility of “evil”, 
given Balthasar’s understanding of the “distance between the Persons of the Godhead, 
(as seen in O’Hanlon, and Healy), he offers no talk of its substantiality, its quiddity. As 
one reviewer accurately summarized, “His goal here is to reassess the Trinitarian 
theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar and to uncover its potential as a resource for a new 
constructive response to the ‘problem of evil’.”47 In short, an attempt to present a 
Balthasarian response to “the problem of evil” once again prevents an actual 
examination of what evil is. 
 It takes very little sifting through this brief survey to uncover the common 
thread present in all three studies, each an otherwise excellent exploration of its 
respective theodicical questions via direct discussion with Balthasar’s work. The 
problem, from the perspective of this study, however, is the shared refusal to enter into 
the realm of the ontological – even while hard at work in metaphysics. This is to say, 
quite plainly, that none of these works, or any others that I have encountered thus far in 
                                                          
 46 Jacob H. Friesenhahnn, The Trinity and Theodicy: The Trinitarian Theology of von Balthasar and 
the Problem of Evil (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2011). 
 
 47 Thomas Cattoi. Review of above (see no. 32) in Theological Studies, 74, 1. (March 2013): 212-
214. 
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the rapidly expanding field of Balthasarian studies, deals with the question most 
repeatedly raised in any prolonged engagement with his work on evil: the substantiality 
of sin. The cause of this avoidance should be quite clear. The question of sin’s quiddity is 
never raised because the traditional (note: not The Tradition’s) theological grammar 
does not even allow for the question to be, properly speaking, posed. And so this study’s 
first task will be to turn and face the imposing wall that seems to deflect further 
exploration into the present subject: Augustine’s theory of moral evil as accidental, and 
specifically privative of substantial existence per se.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Balthasar and the Privative Tradition 
 
 
 Balthasar’s critics and I agree on at least one point, he is undoubtedly in conflict 
with a long and eminent tradition, well entrenched in Catholic theology, of viewing 
moral evil as non-substantial and, in fact, privative of any existence per se. In just one 
instance of his very conscious and open divergence on this issue, he boldly proclaims 
that, “because of the energy man has invested in it, sin is a reality, it is not nothing.”48 
The air of challenge here is clear, a challenge to a theological tradition in which he 
himself was steeped. Before exploring Balthasar’s divergence from it, however, the 
extent, if not existence, of the authoritative nature of this tradition of viewing sin as 
privative needs clarification.  
 
A: Augustinian Origins  
 The language that the privative tradition depends upon is strictly philosophical 
in nature, and therefore not a matter of theology per se. It is important, however, to 
both stress and clarify that use of “strictly” – after all, a great deal of Christian doctrine 
is expressed by means of a philosophical “scaffolding.” The important distinction, of 
course, being that none of the datum of faith seeking such expression arise from 
philosophy. Perhaps, then, it would be better to say that, for Balthasar, it is precisely 
sin’s theological nature that renders it ultimately irreducible to a complete 
philosophical systematization. As he stated in the course of discussing the theological 
                                                          
 48 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume IV –The Action (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1980), 314. 
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truths present in the art of ancient Greek drama, especially the ritualized performances 
of the great tragic cycles, the spectator was confronted with"[…] guilt which cannot be 
morally quantified any more than it can, through equation with finitude, be 
metaphysically wished away, for indeed, the only proper description for it is 
theological."49 
 In point of fact, the language of the Catechism of Catholic Church supports this 
claim. When speaking of the existence of evil (a datum of faith, if not personal 
experience, and hence its proper inclusion in a catechetical context) it does so by citing 
the opening words of Augustine’s arguments for a privative explanation of moral evil: 
God is infinitely good and all his works are good. Yet no one 
can escape the experience of suffering or the evils in nature 
which seem to be linked to the limitations proper to 
creatures: and above all to the question of moral evil. 
“Where does evil come from? I saw whence evil comes and 
there was no solution," said Saint Augustine […]50 
 
The Catechism, rather tellingly, however, does not follow the great Doctor of the Church 
                                                          
 49 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological-Aesthetics – Volume IV: The Realm 
of Metaphysics in the Antiquity. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 128. In light of Balthasar’s mining 
the tragic, as well as philosophical, Hellenist traditions for further insight into the human condition, see 
his essay “Tragedy and Christian Faith”, from Explorations in Theology, Volume III: Creator Spirit (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1967). While discussing this moment of confrontation mentioned above, 
between the audience and the tragic spectacle of their own lives displayed on stage, the following 
passages seem particularly relevant: “When we consider that such an act of disclosing the human 
situation, in its exposure to the gods, is intended as a cultic, a liturgical act, that here man is held up into 
the light and into the darkness of the gods in the same way as the Flesh and Blood of Christ […], so that all 
those who stand around may see it, and so that the divine Father himself may turn his eye to it, then one 
suddenly sees how exposed this act of disclosure in itself is. (395-6).” He continues: “The drama which 
holds the human situation into the light of the truth, the absolute truth that holds sway between god and 
man, as a sacral symbol, as something that has become possible to see in its totality for a moment, is 
something like a sacrament -- that contains something like grace and redemption in a form perceptible to 
the senses. It does not lie in the mastering and abolition of the fundamental contradictions of existence 
(397) – emphasis, mine. For further elucidation of Balthasar’s ideas on this subject, I recommend the 
work of Christopher Steck, especially his excellent article “Tragedy and the Ethics of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar,” The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics Vol. 21 (2001): 233-250. 
 
 50 Catechism of the Catholic Church (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1994), 385 
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into the subsequent logic at work in his privative argument, despite beginning, as he 
had, with this notion of God’s goodness. Instead, leaving the continuation of these lines 
from The Confessions aside, The Catechism returns to the language of faith, not of 
philosophy, reminding the reader that, “[Augustine’s] own painful quest would only be 
resolved by his conversion to the living God. For ‘the mystery of lawlessness’ is clarified 
only in the light of ‘the mystery of our religion’”.51 This is, as I will argue below, the 
same thinking at the heart of Balthasar’s ultimate rejection of privation as a viable 
theory for exploring the mystery of moral evil, especially as that mystery is revealed in 
a unique way via the Paschal Mystery. Nonetheless, if for no other reason than to better 
situate Balthasar in the context of his divergence from it, it is important to understand 
the privative tradition, at least by way of its most popular (ecclesial) formulation, in the 
work of Augustine. With this in mind, I quote the central passage from The Confessions 
at length here, at the outset of our investigation: 
And it was made clear unto me that those things are good 
which yet are corrupted, which, neither were they 
supremely good, nor unless they were good, could be 
corrupted; because if supremely good, they were 
incorruptible, and if not good at all, there was nothing in 
them to be corrupted. For corruption harms, but, less it 
could diminish goodness, it could not harm. Either, then, 
corruption harms not, which cannot be; or, what is most 
certain, all which is corrupted is deprived of good. But if 
they be deprived of all good, they will cease to be.52  
 
Two issues arising directly from this passage, that of the transcendentality (or 
“ontological-coextension”) of goodness and existence, and the Christian conception of 
                                                          
 51 Ibid. 
 
 52 Augustine, The Confessions (New Jersey: Catholic Book Publishing Co., 1997), 186 
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Creation – as well as of both issues’ respective relationship to Balthasar’s conception of 
evil, will be further explored in Chapter 4.53 For now, it is enough to say that these 
considerations on coextension and on creation lead Augustine to the conclusion that:  
If [corruptible substances] shall be deprived of all good, 
they shall no longer be. So long, therefore, as they are, they 
are good; therefore whatsoever is, is good. That evil, then, 
which I sought whence it was, is not any substance; for 
were it a substance, it would be good.54  
 
While this is certainly the central passage of Augustinian theodicy, the question of evil’s 
nature is implicit in almost all of Augustine’s philosophical-theology— a result, I 
propose, of an ontology deeply rooted in his Neo-Platonically oriented abandonment of 
Manicheism. After all, his faith in the Persian dualism at the heart of Manicheism had at 
one time required the future philosopher-bishop to maintain metaphysical positions on 
the nature of substance that appear logically untenable. The psychology behind this 
commitment, along with many of Augustine’s philosophical self-revelations, have been 
explored by Augustinian scholars for centuries. Recently, Sandra Lee Dixon, has 
continued this tradition in her Augustine: The Scattered and Gathered Self, where she 
confronts the issue directly:  
How an amazingly intelligent man could have associated 
himself with a sect devoted to such fantastic teachings 
baffles many modern scholars. He tells us little of the 
attraction of the Manicheans for him. [But,] their 
                                                          
 53As will be argued, sin need not work according to the coextensive properties of transcendental 
being (i.e., goodness) because said properties apply only to those things that God has created. As I hope to 
demonstrate below, in Chapter 4, Balthasar envisions sin as an act of de-creation, a movement toward the 
disorder and chaos from which creatures were called forth by God into order, at the creative act. The free 
will with which one of these creatures, humanity, is endowed (both by and, to that extent, within the 
bounds of God's free will) seem capable of providing the ontological conditions for creating something 
which is not also good: a paradox in and of itself, a contradiction of reality per se. 
 
              54 The Confessions Book 7, Ch.12 
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explanation of evil spoke to Augustine's own discomfort 
with the topic. […]The problem of evil had so preoccupied 
Augustine that it not only made the Manichaean and their 
answer to it attractive to him, but reinforced his 
attachment to them.55 
 
As to the “fantastical teachings” he was asked to believe, primary among them is the 
idea that that two infinite substances could co-exist in the same reality: an ultimate 
principle of Light and an “equally ultimate” principle of Darkness. This is, after all, the 
very bedrock of Zoroastrian Dualism upon which Mani (216-274 AD) would expound, 
employing the language of Gnostic-Christianity to do so.  As I propose that Augustine’s 
one-time belief in an eternal, personal principle of Evil had a profound effect on his later 
theodicy and philosophy as a whole, especially his rejection of any substantial value to 
moral evil, it would be wise to reconstruct the basics of what we know about this 
mysterious being. 
                    While much of our knowledge of Manicheism comes from Christian (and 
later, Muslim) scholars attempting to dismantle the logic, or defame the practices, of its 
followers (the majority of these works belonging, by far, to Augustine himself), more 
recent scholarship has attempted to reconstruct a basic outline of its major tenets. One 
such work, The Other God, by Yuri Stoyanov, proposes that, “In Mani's synthesis, the 
Gnostic, anti-cosmic dualism of spirit and matter coalesces with the latter Zoroastrian 
type of dualism of the two primordial, irreconcilable principles of good and evil [...].”56 
                                                          
 55 Sandra L. Dixon, Augustine: The Scattered and Gathered Self (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 1999), 83 
& 112 
 
 56 Yuri Stoyanov, The Other God: Dualist Religions from Antiquity to the Cather Heresy (Yale 
University Press: New Haven, 2000), 108.   
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With Mani linked securely back to the metaphysics of Persian Dualism, Stoyanov 
investigates the latter’s cosmogony in more detail, offering, in summary:   
 
In classical Zoroastrian accounts of the new strict dualist 
system, Ohrmazd and Ahriman appeared as two separate 
prime causes existing from the beginning-- two absolutely 
independent and diametrically opposed spirits […]. 
Ahriman perceived the light of Ohrmazd and, obsessed 
with envy and desire for destruction, fashioned from his 
own darkness his destructive 'black and ashen' creation 
and the essence of the demons, an evil (disorderly) 
movement, designed to bring destruction to Ohrmazd 
creatures.57 
 
 While Augustine’s many mentions of his time among the Manicheans offer very 
little discussion directly relating to the nature of Ahriman, I believe that as earlier as the 
2nd and 3rd chapters of The Confessions, Augustine's ontological concerns, inherited by 
way of his time confessing such an ultimate dualism, make themselves quite clear.  
 
Taking up his book-length tale of conversion, Augustine is immediately at pains 
to demonstrate the infinity of God, by way of the rhetoric of his training and subsequent 
fame in Rome: “ What room is there in me where my God may enter […]? Is there 
anything in me that can contain you [...]? Is it the case that, since nothing that is could 
exist without You, therefore whatever is must contain You?”— ending, finally, in the 
existential assessment that, “I would not exist if I were not in You.”58 The Confessions, in 
both name and nature, is a work driven by a compelling first-person, monologue-cum-
autobiography. Within the process of relating his movement toward metaphysical, as 
                                                          
 
 57 Ibid.,39-40 
 
 58 Confessions Book 1, Ch. 2 
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much as religious clarity, it seems appropriate that Augustine begin with questions 
ultimately not reducible to “why am I here?”, but rather much closer to “how am I 
here?”, ontologically speaking, in light of his new-found Christianity and its 
commitment to One, personal, infinite principle: God. Having rejected dualism, can he 
still find room for himself, or will all collapse into monism? From this personal 
epicenter, the same line of questioning begins to expand in scope, to take in the two 
spheres of creation, by asking, “Where then do You pour forth what remains of Yourself 
after You have filled Heaven and earth? Or […] the things that You fill, You fill by 
containing them? […] or are You wholly everywhere, and yet nothing can contain You 
wholly?”59  In short, having abandoned dualism, he ponders its philosophically opposite 
pole of possibility, a monism approaching pantheism. And ultimately, from probing the 
ontological possibility and, to that extent, nature of both self and creation, Augustine 
arrives at the question of the nature of the one infinite principle and cause of both:  
How deeply, even then, did my innermost soul sigh after 
you when, often and diversely and in many and large 
volumes, [the Manicheans] spoke of You to me in empty 
words […]. These fictions had no resemblance at all to You 
as you have now declared to me; for they were only 
corporeal phantoms, false bodies […]. But you, O my Love 
are neither those bodies that we see, though they be in the 
heavens, nor those that we do not see elsewhere […] How 
remote then you are from those fantasies of mine, 
imaginings of bodies that have no being.60 
 
These passages and their like, directly related in the text to his introduction to Neo-
Platonism, are presented in such a fashion that while his conversion, properly speaking, 
                                                          
 59 Confessions, Book 1, Ch. 3 
 
 60 Confessions Book 3, Ch. 6 
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will come in the famous garden scene outlined in Book 8, Chapter 12, Augustine comes 
rather close to making philosophic realization revelatory in nature, demonstrating just 
how deeply these ontological issues were at play in his leaving heresy behind. After 
confessing his Neo-Platonist inheritance, Augustine seems unable (and understandably 
so) to conceive of Ahriman in metaphysically acceptable terms. The Dark One was said 
to be a personal, eternal, spiritual substance. But how can such a being even exist? 
Augustine struggles with this when he realizes that: 
In my ignorance, I was disturbed by these questions, and in 
going away from Truth, I thought I was going toward it, for 
I did not then know that evil is nothing but the privation of 
good, and that it is in reality nothing at all. For how could I 
have discerned this, when my eyes could only discern other 
bodies... Again, I did not know that God is a spirit without 
lengths and breadths of limbs, that he has no corporeal...61 
 
It would still be another 50-odd years before Boethius (480–524) would propose 
what would become the standard philosophical definition of a “person” in his 
Theological Tractates: naturæ rationalis individua substantia.62 However, already in 
Augustine’s struggles, one can appreciate the growing importance of the logic behind 
such a definition, and the fact that it had not yet reached the level of clarity it would find 
in the “last of the Romans”. This is quite clear in Augustine, in the very passages just 
explored, where concepts of substance, and the possible conflation of spiritual ones 
with those material in nature, are at work. In point of fact, I would argue that the logic 
that led Augustine to abandon the idea of any co-infinite principle, let alone one of a 
                                                          
 61 Confessions, Book 3: Ch. 7. Emphasis, mine. 
 
 62 Boethius, Theological Tractates – “Against Eutyches and Nestorius”, Chapter 3: 
http://www.ccel.org/download.html?url=/ccel/boethius/tracts.pdf [accessed 09/05/2015] 
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personally substantial evil, would also bind him, through a perceived consistency of an 
attempted systematization, to reject the possibility of impersonal (but) substantial evil, 
even such a substantial evil that claims to be neither co-infinite nor co-eternal with God 
(even if the datum of revelation seem to refuse such a logic and belie such a 
systematization). For, while all persons are substantive, not all substances need be 
personal, or even animate.  
 I will return to this issue of how a substantial, but non-personal, spiritual 
substance (such as moral evil) may best be classified below. For now, it is enough to 
recognize that when Augustine began to move away from dualism it was primarily over 
issues of ontology, and because of this, one can usually expect ontological issues (i.e. 
privation) to present themselves to the reader as barely below the surface of the 
respective theological reflections in which they appear.   
Balthasar recognized this ontological confusion, directly addressing it in the 
context of the construction of the Augustinian theodicy in two passages from the 
Triptych. In the first, from the second volume of the Theological-Aesthetics, he states: 
Augustine has to press his argument against the Manicheans 
into the finest points of detail and tentatively, but also 
firmly, he makes no exception for the sufferings of the 
rational creature […]. This interpretation, in which 
immanent evil considered transcendentally, becomes good, 
is then used to close the gap left open by philosophy [...]. 63 
 
In short, Balthasar comprehends that Augustine’s classification of evil as privative may 
best be viewed as the result of the latter’s attempts at philosophical systematization (a 
desire born of the confusion caused him by his early Manicheism), but certainly not the 
                                                          
 63 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological-Aesthetics –Volume II: Clerical 
Styles (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1962), 127-128. Emphasis, mine. 
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result of an existential exploration of evil as actually experienced.   
    The second of Balthasar’s direct assessments of the Augustinian theodicy, 
written some 25 years later, in the second volume of his Theo-Logic, continues the direct 
critique of Augustine’s attempt to force something that is, by nature, perhaps an 
ontological paradox into a ready-fit system of logic. Therein, Balthasar feels compelled to 
state that, “[as] far as the New Testament is concerned, this contradiction [moral evil], 
whatever else it may be, is not nothing: “This ‘not nothing’ engendered the speculations of 
Manichaeism. Augustine can escape them only by interpreting evil as a privation.”64 As I 
argued above, Balthasar finds a personal, philosophical reaction (or overreaction) to an 
experience of metaphysical dualism to be at the heart of Augustine’s privative theory. I 
agree, proposing further that the language of ontology being employed is a direct result 
of Augustine's Manichaean revolt and, that to such an extent, and in consideration of the 
fact that Manicheism blamed evil on an eternal person, or agent of action, that this 
ontological language is not being employed for actual metaphysical purposes. Rather, 
this language is being used to construct a theodicy.  
 
 In The City of God, while maintaining the same ontological perspectives on 
display in The Confessions (“For evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good has 
received the name “evil”), Augustine moves the argument further away from our 
concerns of substance to those of causation.65 Which is also to say that he has moved 
away from his consideration of the quiddity of evil and is now concerned with questions 
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properly belonging to a theodicy. The logic is rather clear in this regard. If the question 
at hand is one of causation it is, in essence, a question of agency and, eventually, a 
question of blame. Where blame appears within a very particular 
Theological/Philosophical context as this, a theodicy is usually in the making. A passage 
from the 6th part of the 12th chapter of The City of God illustrates this particular point: 
I ask if it [evil] has been existing in some nature. For if not, 
then it did not exist at all; and if it did exist in some nature, 
then it vitiated and corrupted it, and injured it, and 
consequently deprived it of good. And therefore the evil will 
could not exist in an evil nature, but in a nature at once 
good and mutable, which this vice could injure. […]66  
 
Note how suddenly concerns originally ontic at heart (language dealing, respectively, 
with subsistence, existence, nature, privation, et al.) appear to inexplicably invite 
considerations of the “will”. The same passage continues, displaying in doing so a 
similarly sudden, unexplained transition from metaphysical-ontological terms to those 
theological-theodicical in concern: 
And therefore there could not be from eternity, as was 
suggested, an evil will in that thing in which there had been 
previously a natural good, which the evil will was able to 
diminish by corrupting it. If, then, it was not from eternity, 
who, I ask, made it? 67 
 
Finally, from issues of general causation to a proper examination of efficient causality, 
Augustine has arrived at the question of responsibility for the “making” of evil; the very 
heart of theodicy: 
How, I say, can good be the cause of evil? For when the will 
abandons what is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it 
becomes evil— not because that is evil to which it turns, but 
                                                          
 66 Ibid., XII:6 
 
 67 Ibid 
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because the turning itself is wicked. Therefore it is not an 
inferior thing which has made the will evil, but it is itself 
which has become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring 
an inferior thing…68 
 
It is worth repeating that a study in causation is a study in agency, and if the agency in 
question be one worthy of blame – (and what else is more blameworthy than being the 
agent of disorder, of evil?) – then this is an attempt at theodicy and, to that extent, does 
not have bearing on what the actual nature of evil is. After all, the very construction of 
this particular theodicy requires that no study of its nature is possible, as it seemingly 
does not exist. And yet, that nature most evidently remains a reality for humanity. In 
short, the privative tradition is theodicical in both origin and intent, and, to that extent, 
not useful in any attempt to discuss evil qua evil.69 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 68 Ibid 
 
 69 While Aquinas adds little to the ontological discussion of evil, teasing out the subtleties, as it 
were, of the Augustinian theodicy, it is nonetheless important to consider the following passages: “... it 
must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that 
"evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the 
absence of the other. [ST I: Q 48, Article 1] and, “But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good 
can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; 
otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through 
not having the good belonging to something else […]. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is 
an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness [ST I: Q 48, a3 (emphasis, mine)]”. These 
ideas are repeated, with minor contextual differences, in Summa Contra Gentiles: SCG III: Q 6, 1 & 11, as 
well as Q7, 2]. In fact, even the Angelic Doctor’s rather lengthy treatise on the subject, De Malo, repeats 
the same basic ontology: “We speak of evil in two ways, just as we do of white. For when we speak of 
white in one way, we can understand the subject that is white. In the second way, we call white what is 
white as such, namely the very accidental quality. And we can similarly understand evil in one way as the 
subject that is evil, and this subject is an entity. In the second way, we can understand evil itself, and evil 
so understood is the very privation of a particular good, not an entity [De Malo I: Q1]”. From this, by now, 
familiar stance in regard to what evil is (or, more properly speaking, what it is not) his considerations 
turn to demonology, finally ending with an examination of the classical vices.  
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B: Voices of Critique and Attempts at Classification 
Balthasar was certainly not alone in his concern over the consequences of 
placing philosophical consistency over the maintenance of revelation. One can find 
similar sentiments as his own in regard to the limitations of the privative tradition from 
voices both suspected and surprising. In the latter camp, an excellent example presents 
itself in the case of the theologian Charles Cardinal Journet, O.P. (1891-1975). This 
contemporary countryman of Balthasar’s, although on cordial terms with such 
Ressourcement figures as Lubac and Congar, was an adamant Thomist of the Roman 
school, suspicious of the “New Theology”, which would include the work of Balthasar.70 
It is little surprise, in that light, that one of his best-known works was a presentation of 
the classic Augustinian theodicy, The Meaning of Evil (1961).71  What is surprising, 
however, is the fact that within this systematic presentation of the Catholic use of the 
privation theory, Journet presents an honest account of its shortcomings as a 
metaphysical theory. Most important among these, for our present considerations, is his 
admission that: 
[To] define evil as a privation is not to declare that it is 
nonexistent and powerless. […] It is an inverted positivity 
whose ravages can be limitless and disastrous in the order 
both of being and action [...]. Let us therefore not talk of pure 
non-existence, but of an existence which, like letters hollowed 
out of stone, can be a terrible reality. The depth of evil will 
always be measured by the value of the being which it 
destroys.72 
                                                          
 70 John Saward, “Charles Journet and the Theologians of the Ressourcement on the Personality of 
The Church” in Ressourcement: A Movement for Renewal in Twentieth-Century Catholic Theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 125-137. 
 
 71 Charles Cardinal Journet, The Meaning of Evil, Translated by Michael Barry. P.J. (New York, NY 
Kenedy & Sons: 1963). 
 
 72 Ibid, 43. Emphasis, mine.  
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Here, while the spirit of privation is maintained, its ontological consequence in the 
order of the real, the existing, is not dismissed as a simple lacking, without its own 
manner of existence as “lack”, per se. What is more (and what will be echoed in 
Balthasar’s conception of this manner/mode of evil’s existence), is that Journet 
“doubles down” on his insistence of its existence by assigning it at least one 
characteristic: power, an accident requiring a substance in which to inhere. Thus, even 
here, in an attempted defense of the traditional Augustinian-Thomistic conception of 
evil, there appears to be some hint of concession to sin’s possible substantiality. 
From another contemporary of both Journet and Balthasar, located on the 
fringes of the Ressourcement, “Then” Joseph Ratzinger, we find a similar concern that an 
ontology of negation not, in point of fact, negate the existential, human experience of the 
reality of evil. Interestingly, Ratzinger’s best expression of this concern comes not in a 
discussion of Augustine’s understanding of evil, but rather in the course of discussing 
another Neo-Platonist Father, Origen, on the same subject: 
The effect of Neo-Platonism in [Origen’s] Peri Archon was to 
over accentuate the idea that evil is in fact nothing and 
nothingness, God alone being real, the great Alexandrian 
divine later sensed much more acutely the terrible reality 
of evil, that evil which can inflict suffering on God himself 
and, more, bring him down to death. Nevertheless, Origen, 
could not wholly let go of his hope that, in and through this 
divine suffering, the reality of evil is taken prisoner and 
overcome, so that it loses its quality of definitiveness.73   
 
Similar to Journet, “Then” Cardinal Ratzinger seems to allow evil at least one quality, it’s 
                                                          
 73 “Then” Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life (Washington D.C., 
Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 215-216. Emphasis, mine. 
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“definitiveness”, which again, seems to speak to some conception of its objective 
substantiality. 
The last example of a shared concern over the ramifications of the privative 
tradition I offer here is, perhaps not surprisingly, from a Balthasarian translator and 
commentator, Aidan Nichols, OP. The passage in question, however, does not come from 
any of the number of works dealing directly with Balthasar by the British Dominican.74 
Instead, it is within the course of Nichols’ own attempt at constructing a contemporary 
Catholic theological-synthesis, within The Shape of Catholic Theology: An Introduction to 
Its Sources, Principles, and History, that one finds the following: 
We might wish to ask whether a theory of the ontological 
status of evil can depart too far from the facts of 
experience and still stay credible. The meontic theory is 
fine when trying to explain what happens when a carton of 
cream turns sour, but it is less successful in coping with 
the individual who says 'Evil, be thou my good,' and seeks 
what is evil with extraordinary energy and 
determination.75  
 
With such reservations in mind, reservations from across the spectrum of  
Balthasarian criticism,  reservations about the value of the privative understanding of 
the ontic value of evil, it becomes more and more evident that in order to speak further 
about the quiddity of moral evil, we need some manner of naming it. This attempt at 
                                                          
                 74 Nichols is best known, in Balthasarian circles, for his English language translations of several 
central volumes of Balthasar’s work as well as for his four part commentary on the major sections of 
Balthasar’s theological project, an immense and invaluable project: The Word has Been Abroad: A Guide 
through Balthasar’s Aesthetics (1998), No Bloodless Myth: A Guide through Balthasar’s Dramatics  (2000), 
Say it is Pentecost: A Guide through Balthasar’s Logic (2001), Scattering the Seed: A Guide to Balthasar’s 
Early Writings on Philosophy and the Arts (2006), and Divine Fruitfulness: A Guide to Balthasar’s Theology 
beyond the Trilogy (2007), all published by Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.  
 
              75 Aidan Nichols, The Shape of Catholic Theology: An Introduction to its Sources, Principles, and 
History (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1991), 70-1. 
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classification, however tentative or preliminary, is necessary to avoid the tautology 
that seems to arise by accepting the logical conditions of Augustine’s explanation (that 
which does not exist has no need of names or classification: issue solved, case closed).  
However, if as I propose, Balthasar presents us with sin that sounds surprisingly like a 
substance then by very virtue of this substantiality, it should be pliable to metaphysical 
classification. Further, what better way to classify substantial sin than according to the 
same metaphysic at work in Augustine’s theology, that of the last great pagan Latin 
Neo-Platonist, Porphyry (c.235-c.305).  
           I believe this attempt at classifying sin within this particular metaphysical 
context to be worthwhile, as Porphyry was not only the most likely hand behind much 
of the philosophical work that Augustine mentions encountering and admiring (The 
Confessions: Book 7, chapter 9), but also because his commitment to the Aristotelian 
elements present in Neo-Platonism allowed him to contribute to the construction of 
the now eponymous Porphyrian Tree – a tool seemingly ready-made for this task of 
metaphysical classification.  
As the contemporary realist metaphysician, David S. Oderberg, has pointed out: 
The basic idea behind the Porphyrian tree, as it is has come 
to be called, goes back at least to Plato, was highly 
developed by Aristotle, defined by Porphyry, [and] what 
taxonomy aims at is real classification. It aims precisely at 
the classification of things based on their essences. Since 
everything has one, and only one essence, there can only be 
one correct scheme of classification for each thing.76 
 
                                                          
 76 David S. Odenberg, Real Essentialism (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 92. 
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However, if one were to begin to construct a definition of evil according to the orthodox 
version of the Porphyrian Tree, she would seem to run into an immediate problem. The 
tree is only “descend-able” to the ontic footing suitable for definitions by way of 
affirmations made about the substance in question. And the substance in question here, 
if accepted by way of the privative tradition, does not, of its nature, lend itself to any 
positive description. To this issue, Oderberg points out:  
A positive classification is needed for the entity being 
classified. It is difficult to see how one could get a wholly 
positive classification of the nonliving, since the very 
concept is parasitic on the concept of the living. Hence, the 
best we can do for the non-living is to classify it as such, as 
inanimate, but to register the fact that we are focusing on 
positive features.77 
 
 Nonetheless, if for no other reason 
than to proceed in our exploration of 
Balthasar’s conception that sin is 
substantial, the following classification 
of it by way of an unorthodox descent 
along the Porphyrian Tree is offered. 
For purposes of contextualizing this 
experiment, Figure 1 presents the 
metaphysical pedigree of the mineral: 
a non-living, corporeal substance, while 
Figure 2 presents the same for the 
animal: a living, corporeal substance: 
                                                          
 77 Ibid, 96, no. 1. 
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Having defined a living and non-living 
corporeal substance, in light of our goal of 
doing the same for sin, we must also 
consider the classification of an 
incorporeal substance. Catholic theology 
offers only one instance of such a 
particular existent: the angelic (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
Before allowing sin its own journey 
toward definition, however, the question 
must be asked if the incorporeal substance 
is synonymous with the spiritual, with the 
animate. While it is certainly true that, at 
least according to my research, no other 
spiritual substance save those which 
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move/live (even if only from a state of potentiality to actuality, from will to 
accomplishment) are given consideration in the Christian metaphysical tradition, I do 
not believe this is the product of a conscious equating of all that is incorporeal with that 
which moves (the animate, the living). This seems evident from the fact that most 
presentations of the Porphyrian Tree arising from this same tradition separate the 
question of whether or not a substance possesses corporeality from the question of 
whether or not that same substance possesses “vivum” – the most general classification 
of anima/life. With this clarification in mind, a tentative classification of sin can be 
offered as a non-living, non-corporeal substance (see Figures 4a and 4b).  
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But, to push the premise of such philosophical questions even further, let us ask 
about the ultimate consequences of giving up the Augustinian refusal to reify sin, of 
allowing it the existence necessary to classify or define it. Are there major theological 
ramifications in doing so? A contemporary philosophical critique of privation theory 
taken, as it were, on its own terms, without the perhaps overly reductive reading of its 
origin in Augustine’s life as I’ve proposed is available. There are few better treatments 
of this very question than the one offered by the late philosopher of religion, G. Stanley 
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Kane (1938-2010), in his 1980 paper, “Evil and Privation”.78 Therein, we find him 
proposing:    
The general thinking that lay behind the development of 
the privation theory was that there are certain articles of 
faith or theological doctrines whose truth is logically tied to 
the truth of the privation theory, so that if the privation 
theory is not acceptable these doctrines and beliefs are 
indefensible. [...] the major doctrines that were regarded as 
standing or falling together with the theory are in fact 
unaffected by its rejection.79  
 
              Now, one of the primary doctrines believed to be upheld by ascribing to the 
privation theory is that of the essential goodness of God’s creation. This was, after all, at 
the heart of the Augustinian version of the theory, resting on its premise that 
“everything that exists is to that extent good”. Kane, in referencing his contemporary, 
Wallace Matson (1921-2012), a historian of philosophy, points out that the privation 
theory may, in point of fact, rely on a metaphysic so imbued with Neo-Platonic 
emanationism that, if taken to its logical consequence, would end in the eventual denial 
                                                          
 78 “Evil and Privation” G. Stanley Kane, in The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11.1 
(1980): 43-58. 
 
 79 Ibid, Kane, 52    Let’s pause for a moment and briefly explore one such “unaffected” doctrine, as 
Balthasar sees it; the doctrine of divine omnipotence, which allows for the goodness of what God, via this 
power, has created. In his 1984 essay “Divine Omnipotence” from Explorations in Theology, Volume V: 
Man is Created (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2014), Balthasar insists: “We must not forget this 
Trinitarian horizon of divine omnipotence - God's power to be himself, the other, and the unity of both - 
when considering his all-powerful freedom to go beyond his own nature by creating other natures 
endowed with the gift of freedom and (proportionate) power in their turn.” This same insight appears 
again in the last work of Balthasar’s, Credo: Meditations on the Apostles’ Creed (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1990).  When discussing the very first article and its affirmation of belief in a omnipotent Creator 
God, Balthasar states the following: “When the New Testament refers to him in many passages as 
"almighty", it becomes evident from these that this almightiness can be none other than that of a 
surrender which is limited by nothing--what could surpass the power of bringing forth a God 'equal in 
nature', that is, equally loving and equally powerful, not another God but an other in God... It is therefore 
essential, in the first instance, to see the unimaginable power of the Father in the force of his self-
surrender, that is, of his love and not, for example, in his being able to do this or that as he chooses.” But, 
here, again, we begin to wade too deeply into the waters of a theodicy. Balthasar can certainly offer one, 
based especially around his Trinitarian theology of an eternal kenosis within the Divine, but this is 
neither his goal nor our own. 
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of the goodness of anything outside of the First and Ultimate Cause: God. Or, as Kane 
writes: 
A mistaken inference is drawn from the fact that the 
privation theory goes hand-in-hand with the doctrine that 
whatever exists, in so far as it is real and positive, is good. 
The mistake can be seen in the following quotation from 
Wallace Matson, "evil, then, considered in itself, is mere 
nonbeing, the deprivation of reality, whereas being and 
perfection are synonymous. In so far as anything is real, it is 
perfect and good. But everything, except God, is and must be 
finite; hence everything, except God, must be evil to some 
extent." 80 
 
Here, the very existence of finite beings lends them an air of privation, and fault, when 
conceived as occupying the same reality as the perfect, Infinite One, which would result 
in a failure to properly integrate exactly that aspect of the Christian revelation of God as 
Creator of an explicitly “good” creation that Augustine was trying to defend. Clearly, this 
is a result of Neo-Platonic emanationism, for if any existent along the chain of being is 
evil, then this evil (at least “evil by way of comparative finitude”) is applicable both 
upwards and downwards along the rungs of the ontological ladder.  All of which seems 
to beg the question: how would privation affect a thing/existent/res in a system of 
thought that is not dominated by an essentialist ontology but rather, one more 
existential in nature?81 Balthasar himself, speculates on this same question in the second 
                                                          
 80 Kane, 46 
 
 81 This brings to mind some of Etienne Gilson's insightful lines in comparing the existential 
Thomas to the more essentialist Bishop of Hippo: "By a strange paradox, the philosopher who must 
completely identified God with the transcendent immutability of essence was the Christian most aware of 
the immanence of divine efficacy in nature, in the universal history of humanity, in the personal history of 
the individual conscience. When he speaks of these things as a theologian, St. Augustine seems infallible. 
Here he is without rival in the history of Christian thought. He has only disciples. His greatness is not the 
philosopher's but the theologian's whose philosophy lags behind his theology without retarding its 
progress... We willingly accord St. Augustine the full measure of success possible here, but we have also to 
recognize that to justify Christianity as history by means of an ontology in which 'becoming' hardly 
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volume of his Theo-Logic, looking at the ontological repercussions of what, in Catholic 
morality, is commonly considered a “sin of omission”: 
A missed opportunity to do what we ought to have done is 
an irredeemable deprivation, which appears as a mere 
negation, only from the outside. When this external 
viewpoint is adopted, speculative reason, though bound in 
solidarity with the real and actual use of the practical 
reason is artificially separated from it. The result: 
"bloodless concepts" and "words", which then, by reason of 
their purely abstract mutual in- and ex-clusion, give rise to 
an empty logology (school logic) outside of real being [...]. 
Authentic choice always intends the whole: being or 
nonbeing.82   
 
 The privation of a particular action results in the creation of a real, existential situation; 
or, for our purposes (avoiding the abstract/external), such a situation of “deprivation” 
results in a real thing, a substantial thing – a substantial (not “bloodless”) sin. The 
failure to recognize this thing-that-should-not-be results from a choice to maintain 
philosophical consistency over the datum of either divine revelation or human 
experience. This is the “logology (school logic)” that Balthasar, along with other major 
figures of the Catholic Ressourcement, worked so hard to overthrow by a “return to the 
sources” in the face of their shared training in the manual tradition of Neo-Scholastic, 
axiomatic theology.   
Later, in the course of the same section of Theo-Logic –Volume II: The Truth of 
God, Balthasar continues to explore how to present an honest account of the experience 
of evil in light of the real havoc that it works not just on the ontic level of reality but also 
                                                          
deserves to be called 'being' was a very difficult undertaking." The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas 
Aquinas (New York, NY: Random House, 1956), 134-135. 
 
 82 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Volume II – The Truth of God (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1985), 30, no. 9: "[...] this point becomes clear to an ever greater degree when we consider the goal 
of Blondel's main work, L'Action...” Something this study will do, in fact, at some length, in chapter IV. 
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in the human attempt to confront it, to conform it to logic, to a strict philosophical 
systematization: 
Diabolical contra-diction cannot be assimilated into God's 
logic. Can it claim an existence of its own as the lie, as an 
un-logic, next to, or outside of, this logic? [...] can sin, which 
openly contradicts the truth and, therefore, beauty, be 
incorporated into the structure of the – logical! – whole in 
this way, unless it be inwardly over-, or under-, taken in 
some (for now) altogether unforeseeable manner?83 
 
The reference to an “unforeseeable manner” is, of course, to Christian Soteriology, to 
the “unforeseen” life-through-death of the Paschal Mystery itself. It is to this event, and 
to what Balthasar believes is uniquely revealed in it about substantial, non-privative 
sin, that one must turn for answers in the face of the illogical, but seemingly necessary, 
statement that “sin exists.” As mentioned above, a careful scholar could construct the 
beginnings of a Balthasarian theodicy, centering on the theologian’s conception of God’s 
creative omnipotence finding its best expression in the kenotic process of allowing for 
other existents. Balthasar himself, however, does no such thing. His own attempts to 
conceive of, and subsequently speak of, substantial sin are always focused on or around 
the act of its transference from the world to Christ. This talk of the “transference” of sin 
becomes all the more relevant while closing this look at the privative tradition, as both 
the Doctor gratiae and the Doctor angelicus offer the slightest of caveats to their 
respective commitment to said tradition. What is more, both brief statements mirror 
the very idea that Balthasar was stressing: if sin is substantial, it reveals itself most 
clearly as such during Christ’s Passion.84 And so, despite his essential role in the 
                                                          
          83 Ibid, 32 
 84 Hans Urs von Balthasar, To the Heart of the Mystery of Redemption (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1977), 26: “The transplantation in question is real, it sets up a new ontology of man.” 
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privative tradition’s entrance into Latin Christian thought, one can find Augustine, in his 
Enchiridion, stating that sins “in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And 
when they are not transferred elsewhere, […] they cannot exist anywhere else.”85 And 
likewise, in Question 48, article 1 of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas briefly employs 
language allowing for the possibility that something he has spent considerable time 
arguing possesses no ontological value is still able to act in a manner more consistent 
with a substantial being; for, as he has it, “evil imports the absence of good.”86 
 With this talk of the transference and importation of sin in mind, coupled with 
Balthasar’s repeated insistence that sin reveals the substantiality denied it by the 
privative tradition exactly in Christ’s assumption and removal of it, a closer look 
directly at Balthasar’s soteriology of the Cross follows.  
                                                          
 
 85 The Enchiridion, 11. Emphasis, mine. 
 
 86 Summa Theologica, Pars Prima, Question 48, article 1.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 Balthasar and the Influence of Pauline “Mystical Realism”  
 
  
For Balthasar, all theological knowledge is revealed in the singularity of the 
Hypostatic Union. This is especially the case for Theology, proper, that is the study of 
the nature of God and, in this case, through the window of the Cross, the triune nature 
of God as multi-personal/communal.87 One finds him affirming this as early as the 
publication of a collection of aphorisms, gathered during the 1940’s and early 50’s, 
many used as seeds for future reflection in his later theology. Thus, in The Grain of 
Wheat, Balthasar writes that:   
[Christ's] works, words, and miracles are one and all signs 
that point to something: they do not signify only 
themselves. They possess an unbounded depth into which 
they attract and invite us. But we do not find the truth 
behind, them at a second, purely spiritual level […]. Rather 
[…], the Word became Flesh; the eternal Meaning has 
become incarnate within the temporal symbol. What is 
signified must be sought within the sign itself [...]. No one 
shall ever leave Christ's humanity behind as obsolete 
instrument.88 
 
As I will argue, this last emphasis on the impossibility of moving beyond what has been 
definitively incarnate will play a major role in the development of Balthasar’s ontology 
                                                          
 87 Benedict XVI, one time colleague and friend of Balthasar, was sure to point out this central 
aspect of his theology when composing his October 6th, 2005 MESSAGE OF HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT 
XVI  FOR THE CENTENARY OF THE BIRTH OF FR. HANS URS VON BALTHASAR:  “He made the mystery of 
the Incarnation the privileged subject of his study, seeing the Easter Triduum - as he significantly entitled 
one of his writings - as the most expressive form of God's entrance into human history. In Jesus' death 
and Resurrection, in fact, the mystery of God's Trinitarian love is revealed in all its fullness.” 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/messages/pont-messages/2005/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_mes_20051006_von-balthasar.html [Accessed 6/2015]. 
 
 88 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Grain of Wheat: Aphorisms. Translated by Erasmo Leiva-
Merikakis. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 58. 
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of substantial sin. Most Balthasarian scholars recognize this revelatory Christology as a 
very particular hallmark of his theological style. As Aidan Nichols, one of the most 
prolific translators of his works, had to say: 
[Balthasar's] Christology is highly concrete, and has been 
compared, suggestively, to the iconography of Andre 
Rublev […], directly involved in an account of the mysteries 
of the life. In each major moment (mystery) of the life, we 
see some aspect of the total Gestalt Christi, and through 
this, the Gestalt Gottes itself.89 
 
These lines from Nichols are found at the outset of Mysterium Paschale, Balthasar’s in-
depth, theological-commentary on the Triduum. For, if his Christology is revelatory in 
nature, and all of Christ’s physical acts point to an essential truth of the Godhead, the 
Paschal Mystery must be seen as the summit of all Christological revelation. And, in 
point of fact, this is exactly how Balthasar treats it. For him, Theology, proper, is 
impossible without Christology, and Christology is only discernable (or worth 
discerning) in as much as it is salvific for humanity. 
While this foregrounding of the Paschal Mystery is hardly unique to Balthasar, 
his particular stress upon it and the ideas he proposes to gleam from it, are – as the 
work of Anne Hunt has argued. Expounding on this topic, as especially ripe for 
comparisons with Scholastic and Neo-Scholastic contrasts, she writes that: 
[He] offers a profoundly inspired and highly evocative 
reflection on the Trinity as it is revealed in the paschal 
mystery of Jesus Christ. Based on that reflection, he rejects 
the classical psychological analogy and seeks instead to 
explicate God's being, including the Trinitarian processions, 
not in classical terms of absolute being, Actus Purus […] but 
rather in terms, as revealed in the paschal mystery, of the 
                                                          
 89 Aidan Nichols Introduction to Hans Urs von Balthasar’s, Mysterium Paschale. Translated by 
Aidan Nichols, OP. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 6-7. 
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self-emptying, self-sacrificing, and intrinsically dynamic 
nature of love.90 
 
With such a clear emphasis placed by Balthasar on the revelatory nature of the Paschal 
Mystery, and, for our present purposes, on what is revealed there of substantial sin, it 
would be wise to turn to his most explicit discussion of both, in his assessment of 
Pauline soteriological claims. 
 
A: The Pauline Passages in Question 
 
 
That Balthasar’s preferred presentation of this theo-phanic Paschal Mystery is 
Pauline in origin should surprise no one familiar with his soteriological works. 
Wherever the issue of atonement is discussed, it is done with a strong conviction that 
Paul’s account of the event is the oldest and most reliable. Often doing battle with other 
theologians who he felt had failed to employ the historical-critical method of scriptural 
exegesis, Balthasar finds his surest footing there. This is most evident in a posthumous 
collection of papers, presented in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s to various retreats of 
clergy, subsequently published as To the Heart of the Mystery of Redemption, wherein he 
states: 
It is not possible to dismiss the Pauline texts quoted, or 
other similar passages, as witnesses of a later New 
Testament soteriology, one that could consequently be 
relativized... Not only are the Pauline epistles the most 
ancient documents that we possess, not only do they 
incorporate and develop soteriological formulas that are 
still older, but the earliest Credo, the one quoted to us by 
                                                          
 90  Anne Hunt, “Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery in Trinitarian Theology”, Theological 
Studies 59.2 (Jun 1998), 198. Hunt explores this issue of the theo-phanic nature of Cross, with greater 
detail, in her The Trinity and the Paschal Mystery: A Development in Recent Catholic Theology (Wilmington, 
DE: Michael Glazier Publishing, 1997). 
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Paul in 1st Corinthians 15, already contains the formula pro 
nobis, and it was starting from this that the whole Credo 
was going to develop.91 
 
From this starting point, Balthasar begins to focus on those elements of the Pauline 
kerygma that stand out as biblically unique in their presentation of the Cross, especially 
those passages of Paul that speak directly to the relationship between Christ and sin in 
the act of redemption. Among these, Balthasar finds three verses in particular, drawn 
from those epistles thought to be genuinely Pauline in authorship, stressing their 
unprecedented language of the assumption of substantial sin into Jesus during the 
Passion.  
Moving in the order of their composition, not their present canonical ordering, 
there is Paul’s assertion in Galatians that, “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law 
by becoming a curse for us—for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who hangs on a 
tree.’”92 This is then echoed in 2 Corinthians, where Paul writes that, “for our sake he 
made him to be sin that knew no sin […]”93 This claim, in turn, is further explored with a 
bit more detail in the eighth chapter of Romans, “For God has done what the law, 
weakened by the flesh, could not do: by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful 
                                                          
 91 Hans Urs von Balthasar, To the Heart of the Mystery of Redemption (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2010), 28. Balthasar continues, citing a 1972 study, "Christologie und neutestamentliche 
Chronologie’: “Martin Hengel, moreover, has demonstrated [...] that the theories that assign very distinct 
stages to an evolution of Christology (a Palestinian phase, then a transition to a Hellenistic Judaism, and 
finally a purely Hellenistic phase of pagan origin) do not take into account the brevity of the time in 
question: according to Hengel, in the very first years after the death of Christ, more things took place in 
Christology then in all future centuries.”  
 For Balthasar’s longest sustained treatment of “pro nobis” as the oldest and most viable model of 
atonement, see “On Vicarious Representation”, (1973) – contained in Explorations in Theology IV: Spirit 
and Institution (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995).    
 
 92 Galatians 3: 13 (NRSV) 
 
 93 2 Cor. 5: 21(NRSV) 
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flesh, and to deal with sin, he condemned sin in the flesh […]”.94 The common 
Christological and soteriological element among these passages is clear. They each 
present an understanding of the Passion in which sin is reified and subsequently 
relocated by means of Jesus’ bodily existence. Balthasar, himself, sums this concept up, 
in a passage that will become central to this chapter’s argument:  
“It was thus necessary to be able to find a method to 
separate the sin from the sinner – and it is of this that the 
Pauline texts speak to us, whether we like their mystical 
realism or not… In reality, it is a question of a gathering 
together, a concentration of universal sin in Christ.95 
 
There is a note of challenge present in the tone here, recognizing that such a concept, 
whatever its Apostolic pedigree, may strike modern ears as too graphic to be spiritually 
useful. This Pauline “mystical realism”, as Balthasar dubs it, and its effects on the 
construction of a Balthasarian ontology of sin, will be the major concern of this 
chapter’s exploration. However, before moving on to such an exploration, a closer look 
at the passages in question is in order. 
One modern perspective on the problem that may support Balthasar’s 
ontological speculations is that of the New Testament Greek scholar, Bradley H. McLean. 
                                                          
 94 Romans 8:3 (NRSV) 
 
 95 Balthasar, To the Heart of the Mystery of Redemption, 24 (emphasis mine).  
Hunt reflects upon this reification of sin, a subject we will return to below, in her The Trinity and the 
Paschal Mystery …, referenced above: “Sin is recognized and judged for what it is: alien to God and alien to 
life. Though Balthasar does not develop the symbolism any farther, his powerful image of sin in itself, 
separate from the sinner also adumbrates, I suggest, a modern understanding of corporate or 
institutionalized sin in which the human person appears not only his agent but as a victim of sin... Finally 
and perhaps most importantly, this reification of sin also allows Balthasar in effect to contrast the infinity 
of God's love [...] with the finitude of sin.” (73-74, emphasis mine) While recognizing the importance of 
Hunt's work in this area, I can't help but disagree with her conclusion. Certainly not because Balthasar 
systematically "developed the symbolism" of reified sin which she seems to find lacking, but because he 
certainly continued work with these symbols in a consciously un-systematic manner throughout the 
whole course of all of his theology (which is the very argument of the present work). 
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First proposed in a 1992 paper for New Testament Studies, and further developed in his 
1996 monograph, The Cursed Christ: Mediterranean Expulsion Rituals and Pauline 
Soteriology, McLean’s scholarship focuses on the unique vocabulary employed in those 
Pauline passages featuring this “mystical realism”. Doing so, he proposes that: 
Paul's soteriology is taxonomically unique and therefore 
can be profitably compared with […] Mediterranean 
apotropaic rituals; that is, rituals used in averting evil,  
curses, and defilement […]. I shall argue that an analogy 
exists between Paul's theology of atonement and these 
apotropaic rituals in that they share a common paradigm. 
Therefore, Paul's idea of atonement can be profitably 
interpreted in the light of this broader ritual context.96 
 
The proposal, to interpret these particular (and peculiar) Pauline passages on 
atonement by way of a non-Hebraic paradigm, arises from McLean’s contention that, 
“when Paul's theology is compared with Jewish sacrifice, it is the contrasts – not the 
similarities –which abound.”97 He argues that an application of standard Levitical 
paradigms to explain Paul’s theology of the cross “prove uninformed about Jewish 
sacrificial practices and theory [because] there is no theological or textual justification 
to describe Paul's cursed and sinful Christ as sacrificial.”98 
Finding the Hebraic models of sacrifice wanting in attempts to explain the 
graphic language of substitutionary “cursing” found in these passages, McLean proposes 
that we take Paul at his word when he claims that “to those outside the law I became 
                                                          
 96 Bradley McLean. The Cursed Christ: Mediterranean Expulsion Rituals and Pauline Soteriology 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Publishing, 1996), 18-19. 
 
 97 Ibid.52 
 
 98 Ibid.52 
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like one outside the law […], to win over those outside the law.”99 And that, as Apostle to 
the Gentiles, he has “become all things to all, to save at least some.  All this I do for the 
sake of the gospel […].”100 In doing just that, Paul, when writing to those congregations 
lacking a knowledge of the Hebrew Scriptures which was present in his other, 
synagogue-centered missions, turns to a seemingly ready-made pagan paradigm of 
atonement: the practice of apotropaic rituals of societal expulsion.   
McLean presents the basic cosmological presuppositions of said paradigm, with 
language featuring concepts of primordial chaos, to which I will return in Chapter 4: 
Defilement can be defined as a disturbance of the system of 
classification that determines two distinct worlds: the inner 
world of society, order, and culture; and the outer world of 
chaos, wilderness, and natural forces. Defilement poses a 
real danger in society because it threatens to damage the 
border between the two worlds such that chaos and its 
deadly natural forces overtake society. The apotropaic 
rituals were used to maintain and restore these borders. 
They reflect a shared belief in the reality of defilement from 
the outer world of chaos. Once unleashed in society, there 
was a very real possibility of physical contagion.101 
 
While concepts of defilement, especially from contact with primordial chaos, are hardly 
foreign to the Hebraic sacrificial paradigm, according to McLean, the ritual solution for 
the physical removal of curses, following upon such defilement, are.102 And, while the 
                                                          
 99 2 Corinthians 9:21 
 
 100 2 Corinthians. 9:22-23 
 
 101 Ibid.,71 
 
 102 One possible exception to the lack of apotropaic ritual in the Hebrew Scriptures is the case of 
the Nehushtan, or bronze serpent, reported in Numbers 21:8-9: “The Lord said to Moses, ‘Make a snake 
and put it up on a pole; anyone who is bitten can look at it and live.’ So Moses made a bronze snake and 
put it up on a pole. Then when anyone was bitten by a snake and looked at the bronze snake, they lived.” 
Here we have an inanimate example of McLean’s Pauline-paradigm: an object (an image of the very ill in 
question), being used to draw the curse out of, and away from, those suffering under its effects. Besides a 
brief mention in 2 King 18:9 (“[Hezekiah…] broke into pieces the bronze snake Moses had made, for up to 
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Jewish Law presented methods of individual purification for particular offences, it was 
Hellenistic religion that offered Paul a model for the physical removal of a communal 
(world-wide) curse by way of ritual substitution. As Mclean argues:  
Apotropaic rituals take advantage of this [...] feature of 
transferability by selecting a victim upon whom this 
physical infection could be transferred and, by expelling the 
victim, the curse is also expelled. The act of performing an 
apotropaic ritual can be divided into five steps: selection, 
consecration, investiture, transference, and finally 
expulsion (sometimes followed by execution).103 
 
The parallels between McLean’s presentation of Mediterranean expulsion rituals 
(derived, for the most part, from his study of the pharmakos rites of Hellenistic 
paganism popular before, and at the time of, Paul’s missionary endeavors) and the 
Passion narratives are, of course, telling.104 Using the steps just outlined by McLean, a 
                                                          
that time the Israelites had been burning incense to it.”), the only other mention of the Nehushtan in 
Scripture comes from John’s Gospel, and seems to lend credence to McLean’s theory of fruitfully applying 
the apotropaic model of soteriology to the Paschal Mystery, as Christ Himself applies the imagery to his 
salvific actions in John 3:14-15: “’Just as Moses lifted up the snake in the wilderness, so the Son of Man 
must be lifted up, that everyone who believes may have eternal life in him’” and again in 12:32-33:”’And 
when I am lifted up from the earth, I will draw everyone to myself’. He said this indicating the kind of 
death he would die.” As I will go on to argue that Balthasar uses this apotropaic reading to expound on 
the Pauline texts in questions in the process of constructing his ontology of substantial sin, it is worth 
noting that he only makes use of the Nehushtan example once. In his Mysterium Paschale, in the course of 
arguing for an understanding of the Incarnation as ordered directly toward the Passion, he offers the 
following highly condensed commentary on these passages from John: “'Becoming flesh', since it involves 
'not being received' (1:14), is for that reason a crushing of the self (6:54-57). It is dying into the earth, 
disappearing (12:24), yet being 'lifted up' in death-and-resurrection like the serpent in which all poison at 
once gathered and met its antidote (3:14)” (pg. 19, emphasis, mine). 
 
 103 McLean., 72-3. A more recent examination of the subject, supporting many of McLean’s claims 
on this point can be found in chapter 5 of  Richard E. DeMaris’ The New Testament & Its Ritual World 
(London: Routledge, 2008). 
 
104 Much as the etymology of the word makes clear, the pharmakos, was a “medicine man”, who 
brought healing to the community or city-state, by assuming its perceived curses. A similar role can be 
found in the Celtic “sin-eater”, whose graphic title may better represent that role’s function. 
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close reading of both the synoptic and Johannine traditions present multiple 
correspondences.  
The “selection” and “consecration” of the apotropaic victim can be seen in both 
the accounts of Jesus’ anointing at Bethany (which he himself interprets as his 
preparation for burial, his “expulsion” to Sheol) and in the welcome granted him at 
Triumphal Entry, at the very head of the events of Holy Week.105 The “investiture” is 
quite clear in the actions of Herod’s court (Luke 23:11) and all the more so in the 
barbaric behavior of Pilate’s soldiers, who “stripped off his clothes and threw a scarlet 
military cloak about him. Weaving a crown out of thorns, they placed it on his head, and 
a reed in his right hand.”106 The “transference”, that is the transference of the 
substantial sin of the world into the person of Jesus, will be the concern of the 
remainder of the present chapter, as it is with this particular step that Balthasar will be 
most concerned, and from which he will develop his ontology of substantial sin.107 For, 
if sin is to be transferrable, it must be more than simply legal in nature, it must, in fact, 
be substantial.108 And, if this spiritual substance must be physically assumed by, and 
removed in, the body of the archetypal Pharmakos, Jesus, as Balthasar contends, then a 
                                                          
 105 For Jesus’ anointing and his equating of this action with his impending death, see Matthew 
26:6-13, Mark 14:3-9, and John 12:1-8. Luke’s account, according to most New Testament scholars, seems 
to refer to a separate incident at the beginning of Jesus’ public ministry and, most importantly for this 
reading, contains no equation on his part of the actions with his burial.  
 
 106 Matthew 27: 28-29a. For other accounts of this same manner of violent investiture, see Mark 
15:16-18 and John 19:1-5 (the famous “Ecce Homo” passage).  
 
 107 Though, it is worth noting here that all of the Gospel accounts of the Passion place the 
Crucifixion outside the walls of Jerusalem.  
 
 108 As the “expulsion” (via “execution”) step of McLean’s paradigm involves the contemplation of 
substantial sin by Jesus, in his descent into the chaos of Sheol, it will be explored in Chapter IV. 
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closer look at the philosophical “mystical realism” underlying such a process, must be 
dealt with first. 
 
B: Balthasar and “Mystical Realism” 
 
 
In reviewing the Pauline passages to which Balthasar turned in the construction 
of his ontology of sin, I previously quoted his challenging assertion that, “it is of this 
[sin, abstracted and assumed by Christ] that the Pauline texts speak to us, whether we 
like their mystical realism or not.”109 But what is meant by this term, so central to 
Balthasarian soteriology? What is this “mystical realism”? In the context of Balthasar’s 
theology, and for the purposes of this study, I propose the following definition. Mystical 
Realism is a holistic, incarnational approach to theology, stressing the mediation of the 
material world (the "realism" in question), especially the human body, in achieving 
ends usually (mis)understood as strictly spiritual (the “mystical” in question). Now, this 
theme is certainly not unique to Balthasar, in as much as one would expect to account 
for a certain level of realism in any theological landscape dominated by central tenets of 
incarnation and sacramentality. However, with the influence of Latin Neo-Platonism 
acting as the philosophical scaffolding preferred for the purposes of expounding the 
Christian Mysteries (tellingly not Greek Neo-Platonism, with its own holistic-
sacramental system of theurgy), the suspicion of the body as detrimental – and 
certainly not useful – in the process of sanctification/deification grew.110 Balthasar, 
                                                          
 109 Balthasar, To the Heart of the Mystery of Redemption, 24. 
 110 On this issue of Eastern versus Western schools of Neo-Platonism, and their effect upon early 
Christian sacramentality, see the wonderful scholarship in Gregory Shaw’s Theurgy and the Soul: The Neo-
Platonism of Iamblichus, (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1995). 
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while appreciative of the positive outcomes of this influence, would nonetheless, 
throughout his theological career, seek to rectify the damage of this dis-incarnate 
mindset. Two Christological themes, in particular, are repeated often enough to be 
considered motifs of this Balthasarian stress on the importance of the flesh, or corporeal 
substance: recapitulation and reification.111  
As early as the above mentioned collection of aphorisms, The Grain of Wheat, 
Balthasar was mining the theological possibilities of the early soteriological model of 
Christ’s incarnation as the recapitulation of all creation: “As new Adam he encompasses 
everything human but he also incorporates the animal realm in himself, since he is 
lamb, scapegoat, sacrificial ox, ram, and lion of Judah. As bread and as vine he 
incorporates the vegetative.”112 This is not simply the “the Word made flesh” but, 
rather, the Word made into human flesh which, of its own proper nature, is already the 
microcosm of all Aristotelian levels of anima: vegetative, appetitive, and rational. This 
is, in fact, the macrocosm made microcosm, in order that the former may be rectified by 
way of the latter.113  To this extent, Balthasar is simply putting the Ressourcement of 
                                                          
 111 It is important to note that, along with the concepts of “pro nobis” and of “apotropaic” rituals, 
the latter of these two ideas, that of Christological recapitulation, is also Pauline in origin (1 Cor. 15: 45-
49 and Romans 5: 12-21).  
 
 112 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Grain of Wheat: Aphorisms. Translated by Erasmus Leiva-
Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius Press: 1987), 55. Even earlier in the same work he argues that: “The 
Fathers like to stress the fact that man sums up and sets free all of nature's beings in himself. In this 
ontological universalism there are to be found almost more possibilities to understand, in a Christian 
sense, the ‘cosmic-global’ feeling of our time than in the epistemological universalism of the scholastics 
[…]. By virtue of my vegetative nature, I can participate in the being of all plants. I know what lies in their 
being. Thus also for animal life. If we reflect on this, we will fully come to understand Paul's doctrine 
concerning nature's sighing and rejoicing along with us.” 17-18. 
 
 113 This is certainly the case with Balthasar’s groundbreaking (at the time) work on Maximus the 
Confessor’s Christology of recapitulation, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the 
Confessor. Translated by Brain Daley, SJ. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988). This particular stress of 
Maximus’ on the salvific effects of Christ’s Incarnation into flesh already considered microcosmic in 
nature was explored even further by the Swedish Patristics scholar, Lars Thunberg, in the appropriately 
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Patristic Christology to work. But Balthasar does not stop his speculation on the extent 
of recapitulation at the level of the vegetative. Instead, he presses on, into the 
inanimate, the bare res:  
Finally, in the Passion, he became a mere thing and thus 
reached the very bottom of the world structure. This 
reification is most evidenced in the sacraments and 
especially in Christ's quantification in Communion wafers 
and in his multiplication: Christ as printing matrix as 
generic article. Such reification has its cause […] in an 
intensely personal decision of the Redeemer, and in the 
strongest possible effects of the redemption itself, whereby 
the Lord makes himself irrevocably a thing at the disposal of 
anyone who request it.114 
 
The inclusion of mere object-hood in this process of incarnational recapitulation is key, 
as it will allow for the possibility of a relationship between the bare res of sin and the 
person of Christ. While Balthasar will go on, in other works, to explore his 
understanding of the admirabile commercium, or “admirable commerce” (whereby, the 
res of sin is exchanged for the res of Christ, primarily in the Eucharist), my concern at 
present is strictly with the ontological identification of the Incarnate Logos with the 
lowest rung of existence. In the same year that his collected aphorisms saw publication, 
Balthasar also published a collection of prose poems that explore, in deeply personal 
and highly symbolic language, some of the Christological concepts introduced in The 
Grain of Wheat.115 So it is that, in a section of his 1954 Heart of the World, entitled “The 
                                                          
titled Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor (Chicago: Open 
Court Press, 1995).  
 
 114 Balthasar, The Grain of Wheat, 55-56 (emphases, mine). 
 
 115 For a concise presentation of Balthasar’s conception of the admirabile commercium, see the 
wonderfully titled meditation “The Dissolved Substance” in his Life out of Death: Meditation on the Easter 
Mystery (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984): “And if this Easter grace […] presupposes Jesus’ cross and 
death, which in the death […] is vicariously ‘made into sin’, the institution of the Eucharist includes this 
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Putting-Off Game”, the same relationship of recapitulation to reification is contemplated 
through accounts of the trials of the Passion: 
You become a burden, especially to those closest to you: 
from the New Covenant, from your Church [...]. Driven out 
of your Church, you fall to the Jews, the people of yore. You 
fall into the enclosure of the covenant which you yourself 
had once directed around Israel, but here you are no less 
unwelcome... And the ball rolls on, out of the covenant 
enclosure, and it chances over to the people outside -- the 
nation of the heathen...  Thus it is that you are totally 
expelled outside the farthest "outside", up like a Host over 
the earth which has rejected you, fastened onto the 
indifferent sky. […] Be off! Tolle, crucifige!"116 
 
While presenting his feelings on the contentious question of the legal responsibility for 
the crucifixion, by having every party take a turn at kicking the “ball” further along the 
road that leads outside the walls of Jerusalem, to Golgotha, Balthasar again employs the 
imagery of mere res-hood. He is at pains to stress identification of Christ, via 
recapitulation, with even the lowest rung of existence, the utterly passive object. But to 
what end?  
 Why this stress in Balthasar on Christ’s ontological identification, both as 
creating Logos and incarnate Lord, with every level of being? I believe the clearest 
answer to this question, one that accounts for this relationship between recapitulation, 
res, and substantial sin, to be found in Balthasar’s reading of the theology of Irenaeus. In 
the second volume of his Theological-Aesthetics, Balthasar offers what is essentially a 
collection of short, but dense, monographs on those Christian theologians that deal 
                                                          
same cross and this same death in anticipation of itself. […] How the living Lord in the form of corporeal 
solidity was able from the outset to make use of this corporeality in the dissolution of death remains a 
mystery.” (45-46). The mysterious nature of this Christological ability does not, as we will see below, 
keep Balthasar from further exploration of it. 
 
 116 Balthasar, Heart of the World. ,102-103  
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directly with the concept of the Beautiful. In this process, he engages with the 2nd 
century thought of Irenaeus, one of the Latin/Western fathers to deal with the 
recapitulation theory of atonement, which would become much more prevalent among 
the Greek/Eastern fathers in the centuries to follow. Therein, we find Balthasar 
proposing the following about Irenaeus’ view of Christ as “fulfiller” of all grades of 
reality: 
The active power of the fulfiller to give every emergent 
thing scope within itself in order, by assimilating it to 
himself, to bring it to its own fullness: without this active 
attraction into his own primacy recapitulation would be 
impossible [...], a process in which all things are fulfilled 
and redeemed, not outside themselves, but in their own 
essence, with an effect which works back in time. […] All 
Christ's acts must possess this absorptive power.117 
 
Of special note here, in light of McLean’s reading of Paul’s Passion “narratives” as reliant 
on apotropaic rituals of transference, are the powers Balthasar chooses to ascribe to 
Christ in his role as macrocosm (the Logos) made microcosm (man). He is able to 
recapitulate a disordered reality by way of “assimilating”, “attracting” and, “absorbing”. 
For Balthasar, just as Jesus is able to restore all existents by calling them back to their 
source, into his very person, he is also able to assume the substance of sin and 
physically remove it, in his death, from the presence of the living. 
So central is the theology of Irenaeus in passing this Pauline stream of 
atonement-realism into the theology of Balthasar, that at least one scholar has made the 
bold claim that whole work of the latter can best be understood as a Ressourcement of 
the work of the former. In his excellent The Systematic Thought of Hans Urs von 
                                                          
 117 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological-Aesthetics – Volume II: Clerical 
Styles. Translated by Andrew Louth, et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), 52-53. Emphasis, mine. 
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Balthasar: An Irenaean Retrieval, Kevin Mongrain proposes that “Irenaeus, read through 
the Lubac's lens, therefore became von Balthasar's primary critical resource from the 
patristic archive for reforming contemporary Catholic theology...”118 Having introduced 
the major hand played Henri de Lubac and the Ressourcement in this Irenaean 
transmission, Mongrain refines his thesis even further: 
A careful reading of von Balthasar's trilogy shows that he is 
undertaking a massive project to rehabilitate the doctrine of 
the corpus triforme by presenting it in its Irenaean version. 
His overarching goal is to preserve Irenaeus' emphasis on 
the organic 'unfolding' of the one Body of Christ in a 
multiplicity of incarnational forms throughout history... My 
contention is that this Christology spans von Balthasar's 
trilogy.119  
 
I believe Mongrain to be quite right on this point, and that his research here helps 
support our own. Reading Balthasar, one can find him affirming several aspects of this 
thesis. As to its basic content, the “multiplicity of incarnational forms”, Balthasar makes 
continued use of this concept in several works. Perhaps none of them are so connected 
to the present study of the transmission of the substance of sin as his 1978 devotional 
work on the Christology of the Rosary, The Threefold Garland: The World’s Salvation in 
Mary’s Prayer. Therein, he proposes that, “[in] its totality, Christianity never ceases 
being Incarnation: God’s incarnation in Christ, the incarnation of sin in Christ, and 
Christ’s incarnation in our corporeal existence.”120  
                                                          
 118 Kevin Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar: An Irenaean Retrieval 
(New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company: 2002), 16. 
 
 119 Ibid., 38 
 
 120 Hans Urs von Balthasar. The Threefold Garland: The World’s Salvation in Mary’s Prayer. 
Translated by Erasmo Levia-Merikakis. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 80. 
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 As to the duration of this concept throughout his over 60 years of active writing, 
and especially in his central works, the “trilogy” – or “triptych”, sure enough, one can 
find it as early as the second volume of the Theological-Aesthetics, from 1962,  “[…] the 
living Second Adam finally also enters into bread and wine, into products of the earth, 
in order to recapitulate in himself not just man but also nature and the cosmos, the 
most deeply realistic earth.”121 And one can just as easily find it on display in the whole 
project’s closing, in the Epilogue (1987), where the stress on the metaphysical 
ramifications of incarnation are still on display in Balthasar’s assurance that, “according 
to the Cyrillian and Chalcedonian view of human nature, Jesus holds a position that 
alters the whole of this nature (as we say: for he shares in the materiality of all other 
humans).”122  
 Finally, Mongrain’s thesis is validated in its presentation of the theological 
lineage that informed Balthasar’s incarnational insistence. He, himself, cites the link 
between his work and that of Patristic and Medieval exponents of this concept when he 
directs readers to the work of Lubac:  “On this whole issue, cf. H de Lubac, Corpus 
Mysticum (1949), in particular where he speaks of the unity of Christ's 'threefold body' 
(in particular in Paschasius Radbertus).”123 Balthasar, however, here points to a name 
too often overlooked in this area of incarnationalism, placing Paschasius Radbertus 
                                                          
 121 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological-Aesthetics – Volume II , 55 
 
 122 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Epilogue. Translated by Edward T. Oakes. (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2004), 119-120.  
 
 123 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic, Volume III: The Spirit of Truth. Translated by Graham 
Harrison. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 295, no. 9. The book being referenced by both Mongrain 
and Balthasar himself is Henri Cardinal de Lubac’s, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the 
Middle Ages (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). 
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(785-865) in the line of transmission. This inclusion of the 9th century theologian bears 
some consideration.  
 I contend that within the lineage of Pauline Mystical Realism, and especially as it 
concerns this incarnational stress, Balthasar’s understanding of the ontological 
ramifications of recapitulation (which, as argued above, directly affect his 
understanding of sin as substantial and transferable), is closest in content to that of 
Paschasius’. With this, and the continued task of defining the Pauline Mystical Realism 
in question, a brief look at Radbertus is in order. Perhaps the best introduction to his 
place and work in and on this issue, is to be found in a 2005 paper by David Appleby, 
’Beautiful on the Cross, Beautiful in his Torments’: The Place of the Body in the Thought 
of Paschasius Radbertus’. Therein, Appleby claims that: 
Alone among Carolingian authors, Radbertus located the 
'imago Dei' in the whole human being, body as well as soul, 
apparently aligning himself with the second century figure 
Irenaeus, who, though rarely cited in the early medieval 
West, had understood the human image-relation to God in 
light of the incarnate Son's status as image of the Father.124  
 
This stress on the post-incarnational ontological value of the human body would lead 
Radbertus, of course, into his most noteworthy appearance in theological history: the 
publication of his De Corpore et Sanguine Domini, containing the first use of the term 
transubstantiation, and the Eucharistic controversy that followed. His strong realist 
leanings, perhaps best expressed in the famed sacramental phrase “fleshy spiritually 
mingled with flesh”, are directly linked above, by Appleby, to the same Irenaean school 
                                                          
 124 David Appleby, “’Beautiful on the Cross, Beautiful in his Torments’: The Place of the Body in 
the Thought of Paschasius Radbertus” in Traditio, Vol. 60 (2005) 1-46, 14. 
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of thought that Mongrain finds present in Balthasar.125 Appleby goes on to expound 
some of the main themes of this mystical realism, inherited from Irenaeus and passed 
on to Lubac, and finally Balthasar, by pointing out that Paschasius: 
[…] did not equate sanctification with a metaphysical process 
of detachment or flight from the body. [...] His deeper 
commitment was to a centered image of the person, in which 
the body could contribute positively to the process of 
sanctification.126  
 
 As a result of this unique theological anthropology, “Radbertus apparently 
accepted some form of the theory of the senses according to which...the five senses 
allow the soul to extend itself temporarily beyond the limits of the body. Through them 
the anima of the body is able to perceive other bodies.”127 This use of the body as 
conduit for spiritual exchange among persons is exactly the manner of mystical realism 
that Balthasar will put to use in his exposition of the events and consequents of the 
Passion. In fact, we find very similar language to the Paschasius of Appleby’s 
understanding in a late essay of Balthasar’s, “On the Christian’s Capacity to See”, where, 
reflecting his years of formation as a Jesuit, he draws the following conclusions from an 
examination of the Spiritual Exercises: 
Catholic Christology can never be reduced to a mere 
'theology of the word', which is at most a propaedeutic to 
meditation on the incarnate Word, […]. Unlike Origen, 
Ignatius does not speak of the 'spiritual senses', which 
supposedly awaken in the soul when their bodily 
counterparts have been quieted. Man is a unity of soul and 
body and, as Aquinas teaches, it is the intellectual soul, the 
unique form of the body, that sustains all of men's sense 
                                                          
 125 Paschasius Radbertus, PL 120, 1327A  
 
 126 Ibid., 15 
 
 127 Ibid., 16, no. 47 
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powers in being. In themselves, then, these powers have a 
dimension that is at least spiritual and may even be super-
natural […].128 
 
With this theological anthropology acting as the prerequisite to Balthasar’s 
understanding of the soteriology of the cross, his use of the phrase originally in 
question, “mystical realism”, becomes clearer. A spiritual (mystical) substance, sin, can 
be concentrated and relocated into a human soul and human body (realism). And it is to 
this act of sin’s substantial relocation in the Passion that we now turn. 
 
 
C: Balthasarian “Mystical Realism” and the Passion 
 
 
The first thing that strikes the careful reader of Balthasar’s works dealing with 
substantial sin is the language of spiritual boundaries and extension; after all, if sin is a 
res, able to be physically removed in the body and soul of the person of Jesus, it is to 
that extent measurable.129 It is not, therefore, surprising to find Balthasar claiming: 
The Passion, properly so called [...] begins, in the earliest 
narrative, that of Mark, with Jesus 'falling to the ground' 
(MK 14:35) […] Jesus falls down so as to undergo, dashed 
to the ground, the eschatological testing [...] Then the 'hour' 
and the 'chalice' became the entry of the sin of the world 
into the personal existence, body and soul, of the 
                                                          
 128 Hans Urs von Balthasar, "On the Christian's Capacity to See" in Explorations in Theology – 
Volume V (San Francisco, Ignatius Press: 1979), 66-76.  
 
 129 If the idea of measurable qualities being applied to spiritual substances seems odd to modern 
ears (as Balthasar himself implies by his presentation of Paul’s mystical realism as challenging), the case 
of angels and demons in Christian philosophical-theology stands out as a major case of precedent. 
Patristic authors operated under the conception that these beings acted by way of some manner of 
spiritual- matter, and Scholastic writers continued the speculation by spending a great deal of time on the 
question of angelic/demonic “ubiety”, or the property of being in a given place, despite the lack of 
material bodies.  In fact, many of the metaphysical speculations on substance (a term, give the subject of 
our present study, of no little importance) arise directly from an attempt to reconcile a philosophical 
commitment to hylomorphism (which presupposes some manner of form as well as matter, actuality as 
well as potentiality) with dogmatic commitment to spiritual creatures.  
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representative substitute and mediator.130 
 
Jesus, in his initial confrontation with the res of substantial sin, falls. It is as if he has 
encountered a boundary, has struck up against a wall, as it were. This lexigraphical 
stress on the boundaries of two distinct and, what is more, ontic-ly opposite substances 
is made even clearer in the 7th volume of the Theological-Aesthetics, written roughly 
within the same year as the passage from Mysterium Paschale explored above, when 
Balthasar argues that, "within the brackets of this [intra-Trinitarian] love lies the whole 
momentum of the curse of the sin of the world, which crashes against the one who 
bears it. Inasmuch as this curse leads to death, […] no faith or hope can ward off the 
lethal momentum of the blow."131 While Balthasar goes on, in this passage, to begin an 
exploration of Christ’s interior state, I would like to pause here, at the exterior, at the 
place, at the moment, of “impact”, in the Garden of Gethsemane, on the evening of Holy 
Thursday. I wish to do so in order to allow Balthasar’s friend, advocate, and colleague, 
Joseph Ratzinger to expound upon this idea of sin’s mystically real boundaries. He did 
so at length in a homily preached for the liturgy of Holy Thursday. Therein, the future 
Benedict XVI began his reflection by drawing on the historical context of Jesus’ actions 
that night:  
In the calendar of the nomads from whom Israel adopted 
the Passover festival, Passover was New Year's Day, i.e. the 
day on which the creation was re-founded, when it had to 
be defended once again against the inroads of the void […]. 
A regulation forbade anyone to leave the city of Jerusalem 
in the night of the Passover. The entire city was felt to be 
                                                          
 130 Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, 100-101 
 
 131 Hans Urs con Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological –Aesthetics, Volume VII – Theology 
of the New Covenant (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 225. 
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the locus of salvation over against the chaotic night, its 
walls the rampart, protecting the creation.” 132 
One notes the use of “boundary-language” in the protective status given to Jerusalem’s 
walls. But just as evident, by default, would be the status of that space outside of these 
walls. When this historical setting of Passover boundaries is taken in conjunction with 
the Torah’s account of what transpires to those Egyptian homes not marked off by the 
lamb’s blood on doorposts and lintel, that non-protected space becomes the abode of 
evil, the place of substantial sin.133 Ratzinger confirms this in the conclusion to the 
homily, when he reminds his listeners of Jesus’ actions that night, after the institution of 
the Eucharist, where reification again plays a vital role, when: 
After the meal he got up and went out, and he overstepped 
the bounds of the law by going beyond the Brook Kidron, 
which marks the boundary of Jerusalem. He went out into 
the night. He did not fear the chaos, did not hide from it, but 
plunged into its deepest point, into the jaws of death; as we 
pray, "he descended into hell."134 
 
Returning to Balthasar, we move forward in the chronology of the Passion to explore 
more of this “boundary language” in relation to substantial sin and the body and soul of 
Jesus.  Moving into the graphic horrors of Good Friday, we find a similar theological-
exegesis as encountered in Mclean’s reading of Paul outlined above. This is especially 
                                                          
 132 “Then” Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One: An Approach to a Spiritual 
Christology. Translated by Graham Harrison. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 103-104. Our next 
chapter will be dealing at length with the connection between primordial chaos and the quiddity of 
substantial sin.  
 
 133 Exodus 12: 21-32 – “Moses summoned all the elders of Israel and said to them, ‘Go and 
procure lambs for your families, and slaughter the Passover victims.  Then take a bunch of hyssop, and 
dipping it in the blood that is in the basin, apply some of this blood to the lintel and the two doorposts. 
And none of you shall go outdoors until morning. For when the Lord goes by to strike down the 
Egyptians, seeing the blood on the lintel and the two doorposts, the Lord will pass over that door and not 
let the destroyer come into your houses to strike you down.’” (NABRE) 
 
 134 Ibid., 108 
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evident in Balthasar’s 1978 devotional work on the Christology (and, by default, 
soteriology) of the Rosary: The Threefold Garland: The World’s Salvation in Mary’s  
Prayer, where we find him wondering: 
Why was Jesus scourged? Certainly not because Pilate was 
making one last effort to soften the Jews. And also not in 
order to extort from Jesus a confession by means of torture: 
he had already confessed. Rather this is a preparatory 
measure for the crucifixion. The Jews scourged with a 
certain restraint: 40 strokes, less one, out of compassion. 
Pagan soldiers […] often thrashed their victim to death with 
sophisticated instruments whose straps were provided 
with bits of bone, or lead, which often succeeded in 
exposing the internal organs.135 
 
While it is of general popular Catholic piety to express devotion to the physical wounds 
of Jesus, Balthasar is clearly adding theological exploration to this practice, finding in 
them the very means of what McLean called the act of “transference”, whereby the 
victim of an expulsive- apotropaic ritual would need to be rendered physically able to 
absorb the curse or contagion of the land, city and populace in question. And, of course, 
once this rendering, in the definitive sense of “giving over” or “surrendering” 
something, has taken place, the via cruces follows: Jesus’ wounded, absorptive body is 
now literally opened to the infection of the whole of Jerusalem’s sins, which enter him 
as he moves – now laden down with them – outside of the gates of city.  “Behold, the 
Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world!”136 
 This language of Jesus’ confrontation with a substantial, chaotic evil is further 
expanded by Balthasar’s use of the language of the dimension, as it applies to both 
                                                          
 135 Hans Urs von Balthasar. The Threefold Garland, 78. 
 
 136 John 1;29 
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space and time. In a 1982 essay exploring yet another Pauline soteriological formula, 
“death, swallowed up by life”, he says: 
He opens up his embodied spirit as a space in which he 
passively let's human sin work out the whole unimaginable 
brutality of its anti-divine fury. The dimensions of this sin 
extend from the beginning of mankind to its end; past and 
future are enclosed within the present event. This totality 
spiritually removes the suffering Christ into a kind of 
timelessness 'Jesus is in agony until the end of the world' 
(Pascal)...137 
 
But, if this talk of eternity seems to “spiritualize” the event of substantial sin’s 
assumption into the body and the soul of Jesus, the former’s role as conduit for the 
exchange is always stressed and re-stressed by Balthasar – again, firmly placing him in 
the line of mystical –realists explored above. Returning to a theology born of devotion 
to the wounds of Christ, specifically here the act of fixing his body to the cross, he boldly 
claims that: 
What is involved here is a kind of perverse sacrament that 
effects interiorly what it signifies in the external image: the 
sufferings which are being driven into the body of Jesus are 
in truth the sins of the world, knocked forcibly into his total 
divine and human person.... In his humanity God 
experiences what the sin of the world is.138 
                                                          
 137 Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Death is Swallowed up by Life" in Explorations in Theology –Volume 
V (San Francisco, Ignatius Press: 2014), 231. Emphasis, mine. He continues, further unpacking the 
temporal implications: “Christ brings the modality of being dead into his eternal life. Though he does not 
remain dead he does remain the one who once was dead... The Pauline idea that 'death is swallowed up 
by life', then, means not that death is simply annihilated, but that it is incorporated into the life of Christ 
and of God. [...]. If the Lamb of the Apocalypse stands on the throne of God, alive "as though it had been 
slain", then this 'as though' cannot mean that he was not really slain or that his appearance merely bears 
a distant resemblance to being slain or even that, though he actually was slain, the slaying took place in 
some bygone age far removed from the present. No, it must mean that, right now, in the life of eternity, 
the Lamb bears his slaying in his own risen body as a supreme mode of expressing the life that in him is 
one with love.”  (236-237) 
 
 138 Balthasar, The Threefold Garland.., 79. Balthasar continues, applying his speculations on the 
spatio-temporal nature of sin to the question of the Sacrament of Penance: “It is an incalculably 
amorphous amalgam... It contains my sins, too, which in turn are innumerable.  A sin which is a palpable 
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But, if we have shown (as we contend we have) that Balthasar’s envisions transference 
of a cursed substance, the collective sins of the world, into the person of Jesus during 
the events of the Passion, what is one to make of this substance? What is it? Questions 
of quiddity follow naturally from proposals of existence, and I would contend that, with 
several direct and indirect references to “chaos” present in the passages outlined here, 
one could begin to answer the question of the quiddity of sin according to Balthasar.   
                                                          
reality is remitted by absolution, it does not simply dissolve into nothingness: through the alchemy of 
divine love it dissolves into the suffering of Christ.”  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The a priori Conditions of Possibility for Substantial Sin:  
Primordial Chaos and Barthian Nothingness 
 
 
Having set aside the issue of the privative tradition (Chapter 2), and coming to 
the heart of the matter considered in the Pauline passages of “mystical realism” 
(Chapter 3), I propose that in answering the crucial question as to what sin is, per se, 
von Balthasar consistently – if in a fragmentary manner – presents moral evil as a 
substance of human creation.  As the following chapter hopes to expound, for Balthasar 
this is creation arising from the misuse of human freedom acting as a catalyzing agent 
on a very particular a priori condition within an omnipotent God’s “good” Creation.  I 
also believe that this proposal of Balthasar’s substantial sin, existing within a classically 
Thomistic relationship of actuality to potentiality, to be best explicated by first 
exploring the latter of the two concepts, that is, the theological and metaphysical 
presuppositions that undergird the possibility for sin’s “per se” existence, and then 
turning to the question of the human concretization of the possibility via the misuse of 
human freedom. 
 As multiple Balthasar scholars and commentators have stressed, Lateran IV, with 
its promulgation of the analogia entis, plays a crucial role in understanding the 
metaphysics of the world in which Balthasar’s theology functions.139 I would argue 
                                                          
 139The analogia entis, or “analogy of being”, is that principle of Catholic metaphysics that favors 
analogous language when speaking of the Divine, as directly opposed to univocal or equivocal language. 
This principle was canonized by the Church at Lateran IV (1215), which expressed the issue as follows: 
“For between creator and creature there can be noted no similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity 
cannot be seen between them.” As discussed in the Chapter 1, Balthasar’s reliance on this concept can be 
traced back to the lively theological debates between two of his mentor-friends, Barth and Przywara, on 
this very issue.  
While many of the major Balthasarian translators and commenters (especially Aidan Nichols, OP, 
Edward T. Oakes, SJ, and the noted scholar of the history of Thomism, Fergus Ker) have included 
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further that Lateran IV stands as an interesting co-incidence of two major themes in 
Balthasar’s work. The analogia entis (Denzinger 432) was defined there, with Balthasar 
taking up its exposition and defense (most famously, against Barth), incorporating the 
metaphysic that arises from it into some of his most central works on Christology, 
Anthropology and Ecumenicity.140 However, the other dogma that made its official 
creedal debut in 1217 was creatio ex nihilo (Denzinger 428), and, while the analogia 
entis was put to extensive use by Balthasar, creatio ex nihilo is not the model of creation 
through which his soteriology – with its subsequent ontology of sin – functions. Instead, 
one finds the repeated use of, and a clear working preference for, the model of creation 
apparent in more archaic strands of the Hebrew Scriptures, with God as the one who 
brings order from chaos. This preference of Balthasar’s is clearly on display in three 
works central to his ontology of sin, all appearing in print almost on top of one another 
in 1969-1970 (The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, Volume VII: Theology of 
the New Covenant; Mysterium Paschale; and the essay “On Hell” in the fourth volume of 
his collected essays, Explorations in Theology IV: Sprit and Institution).141  It is this 
“creation-from-chaos” preference, I contend, that is at the very root of the issue 
                                                          
extended treatments of Balthasar’s indebtedness to the analogia entis, the recent work of Angela Frans 
Franks deserves special attention for the foregrounding of this issue; see her article “Trinitarian Analogia 
Entis in Hans Urs von Balthasar” The Thomist 62/4 (1998): 533-559 , as well as her unpublished 
dissertation, completed for Boston College, The Epiphany of Being: Trinitarian Analogia Entis and the 
Transcendentals in Hans Urs von Balthasar.   
  
140 See, respectively, his The Theology of Karl Barth (1951), A Theology of History (1959), and A 
Theological Anthropology (1967), as well as the last three volumes of The Theo-Dramatics (1978-1983). 
 
 141 It is of some contextual interest that this is also the year in which Balthasar’s theological 
contributions saw their first major recognition from Rome (as their author was tellingly not invited to act 
as peritus, like the majority of his peers, at the Second Vatican Council), in his appointment by Pope Paul 
VI to the newly formed International Theological Commission. 
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presently under consideration – the a priori condition of possibility for sin. For, as 
Balthasar, would have it: 
God once fashioned the world from chaos, but man through 
his sin, imported a second chaos into it; now, when the Son 
dies for sinners, it is 'as if God had let the world run back 
into chaos in order to refashion it from chaos at a deeper 
level'. 142 
 
Allow me now to explicitly state that Balthasar does not reject the Catholic dogma of 
creation ex nihilo. Rather, he sees no either-or binary as necessarily existing between 
the two models. Jean Cardinal Daniélou (1905-1974), contemporary and friend of 
Balthasar and Patristic scholar most notable for his groundbreaking studies of 1st and 
2nd century Jewish-Christian texts and theologies, has the following to say of the 
complex imagery employed in the opening narratives of the book of Genesis, “The 
comparative history of religions, depth psychology, and the rediscovery of symbolic 
knowledge show us that we are in the presence of data which lift up from the 
foundations of human experience the elementary and permanent lines of religious 
knowledge.”143  This layering of poetic symbols is especially relevant to Balthasar’s 
theology, including frequent mention of its “symphonic” structure by many of his best 
commentators. The key to this musical style (shared, in many ways, with the Barth of 
                                                          
 142 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume V: The Last Act. 
Translated by Graham Harrison. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 316. And, from one of this earliest 
publications, in dealing with Karl Barth’s concept of Nothingness (which we will explore in more detail 
below): “God created the world by snatching it from chaos, but he did not erase all its affinities to chaos. 
Only the power of God can prevent chaos from breaking through. If the world moved away from God and 
relied solely on its own resources, it would open the door to chaos. And the intrusion of chaotic 
indifference into the world, as depicted in the Bible, is the inevitable consequence of sin.” The Theology of 
Karl Barth. Translated by Edward T. Oakes. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 189. 
 
 143 Jean Cardinal Daniélou, “In the beginning…” Genesis I-III. Translated by Julien L. Randolf. 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1965), 56. 
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the Church Dogmatics) is to be found in weaving repeated motifs into an ever more 
complex structure of interactive typologies drawn from Biblical, Liturgical, and cultural 
settings. We have already encountered an example of this style in action in the previous 
chapter with Balthasar’s commentary on the mystical realism at work in Irenaeus‘ 
thought. 
         While not, therefore, in direct conflict with creation ex nihilo (in fact, as will be 
discussed at the chapter’s close, he’ll be able to establish the same a priori from nothing 
as from chaos), Balthasar seems more comfortable employing other, more archaic 
creation models for his particular theological needs. And he does so with good 
precedent: the accounts of creation as ordered chaos found in the Scriptures themselves 
abound.144  In order, therefore, to better understand the underlying condition allowing 
for sin’s commission in Balthasar’s thought, a closer look into this archaic model of God 
as Creator is in order. 
 
A - Archaic Models of Creation from Chaos 
 
 
 “Then” Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith (and pupil/practitioner of the Balthasar-Daniélou Ressourcement 
                                                          
 144In the authoritative 1978 study of the issue, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of 'Creation Out of 
Nothing' in Early Christian Thought, Gerhard May claims the following “It again becomes clear how little 
we are entitled to presuppose that the fully thought-out doctrine of creation ex nihilo had become by the 
middle of the second century part of the common stock of orthodoxy.” (137). And again, “Throughout the 
second century and the early part of the third the doctrine of the pre-existence of matter was firmly held 
by philosophically educated Christians. [...] At the same time, these Christian Platonists are convinced of 
the unlimited freedom and omnipotence of God and put themselves on guard against the ontological 
equating of God and matter.” (147). Gerhard May, Creation Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of “Creation from 
Nothing” in Early Christian Thought. (New York, NY: T&T Clark International: 2004). 
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style), offered the following summary of the Biblical presentation of creation in a 1995 
collection of homilies on the themes of Genesis’ earliest chapters: 
Gradually, in confronting its pagan environment and its 
own heart, the people of Israel experienced what creation 
was. Implicit here is the fact that the classic creation 
account is not the only creation text of Sacred Scripture […]. 
In the Bible itself, the images are free and they correct 
themselves ongoing-ly. In this way they show, by means of 
the gradual and interactive process, that they are only 
images, which reveal something deeper and greater.145  
 
With these words of Ratzinger in mind, especially in light of the role Balthasar would 
play in his theological development, as well as the role he would come to play in the 
papal “canonization” of Balthasar’s work, unpacking some of the creation “images” just 
referenced is necessary, especially those stressing the role of primordial chaos. 
Perhaps the best display of archaic (that is, “pre-ex-nihilo”) models of creation from 
chaos in Israel’s cannon come from the preservation of their liturgical life in the Psalms. 
Therein, one can find multiple references to both the henotheism of early Israelite 
religion and to the role of the LORD in this near-eastern pantheon. The God of Israel, as 
opposed to the other deities (be they Marduk, Baal, Molech, or Astarte, etc.), is the one 
who brought the world into order from the primordial waters. These mysterious waters 
play a role in the more familiar creation narratives of Genesis (1:2, etc.); however, the 
actual nature of these waters are of great interest to the present subject, as well as to 
the author of Psalm 74: 
13 You divided the sea by your might; 
you broke the heads of the dragons in the waters. 
                                                          
 145 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, ‘In the Beginning…’ A Catholic Understanding of the Story of 
Creation and the Fall. Translated by Boniface Ramsey, OSB. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1990), 14-15. 
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14 You crushed the heads of Leviathan; 
you gave him as food for the creatures of the wilderness. 
15 You cut openings for springs and torrents; 
you dried up ever-flowing streams. 
16 Yours is the day, yours also the night; 
you established the luminaries and the sun. 
17 You have fixed all the bounds of the earth […]146 
 
  
Here we discover that the waters from which the well-ordered world will spring are, 
first and foremost, the home of dragons and of Leviathan, himself. In short, this chaotic 
abyss is the dwelling place of those forces understood by Israel to be inherently 
destructive and directly counter to the establishment of creation-order, so much so that 
the LORD must first violently subdue them in order to proceed with His work. In as 
much as a well-ordered creation is presented as the goal of divine action on Israel’s 
behalf, the primordial waters are the home of all antagonism to this plan. To this extent, 
one would not be wrong to call the waters home to “evil”.  
 Continuing, in not necessarily the order of their composition but, rather, in their 
canonical ordering, Psalm 104 contains a furthering of the same line of thought. Here we 
find the same creation narrative of God taming the waters, the abode of chaos and evil 
(or that which is resistant to God’s creative action): 
   5 You set the earth on its foundations, 
so that it shall never be shaken. 
6 You cover it with the deep as with a garment; 
the waters stood above the mountains. 
7 At your rebuke they flee; 
at the sound of your thunder they take to flight. 
8 They rose up to the mountains, ran down to the valleys 
to the place that you appointed for them. 
9 You set a boundary that they may not pass, 
                                                          
 146 Psalm 74 (NRSV) 
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so that they might not again cover the earth.147 
 
But, after the primordial waters have been tamed to the “boundaries” of creation-order, 
God continues to exert providential power over them by using what was once contrary 
to life to now sustain it: 
10 You make springs gush forth in the valleys; 
they flow between the hills, 
11 giving drink to every wild animal; 
the wild asses quench their thirst. 
12 By the streams the birds of the air have their habitation; 
they sing among the branches […] 
27 These all look to you 
to give them their food in due season; 
28 when you give to them, they gather it up; 
when you open your hand, they are filled with good things.148 
 
This very providence over the (now) tame waters of creation, however, seems to carry 
with it the ever-present corollary, the possibility that this water, whether in excess or 
scarcity, can be the means to death. Deluge or drought, the early nomadic Israelites are 
at its mercy, “When you hide your face, they are dismayed; when you take away their 
breath, they die and return to their dust.”149 To this extent, one would not be wrong to 
call the waters not only home to “evil”, but also “deadly.” 
The last major link, within the tradition of the Psalms, between this association 
of water with adversarial forces and beings, comes in Psalm 139. While singing of the 
extent of God’s providential presence, the author states – 
8b if I make my bed in Sheol, you are there 
9 If I take the wings of the morning 
and settle at the farthest limits of the sea, 
                                                          
 147 Psalm 104 (NRSV) 
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10 even they’re your hand shall lead me […]150 
 
The place the writer observes as the very “launch-pad” of dawn, (for where else would 
the sun rest while dormant?), the far horizons of this water that has been measured and 
ordered (given its limits) by an inescapable God, is also the place of the dead, the 
mysterious Hebrew Sheol. To this extent, I propose that one would not be wrong to call 
the waters “the underworld.” Thus, in surveying the tradition of the Psalms, with its 
emphasis on creation from chaos, one can follow a basic chain of association: these 
primordial waters are “evil,” therefore these waters are “deadly,” and therefore these 
waters are the very dwelling place of the dead themselves: a Hebraic Hades. 
 The thematic associations with the waters of creation (evil, death, underworld, 
et al.), weaving in and out of the Psalmic tradition, are to be found once again, all at play, 
in the concluding chapters of the book of Job.151 Here, the Hebrew Scriptures have God 
himself outlining the events of creation from the waters of chaos, as he rebukes Job’s 
interrogation of divine sovereignty and justice. In chapter 38, we find the following 
familiar imagery: 
3 Gird up your loins like a man, 
I will question you, and you shall declare to me. 
4 “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? 
Tell me, if you have understanding. 
5 Who determined its measurements—surely you know! 
Or who stretched the line upon it? 
6 On what were its bases sunk, 
or who laid its cornerstone 
7 when the morning stars sang together 
and all the heavenly beings shouted for joy? 
                                                          
 150 Psalm 139 (NRSV) 
 
 151 I’m Indebted here to the work of Abigail Pelham and her Contested Creations in the Book of 
Job: the world as it ought and ought not to be Biblical Interpretation Series, Volume 113. (Leiden: Brill 
Publishing, 2012). 
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8 “Or who shut in the sea with doors 
when it burst out from the womb?— 
9 when I made the clouds its garment, 
and thick darkness its swaddling band, 
10 and prescribed bounds for it, 
and set bars and doors, 
11 and said, ‘Thus far shall you come, and no farther, 
and here shall your proud waves be stopped’?152 
 
Again, the primordial waters are in need of taming in order for God to sink the pylons 
upon which terrestrial order will arise, and we find those waters less than compliant to 
some simple divine “fiat.” The waters are resistant to order, seemingly by nature. The 
waters are “evil.” Continuing through the passage, the chain of association met above 
occurs again: this evil water, in as much as it needs controlling in order for 
animal/human life to exist, is deadly and in point of fact, is the entrance to the realm of 
the dead. For, as God asks Job, “Have you entered into the springs of the sea, or walked 
in the recesses of the deep?  Have the gates of death been revealed to you, or have you 
seen the gates of deep darkness?”153 
Finally, turning to the more familiar territory of the Genesis narratives, we find 
the first of them affirming what has been established, “In the beginning, when God 
created the heavens and the earth, the earth was a formless void and darkness covered 
the face of the deep, while a wind from God swept over the face of the waters.”154 A 
passage echoed, of course, in its polar opposite, when God, acting upon his regret over 
creation, returns it to a state of deadly chaos via the very same waters, “When the seven 
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days were over, the waters of the flood came upon the earth.  In the six hundredth year 
of Noah’s life, in the second month, on the seventeenth day of the month: on that day all 
the fountains of the great abyss burst forth, and the floodgates of the sky were 
opened.”155 This is a core reminder about the providential care of God, and a reminder 
of the sinister essence of these waters upon which reality rests.  
Before exploring theological conclusions drawn from this brief survey of 
creation as an ordering of chaos, a return to “Then” Ratzinger, and the fitting summation 
to his homily encountered at this section’s beginning is warranted:  
At the very origin of the world lurks something sinister, and 
in the deepest part of humankind there lies something 
rebellious, demonic, and evil […]. Such views were not 
simply fairytales. They express the discomfiting realities 
that human beings experienced in the world and among 
themselves […].The whole tale of these sinister powers 
melts away in a few words: "The earth was without form 
and void." Behind these Hebrew words lie the dragon, and 
the demonic powers that are spoken of elsewhere.156  
 
 
 
B – Balthasar’s Theology of Primordial Chaos 
 
 
Balthasar makes great soteriological use of the Scriptural presentations of 
creation from the primordial waters of chaos, especially in his theology of Holy 
Saturday (and the subsequent ontology of sin he presents from within this theology). 
But, before turning to a Christian exegesis of these texts from the TANAK, it would seem 
wise to first listen to a Jewish theologian’s understanding of the issues at play in early 
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Israelite religion and its development into1st Temple Judaism. The work of Jon 
Levenson, especially as formulated in his 1988 study, Creation and the Persistence of 
Evil: The Drama of Divine Omnipotence, is be just such a voice.157 Many of the theological 
conclusion drawn here are the same ones which Balthasar himself proposed, nearly two 
decades earlier, as applied to the Christian mysteries. 
 
Levenson’s thesis is readily displayed at the outset of his work, and reveals its 
import in comparison to Balthasar’s thought: 
Although it is now generally recognized that creation ex 
nihilo, the doctrine that God produced the physical world 
out of nothing, is not an adequate characterization of 
creation in the Hebrew Bible, the legacy of this dogmatic or 
propositional understanding lives on and continues to 
distort the perceptions of scholars and laypersons alike. In 
particular, a false finality or definitiveness is ascribed to 
God's act of creation, and, consequently the fragility of the 
created order and its vulnerability to chaos tend to be 
played down.158 
 
From this starting point, Levenson carefully traces the theme of primordial chaos and 
its association with the waters of creation, touching upon most of the Biblical passages 
explored above. However, his stress (as the title’s reference to divine omnipotence 
indicates) is on the present situation of humanity given this creative background. It is, 
at heart, an existential stress. What are humans, especially those in a covenant 
relationship with the Creator, to make of this concept of life resting upon a chaos 
brought to heel by God’s ordering? 
                                                          
 157 Jon D. Levenson. Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence. 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1988). I admit to also finding the use of the term “drama” – 
both in title and text – to have a fine echo with the Balthasarian Theo-Dramatic approach. 
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The habitable, life-sustaining world exists now only 
because of God's continuing commitment to the original 
command. Absent that command, the sinister forces of 
chaos would surge forth again. The biblical drama of world 
order is defined by the persistence of those forces, on the 
one hand, and the possibility (or is it an inevitability) that 
God will exercise his vaunted omnipotence to defeat them, 
on the other.159 
 
For Levenson, the precarious nature of human reality, most especially exemplified in 
the very real drama of Israel’s covenant relationship with the LORD, finds its (literal) 
ground here, at the very creation, which rests – tentatively it seems – upon the a priori 
condition of the chaotic waters. He continues arguing that, “In each case [of preceding 
biblical commentary], the confinement of chaos, rather than its elimination, is the 
essence of creation, and the survival of ordered reality hangs only upon God's 
vigilance.”160 Most interestingly for the connections to be drawn between Levenson’s 
and Balthasar’s concepts, the former speaks not only of a divine preservation of the 
ordered chaos by way of covenantal providence, but also proposes that, in times of 
Israel’s distress, the “covenant relationship includes the possibility that God's 
congregation might activate their Lord's dormant mastery through their cultic action, 
and thus actualize those nearly discredited creative wonders.”161 As will be 
demonstrated later, individual/personal sin serves as the activating agent of 
catalyzation upon this a priori possibility for evil/chaos, and Balthasar essentially 
argued the same conclusions from a negative standpoint. However, it is finally time to 
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turn to Balthasar himself and his understanding of primordial chaos as that very a 
priori possibility for evil’s substantial existence. 162 
 Balthasar first proposed a link between primordial chaos and the substance of 
evil in the seventh volume (according to the English-language division of publication) of 
the first section of his central work, the Triptych: The Glory of the Lord: A Theological-
Aesthetics, VII: Theology of the New Covenant.163 In light the “Mystical Realism” explored 
in the previous chapter, it is not surprising to find a quote from Irenaeus acting as the 
stepping off point for Balthasar’s logic as he approaches the mystery of the Passion, and 
in particular, Jesus’ experience of death and his subsequent descent into Sheol:  
 […] in this ‘visio mortis’ the whole fruit of the redeeming 
Cross was seen together. That is to say, sin in it's pure state, 
separated from man, 'sin in itself', in the whole formless, 
chaotic momentum of its reality was seen by Jesus; and 
with it, the 'remainder that could not be absorbed into the 
Father's work of creation, because he had left man freedom 
to decide for or against God --  the unfinished part of 
creation, that it was left to the Incarnate Son to finish: and 
the Son, obedient to his mission, is led by the Father now 
into the state of existence of this sin that remains: 'He 
descended to the lower parts of the earth to see with his eyes 
that part of creation which was inactive'(Irenaeus, Ad H 4 22, 
I).164 
 
                                                          
 162 In an interesting Patristic parallel, May offers the following explanation of Hermonoges’ (3rd 
century) theology of creation: “Matter itself, before it's ordering, is without qualities, neither corporeal 
nor incorporeal. It is also neither good nor evil, although Hermonoges derives evil from it. But matter 
cannot be essentially evil, otherwise God would have been unable to create anything out of it. It even 
bears in itself the demand to be ordered by God. As matter is infinite, God has only partly formed it. 
Through this forming, it is undergoing a change for the better, but even the ordered cosmos is still a 
mirror and a copy of matter in its original uninformed state. Hermonoges seems to have considered the 
traces of the original disorder of matter remaining in every created thing as the specific ground of the evil 
present in the world.” May, Creatio, 142 (emphasis, mine). 
 
 163 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological-Aesthetics, Volume VII: Theology 
of the New Covenant. Translated by Brian McNeil. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989).  
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As discussed in the previous chapter, Balthasar posited two aspects to the Passion: one 
active and one passive. Dying and being dead; the latter, he lamented, too often 
overlooked in an overly comfortable “rush to Easter Joy” on the part of many Christian 
theologians.165 If the active aspect of the Passion involved the abstraction, assumption, 
and removal of the substance of the world’s sin to Sheol (via a very real death), the 
essence of its passive aspect (being dead) is a mute stare at that deep darkness Christ 
himself deposits in the act of descending. Here, then, is the “where” in the liturgical 
proclamation about the “Lamb of God, who takes the sin/s of the world”.  
 If the human body of the Logos stares, with “corpse obedience”166, into the 
darkness of his own eyelids, the human soul of the Logos contemplates, in a Passion-
passivity, this “visio mortis”. The nature of this deadly sight is elucidated by Balthasar 
with the very language of primordial chaos under discussion. In a dense, single volume 
study of the Triduum published within the year as the passage just considered from the 
Theological-Aesthetics, we find a further exploration of the substance of this “visio 
mortis”. Thus, in Mysterium Paschale, we find that: 
The object of His vision [is] the second death which, itself, 
is one with sheer sin as such, no longer seen as attaching to 
a particular human being, sin incarnate in living existences, 
but abstracted from that individuation, contemplated in its 
bare reality as such (for sin is a reality). In this amorphous 
condition, sin forms what one can call the 'second chaos' 
                                                          
 165 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale.: “Then the silence closed around, as the sealed 
tomb will close likewise. At the end of the Passion, when the Word of God is dead, The Church has no 
words left to say. While the grain of corn is dying, there is nothing to harvest. This state of being dead is 
not, for the Word made man, one situation among others […] as if the life thus briefly interrupted were 
simply to resume on Easter Day […] We must take with full gravity this affirmation: in the same way that 
a man who undergoes death and burial is mute, no longer communicating or transmitting anything, so it 
is with this man, Jesus, who was the Speech, the Communication and Mediation of God.” 49-50. 
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(generated by human liberty) and that, in the separation 
between sin and the living man, is then precisely the 
product of the active suffering of the Cross. […] The object 
of this visio mortis can only be the pure substantiality of 
‘Hell’, which is ‘sin in itself.’167   
 
Besides containing one of Balthasar’s strongest statements in favor of a non-privative, 
model of substantial sin (“for sin is a reality”), this passage also makes explicit his view 
that the substance of this sin, its quiddity, is connected to the primordial chaos of 
creation. Just as creation, before divine ordering, is a miasma of disorder, so humanity’s 
creation, this “second chaos”, is an “amorphous” chaos caused by the misuse of freewill. 
When taken in conjunction with what was said above in the Theological-Aesthetics, with 
its mention of the “remainder that could not be absorbed into the Father's work of 
creation, because he had left man freedom,” Balthasar has now firmly established his 
opinion that there is a direct relationship between sin and pre-creation chaos. Arguably, 
this relationship is being presented as the metaphysical a priori possibility for the re-
entrance of chaos into the (otherwise ordered, “good”) world, by way of the disordering 
effect of individual sins.  
Before exploring the ontological weight given to human freedom in the 
relationship just proposed, and in order to further cement the connection between the 
primordial chaos of pre-creation and the “second chaos” of sin, one final work of 
Balthasar’s must be considered. Again, as with the previous two works, this particular 
passage examines the relationship between these two states of chaos by way of an 
exploration of a central Balthasarian motif, Christ’s Descent into Hell. In the fourth (of 
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five) volumes collecting his essays on various theological topics, one finds a 1970 piece, 
tellingly titled “The Descent into Hell”: probably his fullest treatment of a subject 
appearing throughout his oeuvre.168 Here, Balthasar employs the early Christian 
typological reading of Jesus as Jonah to explore the issue: 
Christ's being dead and his being in the abyss of the sea are 
one and the same thing: Sheol (Hades, underworld) and 
tehom (the abyss of the sea) are normally seen together as 
part of the same range of images in the Old Testament. This 
illuminates the reference to Jonah in Matthew 12:39 […].169  
 
Beyond the initial linking of the waters with the shadowy realm of Sheol, Balthasar 
continues to draw connections between this Hebrew “tehom” and other primordial 
themes from the religious imagination of 1st and 2nd Temple Judaism. Confirming the 
results of the afore-written Scriptural analysis, he also identifies tehom-Sheol as the 
very locus of that chaos whose inchoate power(s) God must first subdue in order to 
create life and land dependent upon mundane, tamed waters: 
Another theme closely bound up with this in a mysterious 
way, though not identical to it, is the theme of the 
connection between the sea's abyss (as the rebellious 
power of chaos resistant to God, tehom…) and Christ's 
baptism, where his immersion in the river Jordan bespeaks 
a first 'cultic' anticipation of his definitive baptismal 
immersion in the abyss of chaos:170 
 
Having introduced the first traditional and Scriptural account of Christ’s encounter with 
water, his Baptism by John, as symbolic of his final, definitive interaction with the same 
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force, Balthasar can turn his attention to the particulars of this later, fuller “immersion”, 
his descent into hell: 
 
This basically gives a positive answer to the dispute about 
whether the dead Lord descended into the farthest reaches 
of hell, to 'chaos', or not... According to Irenaeus, Jesus 
looked at chaos. According to Gregory I, he 'walked through 
the uttermost depths of the abyss.' The Odes of Solomon 
venture the sublime formula: 'the depths were teeming 
with the abundance of the Lord," 171 
 
Readers are now faced with a direct opposition to the picture of the primordial waters 
“teeming” with the dragons and sea serpents described in the creation-through-
subjugation themes of several Psalms and sections of Genesis, Job, etc. Now, following 
this second divine encounter with the second chaos, all of creation, even the unformed 
remainder that had existed since God’s original act of ordering, that anticipatory space 
devoted to the potential reentry of disorder, is “teeming” with salvific grace. In point of 
fact, the threatening waters of death (Leviathan, Noah’s Flood, etc.) have not only been 
fully ordered by the Passion, but ordered in such a fashion that they have become the 
very means of accessing the salvific value of that Passion, through “the waters of 
Baptism.”  Based on such speculations, Balthasar once went so far as to refer to the 
post-Descent Sheol, now properly dubbed “Hell,” as a “Christological space,” echoing, in 
many ways, the question posed by the Psalmist, “Where can I go from your spirit? From 
your presence, where can I flee? If I ascend to the heavens, you are there; if I lie down in 
Sheol, there you are.”172 It is from the perspective of this bold, but clearly Scriptural, 
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proposal that Balthasar would pursue yet another of his theological speculations that, 
like the theory of substantial sin, excites strong reactions from both supporters and 
detractors: his hope for (but certainly not certainty of) universal salvation and 
apocatastasis. After all, if hell is the traditional eschatological destination for those who 
definitively reject Christ, it is also, according to Balthasar, already Christified by his 
presence there in his descent and, in fact, it is the very product of his sui generis 
experience of measuring the farthest boundaries of creation and chaos. 
 
C: Barth, Balthasar and das Nichtige 
 
 
Despite his preference for the order-from-chaos model of creation, Balthasar 
was also able to draw the same conclusions about the substantial nature of sin by way 
of an ex nihilo model. I write “an”, and not “the”, in reference to this model, as it is not 
the normative conception of nothing with which he engaged.173 Instead, Balthasar 
                                                          
173 Christian theologians have previously explored the possible metaphysical consequences of proposing 
“nothing” as the both the starting point of God’s creative action as well as the ultimate definition of 
privative evil., but in ways far different from how Barth  did so. Two prominent examples would be the 
naïve realism on display in the 9th century letter of Fridugisus of Tours, De nihilo et tenebris, and in the 
beginnings of dialectical Scholasticism, with Anselm’s 11th century De casu Diaboli. The former, for 
example, in the course of its brief arguments, proposes that: “Is nothing something or not? If one answers 
‘It seems to me to be nothing,’ his very denial, as he supposes it, compels him to say that something is 
nothing, since he says ‘It seems to me to be nothing,’ which is as if he were to say, ‘It seems to me that 
nothing is something.’ But if it seems to be something, it cannot appear not to be in any way at all. Hence, 
the only remaining alternative is that it seems to be something […]. Every signifying is a signifying of that 
which is. But ‘nothing’ signifies something. Therefore, ‘nothing’s signifying is of that which is — that is, of 
an existing thing.” http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/fridugis.pdf [Accessed 10/15/2013]. The latter, in 
the course of Anselm’s dialogue, has a disciple summarize the situation to his magister in the following 
fashion: “I concede […] that evil is a privation of good. But nonetheless, I regard good as a privation of 
evil. And just as I perceive in the case of the deprivation of evil that there results something else which we 
call good, so I notice in the case of the deprivation of good that there results something else which we call 
evil […]. While justice is present, there seems to be such great tranquility and peace of mind that in many 
cases justice seems to be nothing other than a cessation of evil. But when justice departs, very conflicting 
and very harsh and very manifold passion besets the mind […]. It would be astonishing if it could be shown 
that nothing accomplishes all these things […]. Therefore—since the question at hand is about evil, which 
you say to be nothing—if you wish to teach me what I may understand evil to be, teach me first what I 
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approached the connection between the a priori possibility of substantial sin and 
matters of this “primordial” nothing, by way of Karl Barth’s unique conception of it as 
“das Nichtige,” or “Nothingness.” 
That the explicitly Roman Catholic Balthasar should be influenced in this matter 
by the great Protestant founder/expositor of Calvinist Neo-Orthodoxy should come as 
no shock. The young Jesuit had been trained in Thomism by Erich Przywara (1889-
1972), the Scholastic metaphysician whose fame during his life was based largely upon 
the debates held (in both public and print) with Barth over the role of philosophy in 
Christian faith and life.174  Balthasar learned so much of the latter’s theology from 
attendance and participation in these debates that he was soon lecturing on Barth. 
These lectures were not only attended and approved of by the Protestant theologian 
but lead to one of the first of Balthasar’s popular publications, his 1951 The Theology of 
Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation.175  This early attempt by both parties to 
understand the other’s approach to Christianity was the result, or at least early on 
resulted in, a real and very lasting friendship.176 Hence, Mark Lindsay claimed in his 
detailed exploration of this aspect of Barthian studies, “’Nothingness’ Revisited: Karl 
Barth’s Doctrine of Radical Evil in the Wake of the Holocaust”: 
                                                          
may understand nothing to be. Then reply to the other arguments by which I said I was troubled about 
the fact that evil seems to be something. http://jasper-hopkins.info/DeCasu.pdf, [Accessed 10/1/17]. 
 
 174 Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis – Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm. 
Translated by John Betz and David Bentley Hart. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014). 
 
 175 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth. Translated by Edward T. Oakes. (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992). 
 176 This friendship has been both recently and exhaustively documented in D. Stephen Long’s 
excellent Saving Karl Barth: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Preoccupation. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
2014). 
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There is no doubt that Barth's doctrine of das Nichtige […] 
represents one of the most remarkable attempts in 
theological history to comprehend the problem of evil. 
According to Barth's Roman Catholic commentator, Hans 
Urs Von Balthasar, by framing this problem of evil in strictly 
theological terms, he has taken it more seriously than any 
purely human experience or philosophical reflection has 
ever done.' (The Theology of Karl Barth, 231)177   
 
 Whereas the standard conception of creatio ex nihilo (the one, by and large, 
endorsed by Lateran IV with its own, particular theological climate) rests on the divine 
fiat, bringing that which was not in existence (potentiality) into a state of existence 
(actuality), Barth’s theory differs based on his own theological environment. That 
environment is, as the name “Neo-Orthodoxy” was meant to imply, one focused on 
returning to the major themes of the Protestant Reformation and, specifically for Barth, 
a return to Calvin and his emphasis on divine sovereignty, especially as witnessed in the 
act of election. However, a simple re-statement and retrenchment of historical 
Calvinism would do little justice to the newness, or “neo,” used by Barth in his approach 
to this “orthodoxy.” Sharing important traits with the contemporary Catholic 
Ressourcement movement so key to Balthasar’s theological development, “Neo-
Orthodoxy” – with Barth largely at its vanguard – sought ways of exploring key 
Reformation tenets within the context of 400 plus years of intervening theological, 
historical, and exegetical developments. The clearest example of this in Barth’s work, 
and one that will have direct bearing on his theology of primordial Nichtige, is the 
aforementioned doctrine of predestination – or divine election.   
                                                          
 177 Mark Lindsay, “’Nothingness’ Revisited: Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Evil in the Wake of the 
Holocaust”, COLLOQUIUM 34/1 (2012), 6.  
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 For Calvin, drawing on his selective reading of Augustine’s anti-Pelegian tracts, 
divine sovereignty is best understood by way of the issue of salvation itself, the crucial 
question as to the efficiency of Christ’s salvific work. While humans may very well 
operate under the effects of their temporal existence, that is, under the assumption that 
their choice for or against the claims of the Paschal Mystery arise from the use of their 
own free-will, Calvin insists that the impetus of all true conversion to salvation is found 
only in the eternal decree of God’s divine choice. God has chosen his elect, those who 
will receive the benefits of salvation, those specifically for whom Christ suffered and 
died. God has also, according to this schema, passed over others from all eternity. While 
never officially taught by Calvin, many of his immediate followers (including his 
successor at the head of Geneva, Theodore Beza) would transform the understanding of 
the latter class into those actively not chosen by God: the non-elect, the reprobate, 
resulting in the open advocation for the doctrine of Double Predestination.  
 Barth’s great contribution to this particular aspect of his Calvinist heritage was 
to return the doctrine of predestination to the Scriptural and Patristic context of its 
origin, specifically, to resituate it in the larger context of Christology. For Barth, as for 
Paul and the early Augustine, all predestination is predestination “in Christ,” which is to 
say that it is Christ who is object of both the Father’s election (as “Only Begotten,” or 
incarnation-ally, as “Second Adam”) and his rejection (in the Passion). This refocusing 
of election from a purely soteriological to a Christological context, however, continues 
for Barth – moving back into the very act of creation itself. Here starts the introduction 
to the concept of das Nichtige, Barth’s cosmic/primordial alternative to the Calvinist 
mass of reprobate individuals.  
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 In the third section of the 3rd volume of his monumental Church Dogmatics, one 
finds Barth’s understanding of the doctrine of Divine election as it applies to the 
bedrock of extra-Trinitarian reality, the creation: 
Even on His left hand the activity of God is not in vain. He does 
not act for nothing. His rejection, opposition negation, and 
dismissal are powerful and effective like all His works because 
they, too, are grounded in Himself, in the freedom and wisdom 
of His election. That which God renounces and abandons in 
virtue of His decision is not merely nothing. It is nothingness, 
and has as such its own being, albeit malignant and perverse. 
A real dimension is disclosed, and existence and form are 
given to a reality sui generis.178 
 
That which God did not elect to create is, as a logical consequence of Barth’s 
foregrounding of the absolute power of divine sovereignty, that which is rejected, that 
which is “malignant” (a word whose oncological-ontology will be studied in Chapter 5). 
In short, that which a sovereign, good God chooses not to call into existence is, by that 
very same divine decree (or lack thereof), given its own “sui generis” shadow substance. 
Barth continues to explore the effects of God’s, no on this unwilled-uncreated 
dimension by employing the language of Calvin: 
This negation of His grace is chaos, the world which He did 
not choose or will, which He could not and did not create, 
but which, as He created the actual world, He passed over 
and set aside [...]. And this is evil in the Christian sense, 
namely, what is alien and adverse to grace, and therefore 
without it.179 
 
                                                          
 178 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics Volume III: 3 – The Doctrine of Creation. (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1977), 351-2. 
 
 179 Ibid., 353 (emphasis, mine) 
 
105 
 
Just as those human individuals whom God “passed over” in Calvin’s soteriological 
conception of Election-to-Salvation are rendered “reprobate,” so the whole reality 
which God “passed over” in the original, primal Election-to-Creation is rendered 
ontologically reprobate. And in as much as it is that which is rejected by the good God, it 
is, according to Barth, the very stuff of evil and that which possess no trace of God’s will 
or grace.180  
As is evident, evil most certainly exists for Barth but its manner of existing is the 
problem. It has no divine mandate to exist and, hence, cannot be considered part of 
creation. It does, however, exist (in the very act of being rejected), and to this extent, is 
ontologically speaking, substantial. Seemingly in response to presenting such a novel, 
and admittedly confusing, model of creation as it relates to that which is evil, Barth 
concludes this section of his Dogmatics, in an almost catechetical fashion, attempting to 
lend a bit more clarity to this shadow realm he proposes: 
If God Himself were not the primary victim and foe of 
nothingness, there would be no reason for the unyielding 
recognition that (1) nothingness is not nothing but exists in 
its own curious fashion, (2) that it is in no way to be 
understood as an essential attribute of divine or creaturely 
being but only as their frontier, (3) that we are capable of 
knowing nothingness only as we know God in His self-
revelation, (4) that nothingness has its being on the left 
hand of God and is grounded in His non-willing, and (5) 
that it is evil by nature and therefore we cannot regard or 
grouped it in any sense with God and his creature.181 
 
                                                          
 180 Balthasar employed this Barthian language and approach, to maters of sovereignty and sin in 
sections of Mysterium Paschale explored early in this chapter, especially in describing the ‘visio mortis’ of 
the dead Christ, “In this presentation, Hell is a product of the Redemption, a product which henceforth 
must be ‘contemplated’ in its own ‘for itself’ by the Redeemer, so as to become, in its state of sheer 
reprobation that which exists ‘for him’: that over which, in his Resurrection, he receives the power and the 
keys.” Mysterium Paschale, 174 (emphasis, mine). 
 
 181 Ibid, 360. 
106 
 
This dissection of the concept of das Nichtige into the five statements Barth feels 
comfortable affirming provides a unique look at the specific elements of the theory 
which would influence Balthasar’s understanding of sin. Of particular interest in this 
regard are the 1st, 3rd, and 4th clauses. Each contains a core concept of Balthasar’s 
ontology of sin. First and foremost is the statement of its existence, its ontological 
weight and substantiality in direct contradiction to the privative approach explored in 
Chapter 2. For Barth, as for Balthasar, though the manner of sin’s existing is not the 
result of divine will, nonetheless, the fact of its existence is self-evident. Next, in the 3rd 
clause, Barth expresses what was discovered as Balthasar’s view in Chapter 3, that the 
mystery of its mode of existence is only made intelligible by way of divine revelation, 
and specifically, in the apex of all divine revelation: God’s self-revelation in the Paschal 
Mystery. Finally, in the 4th statement by Barth, one finds echoes of Balthasar’s use of 
“chaos” as explored previously with evil as that substance which is resistant to God’s 
providential ordering of a primordial state.  
 Perhaps just as telling are the two statements from this catechism of Barth’s on 
das Nichtige that do not echo in Balthasar’s ontology of sin. In the 2nd clause, Barth 
seems to be anticipating, and silencing in advance, any accusations of dualism. 
Nothingness, however primordial or radical, is in no way logically or ontologically 
essential to divine or human nature. Balthasar, having even less tolerance for any hint 
of Hegelian concepts of God’s dependence on antithesis in order to achieve actuality, 
feels no need to take up this defensive line of Barth’s. However, in the 5th and final 
clause, Barth pushes his preemptive defense against accusations of dualism to the point 
of proposing that humans “cannot regard or group [nothingness] in any sense with [… 
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God’s] creatures.” As will be outlined immediately below, in the examination of 
Balthasar’s direct theological interaction with the theory of das Nichtige, this radical 
rejection of any regard able relationship between Nothingness and human nature does 
not give human freedom its due in actualizing said Nothingness into substantial sin. 
 Balthasar’s estimation of Barth’s conception of Nothingness, as expressed in 
Church Dogmatics, was both positive and negative nature. In the former case, Balthasar 
seems to have found here, in Barth’s das Nichtige, the clearest contemporary theory 
proposing an a priori condition of possibility for disorder and disintegration at an 
ontological level. This condition of possibility, when activated – as will be discussed 
below – by man’s misuse of will, becomes the basis for, if not the very substance of 
actualizing that which is contrary to God: sin. In his aforementioned Theology of Karl 
Barth, Balthasar affirms: 
[For] Barth, evil was […] primarily that to which God, in his 
wisdom, has said 'no' from all eternity. It is that which God 
has passed over and rejected and forbidden to his 
creatures, and this eternal divine “no” to vanity, which 
makes it what it is, confirms and corroborates his eternal 
“yes.” Through God's eternal “yes”, the being and truth of 
creatures takes on substance and reality; in like manner, 
through God's “no,” the nonbeing and untruth of evil and 
vanity takes on substance and reality […] From God’s 
standpoint, evil is that which should not be. When man 
opposed this eternal decree, then he gives being to what 
should not be.182  
 
Here one encounters Balthasar using “substance” to describe Barth’s Nothingness, 
lending support to the thesis at issue. In Barth’s theology of creation, a young Balthasar 
had found the modern language he needed to properly resource the Pauline and early 
                                                          
 182 Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 189 (emphasis, mine). 
 
108 
 
Patristic soteriological themes he had found lacking in most contemporary Catholic 
understandings of sin and atonement.  
It was not, however, simply the young Balthasar that found footing in Barth’s 
theology of Nothingness comfortable enough from which to begin his own prolific 
theological speculations. Turning to the very last work that would see publication in 
1988, Dare We “Hope that All Men be Saved”? – with a Short Discourse on Hell, one finds 
Balthasar still operating from this Barthian premise. In a brief reflection on the nature 
of the demonic, he claims:  
[…] the men who are led astray by those powers lend the 
powers something of their own reality. The sins committed 
by men are something real, which, as it were nourishes and 
concretizes the deceiving powers, and precisely this thing, 
being both somehow real and invested with that reality by 
man is committed to self-destruction.183 
 
Again, the language here confirms the basic premise being argued, that for Balthasar, 
human sin is only conceivable as the actualization of an a priori ground of a primordial 
nature. However, it is this very issue of the actualization of an a priori substance (in this 
case, Nothingness) that also lends Balthasar’s reading of Barth’s theory a critical or 
negative view. This is made most clear in his longest sustained treatment of the subject, 
in Theo-Drama, Volume III - Theological Dramatic Theory: The Dramatis Personae: 
Persons in Christ, from 1978.184 Therein, one reads that the “theologoumenon of 
'Nothingness', however, which is not explained with reference to creaturely freedom (of 
                                                          
 183 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Dare We Hope…, 137; (emphasis, mine). 
 
 184 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume III: Dramatis 
Personae: Persons in Christ. Translated by Graham Harrison. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992). 
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choice), but is seen as arising from the mere denial and rejection of what is 'chaotic,’ 
'alien,’ and ‘hostile to God', is untenable.”185  
Balthasar realized that the notion of “nothingness” as the root of sin, however 
much of an important step in correcting problems that the privative tradition had 
brought about in the Christian conception of sin, remains, without proper treatment of 
human freedom, a failed enterprise. While Barth had given evil and sin its theological 
due in restoring it to that class of things with ontological value (however odd that mode 
of existing), by distancing it from human nature, he has also rendered it abstract from 
real human experience. 
Barth concludes that mere man is in no way equipped to face 
the dynamism of 'nothingness'. He does not even know what is 
sinful about his own deficiencies; he only comes to believe in 
sin in the light of the Cross. From this perspective, Barth can 
finally say that 'nothingness' is only 'what has been excluded 
from God's influence, a fleeting shadow, an ever-receding 
boundary. We cannot deny, however, that what Christ bore 
and overcame on the Cross is 'evil'; and evil's mysterious power 
to overwhelm the spiritual creature can only be called into 
actuality by the creature's freedom.186 
 
It is to this next step, then, in the equation of evil, the element of human freedom, 
understood by Balthasar as the catalyzing agent of this a priori condition of chaos-
nothingness, which must be examined next.  
 
                                                          
 185 Ibid, 484. Interestingly, in light of the role F.W.J. Schelling will play in the next chapter’s 
analysis of Balthasar’s concept of activating the a priori via human will and freedom, this particular 
passage continues his critique with, “It was produced as a way of re-Christianizing German Idealism [...] 
and one has to admit that it has a certain magnanimous consistency.” 
 
 186 Ibid., 484. Emphasis, mine. 
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In conclusion to this exploration of the a priori conditions of Balthasar’s theory, 
one can legitimately ask:  is sin, then, a re-creation of a primordial substance over which 
the God of the Hebrew Scriptures once created bountiful order, or is it (showing hints of 
the privative tradition) a result of the de-creation of a particular essence called into the 
act of existing by God’s “fiat”? Given his favor of the chaos model, as outlined above, I 
strongly believe it to be the former. And if Balthasar is claiming that humans create 
something (not, in this case with divine sovereignty, from nothing), this helps solve a 
serious metaphysical concern, one born of the odd relationship of making great use of 
one, while seemingly ignoring another dogmatic formulation from the same Ecumenical 
Council: Lateran IV. 
 Balthasar’s commitment to the analogia entis is at the root of his use of the 
transcendental properties of Being (arising, as they do, from the same metaphysical 
setting as the analogia entis), which in turn are at the foundation of his most central 
theological composition; the Triptych, with its transcendental (that its, coextensive) 
structuring around examinations of “The Beautiful,” in the Theological-Aesthetics, “The 
Good,” in the Theo-Dramatics, and “The True,” in the Theo-Logic. This commitment to 
the coextensive nature of these would be at risk if, as I am proposing, Balthasar’s 
understanding of sin is one of real substance. For how can one still maintain the basic 
law that everything that exists is “good” (or “beautiful” or “true”) if that which is under 
consideration, sin, exists substantially? It cannot. However, if this substance is of human 
creation (or re-creation), bringing into actuality that which lacks/removes the ordering 
of God (tehom-ic chaos), or that which does not arise from the Divine creative “Yes” 
(Barthian nothingness), then the metaphysical problem is avoided. Balthasar maintains 
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his insistence on the importance of the transcendentals as the base of his style while 
also maintaining, from theological speculations pursued in said style, that sin is, in fact, 
a thing of substance. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The a posteriori Mechanism of Substantial Sin’s Instantiation: 
Schelling’s Freedom and Blondel’s Action  
 
 If, as proposed, Balthasar locates the “prime matter” of sin within a primordial 
setting, he does not by so doing, remove the element of human choice from acting its 
part as the principle of evil’s “individuation” essential for substantial sin’s incarnation. 
If evil is rooted in a primal chaos or Barthian nothingness, both having been subdued by 
God in the act of creative ordering, humanity remains standing before Leviathan’s cage 
knowingly playing with the lock. 
  In the fourth volume of Theo-Dramatics, Balthasar describes the relationship 
between these two, the a priori and a posteriori aspects of substantial sin: 
Everyone knows that the powers of evil are not simply 
alien and external to him; everyone knows that there is a 
shaft in him that reaches down to the deepest abysses. Thus 
he stands in a baffling solidarity with the powers and 
superior forces of negativity [...]. 187 
 
Words such as “deepest abysses” call to mind the Hebrew tehom, while Barth’s dialectic 
finds its own particular echo in the use of “negativity,” both presented, in the last 
chapter, as the murky foundation in which at least one pylon of human nature, free-will, 
is forever fixed.  The passage continues, allowing Balthasar to explore the elements that 
constitute the nature of that will and in the process introduce a theme that reappears 
throughout his many works, the complex relationship between freedom and power. In a 
rare speculation on the demonic, from his Theo-Dramatics, he states:  
They are powers: evil is always connected with power, with 
acquiring power over available, natural energies in things 
                                                          
 187 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume IV: The Action. 
Translated by Graham Harrison. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 137. 
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and in man's mind, in order to achieve dominance [...]. Man 
can detect the interrelationships between freedom, power, 
and evil. He knows from his own experience of himself that 
evil in the world comes from freedom, a freedom that uses 
whatever power is available […]. In discussing evil we need 
to start with finite freedom.188 
 
The late Edward T. Oakes, S.J., so central to introducing Balthasar’s work to the English-
speaking world and defending attacks against its orthodoxy, went so far in his masterful 
Pattern of Redemption to propose that this attempt at analyzing the meaning of human 
freedom was the keystone of the whole Balthasarian edifice, including (if not 
culminating) in his conception of sin as a substance. In his examination of Balthasarian 
soteriological motifs, he boldly proposes: 
It is the great principle of Balthasar's entire Theodramatics 
that 'the creation of finite freedom by infinite freedom is 
the starting point of all theo-drama' (Theo-Dramatics II, 
271), but the antinomies that inevitably result from their 
juxtaposition can only be resolved by the 'wondrous 
exchange' that took place when Jesus Christ was 'made into 
sin' for our sake – the central moment in that theo-
drama.189 
 
 
 In order to better understand the anatomy of Balthasarian freewill and 
subsequently, to better envision the pathology behind this actualization of an evil 
substance (kept, otherwise, in a state of passivity by the original act of divine ordering), 
an examination of two of the most formative and persistent philosophical influences on 
                                                          
 188  Ibid, 137. 
 
 189 Edward T. The Shape of Catholic Theology. (Collegeville MN, The Liturgical Press, 1991), 226. 
And, likewise, “In answering this [interplay of freedoms] question, Balthasar has reached the apex of his 
theological achievement, for I regard the last three volumes of the Theodramatics as the culmination and 
capstone of his work, where all the themes of his theology converge and are fused into a synthesis of 
remarkable creativity and originality, an achievement that makes him one of the great theological minds 
of the 20th century. Here, more than anywhere, is where his work should be judged.” pg. 230. 
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Balthasar in this area is necessary. This examination should clearly demonstrate that 
Schelling, and his conception of authentic human freedom (requiring an evil option as 
an object of choice), and Blondel, with his examination of the spiritual mechanisms at 
work in the individual subject’s actualization of choice via action to, come together 
fruitfully in Balthasar’s synthesis.  
 
A) Schelling’s Freedom  
 
 
 Balthasar’s relationship with German Idealism, and with the work of F.W.J. 
Schelling (1775-1854) in particular, is evident throughout the whole of the former’s 
massive oeuvre. As early as his third volume, exploration of apocalyptic tendencies in 
German literature, originally undertaken as a doctoral dissertation and reworked for 
later publication as Prometheus: Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Idealismus, the 
reader finds Balthasar claiming that Schelling’s contribution to the subject of freewill 
should be considered “the most titanic work of German Idealism."190 And such 
appreciation would barely wane as Balthasar entered into his more mature, systematic 
work: the volumes of his Triptych. Schelling is referenced over 130 times throughout 
the course of the Theological-Aesthetics, the Theo-Dramatics, and the Theo-Logic, 
making him one of only a handful of other authors to feature prominently in all three 
sections. 
 This Schelling-Balthasar dynamic was, in fact, one of the earliest aspects of 
Balthasarian scholarship to be pursued at length in English. A good decade before 
                                                          
 190 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Prometheus. Studien zur Geschichte des Deutschen Idealismus 
(Heidelberg: F.H. Kerele, 1947), 240. 
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Oakes’ aforementioned Pattern of Redemption presented any manner of a general (let 
alone in-depth) survey of Balthasar’s work, the Swiss theologian’s relationship with 
German Idealism was already being explored.  This is a bit more understandable when 
taking into account that Balthasar was still actively writing, over five years away from 
death, with at least eight major works left to write, including three volumes of the 
Triptych. Thus, while those who would attempt a wide-angled view of the Balthasarian 
“system” would wait (especially upon the completion of his Theo-Dramatics, with its 
promise of eschatological conclusions to earlier soteriological proposals), those 
scholars whose interests leaned closer to the construction of genealogies of influence 
had already begun their work.  
 Among the latter group, within those early works that treat with the direct and 
indirect uses of Schelling (not simply in Balthasar, but in many modern and 
contemporary Catholic philosophical circles), one of the earliest, Thomas O’Meara’s 
1982 Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism: Schelling and the Theologians, remains 
an excellent source on the subject. Therein, the reader is reminded both of Balthasar’s 
admitted admiration for Schelling, as well as given a hint about the origins of the latter’s 
peculiar but appealing style. As O’Meara points out, with a quote from Prometheus: 
Perhaps the lasting and diverse influence of Schelling upon 
Roman Catholic theology was due to the intersection in his 
own life of the loftiest systems of intellect with the mystical 
exploration of the divine abyss. Von Balthasar writes 'he's 
really an apocalyptic figure for whom all is arranged 
around revelation, around the disclosure of mystery, 
around breakthrough into the mysteries of God. From this 
magical and visionary style [...] emerges the fact that he is a 
prophet and a poet. (Prometheus, 206)' 191 
                                                          
 191Thomas F. O’Meara. Romantic Idealism and Catholicism: Schelling and the Theologians (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 9. 
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But just what did this “apocalyptic poet,” probing the mystery of the “divine abyss” via 
his unique style, propose that would catch the ear of a young Swiss Jesuit and stay with 
him throughout his theological career, influencing many of his own speculations? In 
short, it was the nature of evil as revealed in the exploration of human freedom, 
especially as presented in his 1809 masterwork, Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence 
of Human Freedom.192  
 Following close on the heels of O’Meara’s work, Allen White’s rich commentary 
on Schelling’s masterpiece, 1983’s Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom 
presents the reader with the following bold proposal, one that reveals just what 
Balthasar found here to catch his attention and hold it for decades to come:  
All other explanations either deny evil or attempt to explain 
it as imperfection. To do either is however "to be in conflict 
with the authentic nature of evil." For even the simple 
consideration that it is man alone, the most perfect of all 
visible creatures, who is capable of evil shows that its ground 
can in no way be lying in lack or privation.193 
 
Once again, Balthasar found a non-privative model for evil, one that spoke of its 
possessing an “authentic nature,” in line with his own developing thoughts on the 
                                                          
 
 192 Schelling, F.W.J. Philosophical Inquires into the Nature of Human Freedom. Translated by James 
Gutmann (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press), 1936.  
 
 193 Allen White, Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom (London: Yale University 
Press, 1983), 120-121. Given the rest of the passage, with White linking Schelling’s speculation on evil to 
his dissatisfaction with the privative theory (and the mirroring of this in Balthasar’s work), it bears 
repeating in full – including its own quotation from Schelling (Freedom, 27):  “As to proponents of 
privation theory possible response to Schelling’s positing of radical/real evil, he has the following to say 
in anticipation: It may be objected that what is positive in evil, in so far as it is positive, is good. Evil does 
not disappear in this way anymore than it is explained... if that element in evil which has being is good 
whence comes the wherein it has its being, the basis which really constitutes the evil?"  
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matter.194 And so, logically, one must ask what Schelling’s conception of evil actually 
was.  
 Recently reviving the topic of Schelling’s influence on contemporary theology by 
presenting it as possible common ground from which to launch further 
explorations into the relationship between Russian Orthodox theological trends of the 
past 150 years and some of Balthasar’s bolder Trinitarian proposals, Jennifer 
Newsome-Martin’s work stands as fine resource to mine just such a question. In her 
2012 un-published dissertation for Notre Dame, Hans Urs von Balthasar & the Press of 
Speculative Russian Religious Philosophy, Newsome presents the heart of the Schelling’s 
idea of the nature of freedom as resting on the reality of evil, or as she puts it: “Schelling 
ultimately defines authentic freedom as 'a possibility of good and evil.' Freedom can 
only exist, then, if the genuine possibility for evil is present. Thus, freedom cannot be 
thought of without reference to the brute facticity of evil. [...].”195 This conception of “the 
brute facticity of evil” would obviously appeal to a theologian who was already 
beginning to raise reservations over the Augustinian theodicy of privation and its effect 
on soteriological claims about the Paschal Mystery. Interestingly, while settling on this 
cornerstone, his definition of freedom (as the possibility even for evil), Schelling had 
                                                          
 194 Just as some of the problems that Balthasar found with privation theory find their roots in this 
early and ongoing encounter with Schelling, so too his commitment to a philosophical tradition of 
medieval mystical realism (as outlined in Chapter 3) also finds an echo in Freedom, where Schelling 
warns that, "the abhorrence of all reality which might sully the spiritual through any contact with it must 
naturally blind the eye to the origin of evil too.” Schelling, Freedom, 30.  
 
 195 Jennifer Newsome Martin. Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Press of Speculative Russian 
Religious Philosophy (Unpublished version of her PhD dissertation completed for Notre Dame University, 
2012), 104-5.  Her dissertation has subsequently been published as, Hans Urs von Balthasar and the 
Critical Appropriation of Russian Religious Thought (Indiana, IN: Notre Dame Press, 2015). I have chosen 
to rely on the original version of her scholarship, as it provides more information on Schelling as the 
common influence on Balthasar and Orthodox Sophiology, without the later overshadowing the former. 
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proposed that this understanding of choice is what essentially constitutes humanity’s 
image-hood or likeness to God (the Imago Dei). One can legitimately speculate that 
Balthasar saw here a parallel to Barth's neo-Calvinist understanding of God as the one 
who elects, with his first act of election being the choice between what was to be 
created and what was not: the nothingness (cf. Chapter 4). Evil, therefore, for two of 
Balthasar's most formative, early influences, finds the roots of its "radicality," so to 
speak, in the eternal a priori of divine sovereignty and freedom. However, as Schelling’s 
Freedom is at heart not theological, but anthropological, it must be remembered that 
humanity, via the ontological ramifications of this imago Dei, remains the a posteriori 
vessel of evil’s daily “creation” via human “election”. 
 In stressing Schelling’s theory of radical evil, however, does Newsome-Martin 
end in presenting him, and Balthasar in his wake, as a dualist? After all, If evil must be 
present from the beginning (of at least human nature), in order that real choice be 
possible, has this simply led one back into the very Manichaeism that Augustine’s 
privative theory was created to combat? At the very start of her study, presumably 
foreseeing such accusations, Newsome-Martin points out that:  
When Balthasar repeats, or appears to repeat, suspect 
elements of Schelling or Hegel, he self-consciously subverts 
them, ever dutifully maintaining a crucial corrective 
distance. Balthasar, acknowledging the seductive appeal of 
these discourses, both allows them to contribute positively to 
his theological project while insisting that their content be 
thoroughly vetted. 196 
                                                          
 196 Ibid, 7 (emphasis, mine). It should be added that Schelling himself foresaw the accusation of 
dualism arising from his rejection of privation: "If freedom is a power for evil it must have a root 
independent of God. Compelled by this argument one may be tempted to throw oneself into the arms of 
dualism. However if this system is really thought of as the doctrine of two absolutely different and 
mutually independent principles, it is only a system of self-destruction and the despair of reason." 
(Schelling, Freedom, 28). 
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 But, again, one must ask: just what did Balthasar find in Schelling’s conception of 
evil that was worth both mining and vetting? It seems clear from any reading of 
Schelling’s Freedom that the concept in question here concerns Schelling’s proposal of a 
divine “Ur-ground.” As Newsome-Martin describes it: 
[…] this bitter, dark (material) principle is absolutely 
necessary for God self-actualization, which, much like 
Hegel, requires a self-posited opposition in order to emerge 
(and eventually reunify the contrary principles). [...] At the 
genesis of divinity, then, is the Ur-ground, that 
indeterminate, dark, pre-mundane freedom […] which is 
decidedly non-privative.197 
 
As Balthasar found little time for Process Theology and its indebtedness to Hegelian 
philosophizing of the Trinity that would involve the actualization of divinity requiring 
the creative, it is here that the “vetting,” takes place. By transposing this theme of an 
original (divine) self-actualization (of ur-ground to ground of existence) into an 
orthodox, if still speculative, language of the inter-personal processions within the 
Godhead, Balthasar is able to simultaneously avoid the twin pitfalls of Manichean 
dualism and Hegelian pantheism while expounding his own Trinitarian theology. In the 
fourth volume of the Theo-Dramatics, at the center of his soteriological speculation, he 
states: 
[…] the Father’s self-utterance in the generation of the Son 
is an initial ‘kenosis’ within the Godhead that underpins all 
subsequent kenosis… This divine act that brings forth the 
Son, that is, the 2nd way of participating (and of being) the 
identical Godhead, involves the positing of an absolute, 
infinite ‘distance’ that can contain embrace all other 
                                                          
 197 Newsome Martin, 108-9 (emphasis, mine) 
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distances that are possible within the world of finitude, 
including the distance of sin. 198 
 
This notion of ontological “underpinning” (German: unterfessing), is one of the 
hallmarks of the Balthasarian method; almost as ubiquitous as his aesthetic approach to 
revelation. It is also, when filtered through two of his primary influences (Barth and 
Lubac), the source of his Ressourcement of Patristic Christocentrism. This 
theologoumenon spans Balthasar’s lengthy career, making its first appearance in his 
1957 Theology of History, where he proposes that: 
Theologically speaking the only thing that makes it possible 
to have history, in the deepest sense, within the space thus 
opened up is the fact that this space is an opening within 
the freedom of God... Hence, that it is itself an area of 
freedom: freedom of God giving space and scope to the 
freedom of man. Within this space man is free to make 
history happen […]199 
 
Interestingly, this passage concludes by linking his conception of unterfessing with the 
other (in)famous theologoumenon of his work, the possibility of universal salvation by 
way of Christ’s solidarity with the dead in his descent into Hell, “[However], man cannot 
fall out of the space which is Christ's, nor out of the structural form created by his life. 
This is indeed the 'prison in which God has shut up all in the rebellion only to include 
them in his pardon' (Romans 11:32)."200 But Balthasar’s fullest and yet briefest 
summation of this method in service of Christocentrism comes from the fifth volume of 
                                                          
 198 Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume IV: The Action, Translated by 
Graham Harrison. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 323. 
 
 199 Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theology of History. Translated by n/a. (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press: 1994), 70. 
 
 200 Ibid., 71  
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the Theo-Dramatics, where he claims that: “according to God's gracious plan for the 
world, the processio, which includes the creatio, is to be fulfilled in the Son's missio.”201 
The Kingdom of Heaven, or the community of those whose substantial sins have been 
removed via sacramental incorporation into Christ’s incarnate person (said missio), 
finds its grounding within the world made by the same Christ, as Logos (said creatio), 
which in its turn, is only possible upon the eternal ground of otherness and difference 
that is the eternal generation of the same Christ, as Son from the Father (said processio).  
 The centrality of this Christocentric ontology, this unterfessing at all levels of 
being back into the Godhead itself, is proven so central to an understanding of 
Balthasar’s whole project (and novel to contemporary Catholic theology) by being the 
subject of one of the first English-language monographs on the theologian’s work. 
Predating even Oakes’ 1994 work of introduction, and coming less than two years after 
Balthasar’s death (i.e. before many of his central works had even seen translation from 
German), Gerard F. O'Hanlon’s The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar remains crucial for any proper understanding of the subject at hand.202  This 
may seem surprising at first glance through the text, as it contains no reference to 
Schelling and his Freedom at all. What it does contain, however, are some of the most 
lucid expositions of Balthasar’s ideas on the Trinitarian unterfessing, ones that show 
him putting Schelling’s proposed divine development (from ur-Ground to Ground) to 
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orthodox use.203 Hanolan’s own thesis nicely summarizes this, “We may put forward as 
a hypothesis the notion that a Trinitarian event in God is Balthasar's way of tackling the 
issue of God's immutability.”204  
 Two longer passages, unpacking this “event,” especially as it relates to our 
concern with the pathology of evil, bear repeating at length. First, as to the unterfessing 
of substantial sin finding ground for its appearance within the eternal Trinitarian 
difference: 
It is the difference between the Father and the Son that 
makes possible the cross. If God were simply one he would 
become ensnared in the world-process through the 
incarnation and cross. But, because God is triune, with both 
poles of difference and unity guaranteed by the Holy Spirit, 
the difference between Father and Son can accommodate 
all created differences, including that extreme distance 
shown on the cross [...]205 
 
The second passage goes on to locate the unterfessing of substantial sin’s removal, 
within that same Trinitarian difference, as viewed through an act love that only 
difference (kenosis) can make possible:  
                                                          
203 Another reading of Schelling, that of Slavoj Zîzêk in his The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on 
Schelling and Related Matters (London: Verso, 1996), finds the radicality of evil in the distinctly human 
experience of the movement from Ground to Existence: “We can see how far we are from the traditional 
notion of lack, privation, or imperfection as the Ground of Evil […]. Evil does not reside in in finitude as 
such, in its deficiency with regard to the infinite God – it can emerge only in a finite creature […]. The first 
thing to emphasize here is the elementary dialectical point that man is the unity of Ground and Existence 
precisely in so far as it is only in him that their difference is finally explicated, posited as such […]. In 
other words, from the previous indifference of the two principles, we pass to their unity – and it is here 
that we encounter freedom as freedom for Good and Evil.” (63-64).  A similar conception of the birth of 
the human ego and its tendency for the suppression of “otherness” will be explored below, in the 
following section of this chapter, as it echoes many of the insights on the nature of evil that Balthasar 
inherited by way of Blondel. 
 
 204 O'Hanlon, pg. 25 
 
 205 Ibid, 27 
 
123 
 
The cross is an “emptying” in God. As such it is the extreme 
point of that emptying which occurs already... There is a 
great mystery here, in the way a temporal event can be 
present to God eternally, and can affect God, albeit in a non-
temporal way […]. We may anticipate how Balthasar will go 
about describing this change it will not be a temporal, 
created alteration in God. It will be real. Its reality will be 
grounded in the Trinitarian event which makes it possible 
for God to contain within himself all the modalities of love 
including... that refusal of love which is sin.206  
 
With these passages from O'Hanlon in mind, one can see how Balthasar has effectively 
rehabilitated Schelling's conception of a divine mutability present in the 'event' of the 
divine development from ur-ground, to ground, of being. Instead of a temporal sounding 
mutability, Balthasar vests the concept in the orthodox, if speculative, language of the 
eternal processions of Divine Persons. But, more importantly for the present purposes, 
he is able to accomplish this in order to maintain, albeit in orthodox terms, Schelling's 
location of the 'facticity of evil' (the subject of 'authentic freedom') within the eternal. 
            This relationship between Balthasar’s speculation on the Trinitarian processions 
and the reality of evil are on clear display in two central soteriological passages of his 
work. The first, from Theo-Dramatics Volume IV, further defines the relationship, when 
Balthasar declares that:    
If we realize the ground-lessness of man’s free No in the 
face of the purely gracious (and hence ground-less) Yes of 
God’s love, it is clear that the expiation, the expurgation of 
this ground-less sin must involve a transfiguration through 
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suffering that is surpassingly ‘ground-less’ in a way we 
cannot imagine.207  
 
The second, from a lengthy essay entitled “On Vicarious Atonement,” written shortly 
before Theo-Dramatics Volume IV, goes on to demonstrate how the two, Trinity and Evil, 
find the ultimate demonstration of their relationship in the events of the Paschal 
Mystery:  
And, indeed, God does not overtake freedom in such a way 
that man's choice is called into question from without [...] 
but in such a way that God accompanies man into the most 
extreme situation of his (negative) choice with his own 
divine choice. And this is what happens in the Passion of 
Jesus.208 
 
As always, for Balthasar, questions of theodicy in the strict sense of word/tradition are 
deferred to a theological contemplation of the Passion. This contemplative soteriology 
reveals the “facticity of evil” in all its incarnate horror, allowing for no explanation as to 
why it exists, rather presenting a graphic display of what it is (as we saw in Ch. III and 
its exploration of Pauline Realism and the Paschal Mystery).   
 
 Ultimately, by modifying Schelling's thesis of the “facticity of evil,” Balthasar 
locates the metaphysical ground of sin outside of human choice (subjectivity), 
maintaining its object-hood, which it must in fact maintain, if human freedom faced 
with a real decision genuinely involves a choice between things. However, in doing so, 
he is also laying out the soteriological implications of this freedom... Human freedom is 
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real; to the extent that freedom is real, the evil option is equally real; but like all things, 
both find their ontological ground only within Divine Freedom which is seen most 
explicitly in the Trinitarian perichoresis and which is expressed economically in the 
Paschal Mystery, itself the means for evil's ultimate undermining.  
 While Schelling's reflections on freedom evidently inspired Balthasar’s 
conception of evil's extra-human objectivity, a turn toward another philosopher of 
religion, Maurice Blondel (1861-1945), becomes necessary in order to explicate the 
inspiration for Balthasar’s reflection on the pathological development of evil in the 
realm of the subjective, in the individual. 
 
B) Blondel’s L’Action  
 
 
 Balthasar’s reliance on Blondel is asserted by no less than the former’s own 
cousin, (now Auxiliary Bishop) Peter Henrici, long-time Pontifical Gregorian University 
expert on Catholic Modernism and Ressourcement. In one of the earliest attempts at 
presenting a sketch of Balthasar’s main philosophical influences, Henrici declares to his 
readers that, “Von Balthasar's philosophizing is thoroughly 'apologetic' in the same 
sense as Blondel's... for him there cannot be any philosophy which is not oriented by its 
very essence toward Christianity.”209  The most telling evidence of the Blond Elian 
influence on Balthasar, however, is to be found in the writings themselves. Over 40 
references to Blondel and his work appear throughout the Triptych. Almost half of these 
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references are found in the Theo-Dramatics alone, and a chapter is devoted to him in 
Dare We Hope…?, demonstrating that even when composing his last published work, 
Blondel and his method were still close to Balthasar’s heart and mind.210 Such a long-
lasting influence is not surprising if one also takes into account that Balthasar would 
have developed a thorough grasp of Blondel’s method simply by fact of his key role as 
the German translator for the private journal (Carnets Intimes) that Blondel kept during 
the composition and doctoral defense of L’Action.211 
 
 What then, is the essence of this Blondelian apologetic, so influential to Balthasar 
and upon his unique understanding of sin as substantial? It should go without saying 
that half of the genius of Blondel’s thesis is its bold, but careful, progression through 
several logical premises, revealing multiple philosophical presuppositions in its unique 
style. It is with some reluctance, therefore, that one looks to “summarize” either this 
style or the import of the subject that such a crafted style conveys; however, the nature 
of this particular exploration requires some attempt at summarizing Blondel’s almost 
sui generis (at least for its time) argument. Perhaps the task is best left to him: “All 
attempts to bring human action to completion fail; and it is impossible for human action 
not to seek to complete itself and to be self-sufficient. It has to, it cannot… The sense of 
powerlessness as well as the need man has for an infinite fulfillment remains 
incurable.”212  
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 Attempting to demonstrate how central the idea of achieving ontological 
fulfillment, and doing so through moving beyond one’s own subjective existence, is to 
Balthasar’s theological project is readily demonstrable. Beauty, after all, is one of the 
hallmarks of his work; his Theological-Aesthetics being the most readily recognizable of 
his oeuvre. Beauty, according to Balthasar is that transcendental property of being that 
draws other existents into a relationship with another particular existent in question, 
“A being appears, it has an epiphany: in that it is beautiful and makes us marvel. In 
appearing it gives itself, it delivers itself to us: it is good. And in giving itself up, it speaks 
itself, it unveils itself: it is true (in itself, but in the other to which it reveals itself).”213  
 Beyond the centrality of an exploration of beauty in Balthasar, the concept of 
being’s self-diffusive property is also approached by way of his notion of the human 
will, a concept central to Blondel’s own metaphysical method.  For Balthasar, once being 
is encountered and the classical analogia entis commences (in which one attempts to 
understand this individual and limited act of existence in its relationship to God’s pure 
actuality), questions of contingency arise. And, as is often the case when questions of 
ontological contingency arise, the mundane practicalities of this existing (in an 
analogous way with pure being) bring the concept of personal freedom to the fore of the 
discussion: 
In order to see the true dialectic of power in which created 
freedom is involved, we need rather to consider the latter’s 
intrinsic relation to its origin, which is the identity of 
absolute freedom and absolute power […] the polar 
constitution of finite freedom becomes the reason why the 
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self-actualization of freedom, at its summit, must lead 
irresistibly to a choice (Blondel’s ‘option’) if it is 
authentically to lay hold of itself as freedom, it cannot see 
itself as purely autonomous but must also realize that this is  
a gift, owing its existing to some other source214  
   
In brief, Balthasar argues that a realization of ontological contingency automatically 
implies an investigation into the limits imposed on one’s freedom by this possession of 
limited being. This investigation, in turn, should bring the questioning subject into a 
realization of the deep interconnectedness of ontology and freedom, of existing and 
acting. In fact, such an investigation should arrive at the conclusion that, just as being 
was received from an outside act of freedom, one’s being must—in like manner 
imitating its cause as is metaphysically proper—actualize its ontological value in 
exercising its own freedom, something only accomplished by action upon, or allowance 
for, another external existent: 
Although we cannot deny that finite freedom has an 
absolute aspect, it has power over neither its own ground 
nor its own fulfillment. It does possess itself, yet it is not its 
own gift to itself; it owes itself to some other origin, thus it 
can never catch up with its own ground, nor with its own 
essence; it can only attain fulfillment beyond itself. 215 
 
This last line strikes an immediate chord with Blondel’s work, and in fact, a similar 
progression of metaphysical realizations can be found in the following passages, from a 
self-realization of contingency perceived from outside of the lines of its own ontological 
borders, “Once the will has been interiorized in reflected consciousness, it can no longer 
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confine itself therein; coming from the outside, where it draws nourishment, it returns 
to the outside to operate in it.”216 And, on to the consequent course of exteriorization 
toward (and, hence, allowance of) the other:  
I establish that this freedom preserves itself only by going 
out of itself to submit to a heteronomy, to conquer for the 
will what escapes it and to throw itself into operative 
action. In short, the subject will keep itself intact, complete, 
and sincere only by objectifying itself.217 
  
Both Balthasar and Blondel before him share the same basic anthropology, one realized 
only through action. While “anthropology” is rather broad in scope, as readily 
demonstrated by Blondel’s lengthy and carefully argued critique of several possible 
answers (the immediate, the social, the political, the religious, etc.), the nature of this 
existential act is, for both thinkers, the imitation of its own ontological realization of 
contingency. The individual realizes itself only by risking a step beyond the certainty of 
its boundaries and encountering those of another. This movement out, this self-
objectification, results in the encounter with the boundaries of an object not part of the 
subject’s own being. Subsequently, talk of this “self-objectification” and the realization 
of “the other” as the primary constituents of ontology recalls both authors’ theological 
grounding in Christian notions of the Trinity.    
 
 For both Balthasar and Blondel, the psycho-ontological journey continues past 
self-realization, through self-objectification, into (and out of) the exterior phenomenon 
of action. It continues for both until the eventual realization of the necessity of the 
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transcendent option, which is the only option able to meet the seemingly ontologically 
inexhaustible “willing will” that constitutes a major element of our humanity.  
 But what happens to the individual who, though conscious of the ontological 
contingency brought about by another subject “making room for” (via kenosis) her own 
status as object, refuses to mimic her prior along this ladder of being? Who does not 
“[sense] the presence of another will by which one has to take one’s bearings”? 
Balthasar, in exploring this very line from L’Action, in the course of Theo-Dramatics 
Volume IV, answers by proclaiming that, “Here, for Blondel, lies the choice between 
losing and gaining one’s freedom; here too, therefore, is the original locus of perversity, 
of moral evil in the world.”218  The hypothetical person in question becomes, in the 
misuse of her freedom through inaction, the creator of a reality - of sin. Here is the birth 
of a false god of an irrational, un-living substance. Balthasar’s reading of Blondel on this 
point is confirmed by the latter, when he states that: 
To will nothing is to turn away from every object, in order 
to hold oneself entirely in reserve and to forbid oneself all 
gifts, all dedication, and all abnegation. One wills that being 
not be, but it is a pleasure to be in order to deny being: a 
radical egoism that would destroy everything in order to 
remain alone like a god.219  
    
It is of some note that the term of divinity derisively employed here is not designated 
“God” because the Christian conception must exclude any notion of stasis and solitude. 
The perichoresis, or “dance”, of the Triune Persons forbids it. And it is here, in looking 
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at the failure to act according to (and within) the matrix of kenotic-generativity, that 
either authors locate the birth - or should one say “stagnation”? – of sin. 
  Before turning to the anatomy or, more properly speaking, pathology of sin, it is 
worth revisiting how central this concept was to a Balthasar heavily indebted to 
Blondel’s insistence on the experience of real existential freedom through the 
allowance, and subsequent approval, of heteronomy. At the heart of his trilogy, he 
rather boldly proclaims: 
There is something in God that develops into suffering. This 
suffering occurs when the recklessness with which the 
Father gives away himself (and all that is his) encounters a 
freedom that, instead of responding in kind to this 
magnanimity, changes it into calculating, cautious self-
preservation. This contrasts with the essentially divine 
recklessness of the Son, who allows himself to be 
squandered, and of the Spirit who accompanies him.220  
 
This passage finds striking precedence in Blondel’s own assessment of the situation 
when he proposes that actualization of the self through “the will, therefore, could not lie 
in any sort of jealous reserve or sacrilegious apotheosis, but rather an apparent 
abdication… To act, we must in a way alienate ourselves, hand ourselves over to forces 
we shall no longer dominate.”221  
 That the nature of sin (and not just its origins, as discussed above) was of 
interest to Blondel, as well, is made clear by his English-language biographer (and 
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translator of L’Action), Olivia Blanchette. In Maurice Blondel: A Philosophical Life, one 
reads the following, which sounds similar to the “mystical-realism” advocated by 
Balthasar: 
Blondel's approach to the Christian mystery of redemption 
is one of profound spiritual realism […] What sin entails is 
not just a matter of imperfection or of dereliction in an 
order of passing and reparable contingencies […]. For in 
deciding anything seriously in our lives we are also 
adopting an attitude toward God, using the double motion 
of the right reason and of a divine impulse. In sin we are 
abusing something ontological...222 
 
Of particular note here is Blondel’s rejection of sin as “imperfection” (i.e. privation of 
the good) and his understanding that if sin abuses something ontological, it must—to 
that extent—possess some measure of existence of its own. In short, it must itself have 
being.  
 Sin, therefore, for both Schelling and for Blondel, exists. It is a real option, 
necessary for freedom to be, in fact, free. It is the disorder of existence that results in 
the subject who engages this option of freedom – even, and most primarily, in a lack of 
engagement, in spiritual inertia. That Balthasar, one of the few Catholic theologians to 
have undertaken extensive research on and translation of, both of these philosophers, 
formulated a similar conception of sin’s metaphysical composition should come with 
little or no surprise. However, there is yet another element of these philosophers’ 
explorations into substantial sin that parallels Balthasar’s speculation on the subject. 
Schelling and Blondel share a similar language around transmission, a language 
identifying sin as a very particular type of ontological disease. As this language will 
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allow us to approach an understanding of Balthasar’s attempts to argue for sin’s 
substantial existence within Catholic theological discourse, we move to explore it, by 
way of conclusions, in the following Epilogue.  
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EPILOGUE 
 As noted, Balthasar’s opinion on the matter of the substantiality of sin is made 
most explicit in his claim that, “Because of the energy that man has invested in it, sin is a 
reality, it is not 'nothing.’”223  The choice of wording should be recognized as being 
strongly in line with Blondel’s concept of a quasi-contagion present in causality through 
the relationship between subject and object. In the course of his exploration into the 
actual mechanism of action, he proposes that, “the agent puts himself into what he does; 
and what he does fashions him. The center of equilibrium of individual life moves, 
therefore, and transports itself into the work to which the will consecrates itself.”224 
Schelling shared a similar understanding of sin as ontologically pathological. As White 
confirms in his study:  
Human beings can choose to be guided by the principle of 
understanding that is common to all [...], or they can choose 
to be guided by the principle of will that manifests itself 
uniquely in every individual [...]. Those who choose the latter 
course upset the balance of principles, […] perverting the 
natural order of subordination of will to understanding. The 
result is evil, the spiritual counterpart to illness in the body.225 
 
Both Blondel and Schelling—and through them, Balthasar—endorse an act of 
transmission (via intent or act) from the subject to the object. This transmission, 
therefore, not only damages the individual subject by ultimately missing its own 
ontological mark, but also creates a deforming excess of mis-, or simply, un- used 
freedom. Ironically, or tragically, this excess spreads beyond itself, even in the very act 
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of wishing to remain static, beyond the first conscious instance, and into the whole of 
the individual’s being. Relying on the tradition of Pauline mystical realism as explored 
in Chapter 3, with its proposed use of the pharmakos/i (“medicine-man/man”) models 
of atonement to contemplate the Paschal Mystery, Balthasar sums this up nicely as he 
employs the language of sin-as-sickness in a Holy Week homily from late in his 
ministry:   
Can God do anything against the finite freedom he himself 
has created if it stubbornly gives him a “No”? […] Those 
who champion autonomy are indignant and regard it as a 
theft on God’s part, a violation of our freedom. To them it is 
like anesthetizing a man and cutting some organ from his 
body without his permission. But is this comparison valid? 
Is sin, man’s refusal to be reconciled with eternal absolute 
goodness, really an organ essential to life? Is it not much 
more like a spreading cancer? Can we say that God is 
robbing man of anything by restoring his health? 
Furthermore, if a man has become locked in a syndrome of 
refusal, if he refuses to keep faith with God, can he free 
himself from his own obstinacy?226 
 
The use of the phrase “a syndrome of refusal” to refer to the individuation of non-
kenotic, substantial sin in a particular person is in line with the language of both 
Schelling and Blondel as outlined above. And, indeed, with this shared language of the 
pathological nature of sin’s being, we begin to draw near the heart of the matter: the 
ontological nature of this substantial sin. In one of the few works to explore Balthasar’s 
moral theology, “Tragedy and the Ethics of Hans Urs von Balthasar”, by Christopher 
Steck, one finds confirmation of this idea of a systemic structural (ontologically 
speaking) failure in the non-kenotic person: 
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For Balthasar, the Trinitarian imprint is found in the fact 
that all creation is oriented toward the dialogical. Just as 
the Father expresses himself in the Son, so also every 
creature in some way speaks a 'word' which expresses 
what it is to the other. And in the case of the intelligent 
creature, the encountered manifestation of the other elicits 
another movement: the ek-static perception of the other's 
address. The Triune God who created us imprinted in us a 
conatus toward free creative engagement with the other.227  
 
Steck rightly realizes the source of sin’s manifestation in the type of “syndrome” 
Balthasar outlined, one that fails to follow the imprinted, almost genetically-sounding, 
Trinitarian imago Dei. And as the latter makes quite clear, “[the creature] can also 
refuse this reference, isolating its received power […]. Thus isolated by the creature’s 
abuse of freedom, power becomes evil.228 
 
 In seeking a way toward further discourse about Balthasar’s bold proposal  of 
substantial sin within a theological tradition that has no such language but privation (as 
seen in Chapter 2), I believe there is a ready-made oncological model with which to 
bridge this divide, to further analyze the theologian’s analysis of this ontological failure.  
As seen above, Balthasar himself asked whether Catholic theologians wouldn’t be better 
to wonder, “Is it not much more like a spreading cancer?”229 
 Contemporary cellular biology tells us that this ontological-oncological model 
finds its basis in programmed cell death, or apoptosis, a theory that proposes individual 
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cells or grouping of cells are in fact programmed by their DNA to die in order to make 
room for new, fresh cells.230 In his 2010 article, “The Siren's Song: This Death that 
Makes Life Live”, a poetic title that would sound quite at home among Balthasarian 
essays and homilies, one of the foremost scholars of oncology, Dr. Gerry Melino states 
that “with the increased prominence of apoptosis in biological science has come a shift 
in our philosophical attitude to many disease pathologies.”231 I propose that a similar 
shift in attitude toward evil is at play here, in Balthasar’s attempts to speak of evil as 
substantial, as the result of a systemic ontological failure. Where he speaks of the 
individual person and their refusal to live according to the kenosis that allows for their 
own existence and the existence of the “other(s)”, contemporary oncology speaks of the 
“refusal” of the individual cell to do something strikingly similar. Both acts of refusal 
result in a new, malignant substance, one spiritual in nature – the other physical.  
 The history of the medical discovery of apoptosis and the paradigmatic shift in 
how to speak of a tumor are quite telling. They can’t help but remind the reader of the 
persistence of the language of privation in speaking of evil’s mode or manner of 
existence.  For instance, one is reminded that, “The apoptosis concept, represents one of 
the most important milestones in cell and tissue research this century. Prior to its 
introduction, all cell death was considered to be the outcome of injury and to be 
degenerative in nature.”232 And, again, from an article documenting the discovery and 
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Scientific Revolution” in Apoptosis in Normal Development and Cancer, Edited by Mels Slusyser. (Bristol, 
PA: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1996), 1; emphasis, mine. 
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subsequent presentation of this new oncological vision, we hear how this major 
discovery struggled with the conventional pathological terminology of the day, with the 
concept of cancer as a privation of pre-existing tissue. In writing of its initial discovery, 
its authors relate that  
What had started out as three essentially separate fields of 
investigation of cell death, [...] shrinking necrosis in 
pathological tissues, [...] controllable cell death in endocrine 
tissues, and programmed cell death in the embryo came 
together to form the basis of the generalized concept on cell 
death that was soon to be termed apoptosis... The term 
'shrinking necrosis' had undesirable connotations, as it 
suggested the new type of cell death was simply another 
variant of necrosis, which was clearly not the case. The name 
apoptosis was proposed.233 
 
Oncology had reached the limits of speaking about the development of cancerous cells 
with language that did not accurately reflect the action of said cell/cells. 
In an analogous fashion, Balthasar’s attempts to present a coherent, realist soteriology 
uncovered that an ontological language founded on the conceptual framework of evil as 
a shrinking (a privation) of a previously good substance rang false.   
 While the symptoms of cancer may (and often are) spoken of in terms of 'eating 
away', or 'devastation', of the tissue>organ>system>body, etc., contemporary cellular 
biology now proposes a language of mutation and metastasis to describe the actual 
mechanism of carco-genesis.  In the place of privation there is now fitting language 
about the creation of a thing, a tumor that grows, disrupting the organs, systems, and 
                                                          
 
 233 Ibid, 5. Emphasis, mine. 
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ultimately, life of an individual, a family, a community. One now reads that “the earliest 
changes in apoptosis occur in the nucleus where chromatin is compacted and 
segregated into sharply circumscribed masses, ... concomitant with these changes, the 
cell condenses, rounds up, and in tissues, pulls away from its neighbors...”234 This 
language is strikingly similar to that employed by Balthasar, as documented throughout 
these chapters, to outline the incarnation of a priori evil in a subject's ontological stasis, 
or non-kenotic inertia, in the face of encountering the other and the other’s own claims 
to a share in reality. 
 For Balthasar, sin, this ontological tumor, is the sediment of ontological inertia. It 
is the non-living, spiritual substance that, as discussed in Chapter 2, can find no logical 
home on the Porphyrian Tree— as that which is spiritual is, at its root, that which 
moves … or should move. If one speaks of the “spiritual”, one is, to that extent, according 
to the Hebrew Scriptures, speaking of ruah – of wind or a rushing breeze, the very 
breath of life. And, if one seeks to speak of the soul (anima, in its Hellenistic-Christian 
usage) one, to that very extent, must speak of movement (be it as simple as the growth 
of the vegetative soul, or as complex as the human soul’s rotation of reasoned 
intellection).  But here the very substance of the thing in question, the substance of sin, 
spreads by stasis; contaminates by inertia.235 This becomes, of course, a contradiction, 
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 235 Recalling the primordial aspects of this ontological sin, the creation of substantial disorder 
from the previously ordered substances of God's providence, the following lines of Cardinal Daniélou 
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and, as Balthasar would have it, a contradiction much more destructive than any failure 
of logic:   
If created freedom chooses itself as the absolute good it 
involves itself in a contradiction that will devour it. The 
formal object that informs it, which is in fact absolute self-
positing freedom, is in constant contradiction with finite 
freedom's pretentious claim to be infinite. This 
contradiction, if persisted in, is hell.236 
 
The cosmos, set in motion by the perichoresis of persons within the Trinity, is thrown, 
by the accrual of this inert, spiritual sediment, into a mounting disruption of order, 
which, as argued in Chapter 4, is, in fact, a reentrance of the primal chaos from which 
goodness (creation) was called forth into existence. 
 Sin is an object. Sin is a spiritual substance. Sin is in need of soteriological 
excision. As seen in Chapter 3, this accounts for Balthasar’s reliance on the pharmakos-
influenced mystical realism of certain Pauline passages. The accumulated sin of the 
world though all time, in a surgical sense, is removed, transplanted into a host whose 
hypostatic conditions render him uniquely able to assume this deadly substance and 
take it away (“Take him away! Take him away!” - Jn 19:15), out of humanity, outside the 
city gates, outside the realm of the living, into his Descent, into the infinite, preexistent, 
distance of the kenosis between Persons in the Godhead: a distance, Balthasar never 
tires of telling us, which can contain all, and burn away any substance that cannot 
tolerate the radiant love of its consuming fire. 
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